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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MERRILYN SUSAN VARALLO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANCIS V. VARALLO, 
Defendant-Appellee. j 
Case No. 930574-CA 
Priority No. 15 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Comes now the Appellee, Francis V. Varallo, by and through his 
attorneys of record, W. Kevin Jackson and Douglas P. Hoyt, and 
respectfully submits the following appellate brief in this matter. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal and the 
cross-appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(i)(1994). 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff and a cross appeal by the 
defendant from a Decree of Divorce and Judgment entered by the 
Second District Court on August 11, 1993. (R. 187) . The defendant 
filed an objection to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and the Decree of Divorce on the 29th day of June, 1993. No 
post judgment motions were filed by either party. A notice of 
appeal was filed by the plaintiff on September 7, 1993. An amended 
notice of cross-appeal was filed by the defendant on September 24, 
1993. This court on it own motion consolidated the appeal and the 
cross-appeal by an order entered on the 12th day of November, 1993. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following four (4) issues are presented to this Court by 
the Appellant Merrilyn Susan Varallo (sometimes hereinafter 
referred to as the "plaintiff") on her direct ,appeal: 
1. Whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to an award of 
thirty percent (30%) of the defendant's (i.e. her husband's) 
disposable military retirement benefits. 
2. Whether or not income should be imputed to the defendant 
for purposes of computing alimony and child support. 
3. Whether or not the parties' twenty (20) year old son, 
Sean, is in need of continued child support. 
4. Who should be entitled to claim Sean as a dependant for 
federal and state income tax purposes. 
The following seven (7) issues are presented to this Court by 
Francis V. Varallo, also known as "Bob" Varallo (sometimes 
hereinafter referred to as the "defendant), on his cross appeal: 
1. Whether or not the District Court committed error by 
ordering the Defendant, Mr. Varallo, to pay alimony to the 
Plaintiff in the sum of $500.00 per month, given the earning 
capacity of Ms. Varallo and the fact that Mr. Varallo is currently 
retired from his military occupation and is not otherwise employed. 
2. Did the District Court commit error by dividing Mr. 
Varallo's retirement benefits and giving Ms. Varallo a 30% interest 
therein in light of the property division ordered by the court. 
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3. Did the District Court commit error in ordering Mr. 
Varallo to exercise his Survivor's Benefit Protection enrollment 
option to obtain the maximum coverage for Ms. Varallo and by 
ordering Mr. Varallo to pay all costs associated with the coverage. 
4. Did the District Court commit error by ordering Mr. 
Varallo to pay one-half (1/2) of all educational expenses of each 
of the parties7 children until each child attains the age of 22 
years without a specific finding of disability or other unusual 
dependency of the adult children. 
5. Did the District Court commit error by ordering Mr. 
Varallo to maintain unchanged his life insurance contracts with the 
present carrier in light of the facts of the case and the fact that 
the insurance company is currently in receivership. 
6. Whether or not the District Court committed error by not 
dividing the plaintiff's pension fund and a Bank of Scotland bond 
as part of the marital estate. 
7. Whether or not the state court has jurisdiction to divide 
any portion of the defendant's disability benefits. 
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
This Court has defined the standard of review for an appeal 
from a decree of divorce. The standard of review that this Court 
uses in resolving an appeal of a domestic matter is that the Court 
of Appeals will not disturb the findings of fact of the trial court 
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Burnham v. Burnham, 
716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986) . Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah 
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App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). This standard 
of review applies to cases involving alimony and property 
distribution, Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988), 
and child support, Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d 1055 (Utah App. 
1987). 
If it is alleged, on appeal, that the District Court made 
insufficient findings of fact, the District Court's findings of 
fact will be reversed "unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment.7" Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P. 2d 86 (Utah App. 
1988) citing Action v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) . 
Issues of law are reviewed by the Court under the correction 
of error standard with no special deference being given to the 
District Court's ruling on the law. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 
(Utah App. 1990), Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 
1991). 
V. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes for this appeal are as follows: 10 
USC §1408, which is set forth in addendum "A". 10 USC §1448, which 
is set forth in addendum "B". 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(i) reads as follows: 
11
 (2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: . . . 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
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annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; . . . " 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5(2) reads as follows: 
11
 (2) Income from earned income sources is limited to 
the equivalent of one full-time job." 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10 reads as follows: 
11
 (1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has 
graduated from high school during the child's normal and 
expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the 
base child support award is automatically reduced to 
reflect the lower base combined child support obligation 
shown in the table for the remaining number of children 
due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child 
support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child 
amount derived from the base child support award 
originally ordered." 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, The Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is made by reason of a divorce action filed by 
Plaintiff on or about the 21st day of August, 1992. (R. 1) . 
B. The Course of Proceedings: 
In this brief "Tr." refers to the trial transcript, with 
regard to the trial held on February 17 and 18, 1993; "R." refers 
to the Court's record of the case. 
On or about the 21st day of August, 1992, the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Merrilyn Susan Varallo, filed a verified complaint for a divorce in 
the Second Judicial District, County of Davis. The verified 
complaint sought a divorce from the defendant, Francis V. Varallo, 
an alimony award, the division of the marital property, the payment 
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of all marital debts by the defendant and the division of the 
defendant's military pension. A non-jury trial, on the merits of 
the case, was held before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, on February 
17th and 18th, 1993. When the Court rendered its decision it gave 
the plaintiff and the defendant two options as to the division of 
the marital estate and the payment of the alimony. 
The first option presented by the District Court and rejected 
by the plaintiff during the trial was to divide the marital estate 
which would include the defendant's retirement payments and his 
disability income or benefits. The plaintiff would receive thirty 
percent (30%) of the defendant's retirement benefits in the amount 
of $1,267.50 per month. (Tr. 186) . The plaintiff would then have 
to pay alimony to the defendant in the amount of $850.00 per month. 
The second option presented by the District Court provided 
that Mr. Varallo would increase the Survivor Benefits Plan 
(hereinafter "SBP") to the maximum level available and he would pay 
the monthly cost of the plan or election. Mr. Varallo would then 
pay the plaintiff $500.00 per month in alimony. (Tr. 187) . The 
plaintiff choose the second option presented by the District Court. 
(Tr. 193) . The defendant agreed to this option based upon the 
plaintiff's decision rather than allowing the court to make the 
decision and taking the decision away from the parties. 
On or about the 11th day of August, 1993 the Court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce. 
In the Findings of Fact the trial court specifically found that 
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Sean Varallo, the son of the parties, does not have any special 
needs which warrant ongoing custody and support. The court found 
that the plaintiff's gross income was in the sum of $3,242.00 per 
month and the defendant's gross income was $4,225.00 per month. 
Based upon these findings on the parties' respective income the 
District Court ordered the defendant to pay child support, 
according the guidelines which were then in effect, to the 
plaintiff in the amount of $401.86 per month. 
The District Court further found that the defendant was 
capable of being gainfully employed notwithstanding his proven 
military disability rating. The court recognized that the 
defendant would probably be unable to find employment at a salary 
comparable to his previous salary while he was working with Unisys 
and that his prospects for employment may depend on obtaining 
vocational training. 
The court found that the plaintiff was in need of spousal 
support and the defendant was ordered to pay $500.00 per month in 
alimony to the plaintiff. The court further found that the 
defendant should pay the plaintiff the sum of $4,250 to reinstate 
the plaintiff's retirement fund with the federal government. The 
District Court did not divide the plaintiff's pension benefits as 
part of the marital estate. 
The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to thirty 
percent (30%) of the Defendant's gross military retirement in the 
amount of $1,267.50 per month. The court allowed the parties the 
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decision to increase the SBP to the maximum level in lieu of the 
3 0% award of gross retirement payments with the defendant paying 
the monthly costs of the plan. 
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The defendant attended college at Loyola University in 
1958 and obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in Humanities. 
2. The defendant successfully completed Reserve Officer 
Training Corp while attending college. Upon his graduating from 
college and ROTC the defendant was commissioned a Second Lieutenant 
in the United States Army during the month of February, 1958. 
3. The defendant was periodically advanced in rank during 
the time of his military service and held the rank of major when he 
married the plaintiff. (Tr. 86). 
4. The defendant had been an active member of the military 
for over 12 years prior to the date the parties were married. 
(Tr. 86). 
5. The parties were legally and lawfully married on June 26, 
1970 in Washington D.C. 
6. The plaintiff was working as a government employee at 
the U.S. Census Bureau when the parties were married. The 
plaintiff obtained a job with the United States Army shortly after 
the parties were married. (Tr. 86). 
7. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would quit her job 
with the government and devote her time to the keeping of the 
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marital residence and the raising of the children of the marriage. 
(Tr. 7). 
8. During the course of the marriage the defendant was 
involved in military intelligence and in other sensitive and covert 
operations throughout the world. (Tr. 84). 
9. The plaintiff was not employed outside of the home until 
some time late in 1987 when she voluntarily began working for the 
Defense Nuclear Agency. (Tr. 49). She then took a job with the 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation in the month of 
January, 1990. (Tr. 31). The plaintiff was still gainfully 
employed by the Department of the Interior at the time of the 
trial. 
10. The plaintiff voluntarily made the decision to return to 
full time work. The plaintiff expressed her happiness that the 
defendant was able to care for the children at the time the 
defendant left the work force. (Tr. 31). 
11. Three (3) children have been born as of issue to the 
parties during the course of the marriage, TO WIT: Valerie Jean, 
born January 18, 1972 now age 22, Sean Thomas, born August 17, 
1974 now age 2 0 and Cara Noel, born December 21, 1977, now age 16 
and who is the only minor child of the marriage. 
12. The son of the parties, Sean Thomas Varallo, is currently 
living with the plaintiff and plans to return to school to obtain 
his high school diploma. Sean testified at trial that if he 
decides to apply himself he can succeed at anything. (Tr. 153-4). 
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13. Sean has an above average I.Q. and received an award for 
being the most improved student in Bountiful Junior High School. 
(Tr. 150) . 
14. Sean testified that he has no physical or psychological 
impairment that would prevent him from pursuing a career or an 
appropriate profession. (Tr. 147-150). 
15. Sean has also considered leaving the residence of the 
plaintiff and living with the defendant. The issue of his 
permanent residency has not been resolved at this time and the 
Court did not make an order involving his living with either 
parent. (Tr. 154). 
16. The defendant has retired from the United States Army 
after having served in this occupation for approximately thirty 
(30) years. He received an honorable discharge when he retired 
from the United State Army. The defendant, by and through his 
military service, has retirement benefits available to him. He 
retired in or about 1988. 
17. The defendant also receives a monthly disability benefit 
due to a physical disability he incurred while serving in the army. 
(Tr. 28). 
18. The defendant is paid $4,225.00 per month in combined 
retirement benefits and disability benefits. 
19. The defendant also has the option of purchasing a 
Survivors Benefit Plan that would pay the plaintiff 55% of the 
defendant's gross monthly retirement payments for the remainder of 
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the plaintiff's life. The plan is optional and can only be entered 
into by the defendant. Pursuant to the second option provided by 
the trial court the defendant has obtained the maximum coverage for 
the plaintiff. 
20. The total amount of the Survivor's Benefit Plan allowed 
to be paid to the plaintiff will be reduced to 35% of the 
defendant's retirement benefits if and when the plaintiff utilizes 
the defendant's Social Security benefits which consist of payments 
directly to the plaintiff of approximately $1,300.00 per month when 
the defendant claims any Social Security benefits. (Tr. 180). 
21. The plaintiff was awarded the custody of the minor child, 
Cara, and was awarded child support in the amount of $410.86 per 
month from the defendant. (Tr. 202). 
22. The defendant was ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of each 
child's educational expenses. These additional payments were to 
continue until each child reached the age of 22 years. These 
amounts are in addition to the court ordered child support. (Tr. 
203) . 
23. The plaintiff was awarded the following property by the 
trial court: 
Item Value 
Pentagon Federal Credit Union Account $32,572.00 
Riggs National Bank account 1,000.00 
America First Credit Union Account 8,000.00 
Chase Manhattan Account 3,133.00 
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Proceeds from the sale of the parties7 
Virginia home 143,541.00 
TOTAL $188,246.00. 
The plaintiff was awarded all of the property she received as an 
inheritance from her mother, even though all monies from the 
inheritance were not segregated from the other assets of the 
marital estate. (Tr. 203-204) . The amount of the inheritance was 
determined to be $56,536.88 and consisted of a $15,000.00 bond with 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, $15,000.00 equity in the Petroleum 
Technologies Corporation, $5,261.98 in the Vanguard Money Market 
Fund and $21,274.90 in the Dreyfus Money Market Fund. (Plaintiff's 
Trail Exhibit No. 1) . The Royal Bank of Scotland Bond is currently 
held in a joint account with Susan Varallo and Bob Varallo being 
the holders of the bond. (Tr. 20) . The bond was held in a joint 
account because the broker did not have a pay on death option when 
the account was initially opened. Id. 
24. The defendant was awarded the following property by the 
court: 
Item Value 
Pentagon Federal Credit Union account $13,733.00 
Union Bank of Switzerland account 97,797.00 
Army National Bank account 3 0,000.00 
Miscellaneous securities 2,000.00 
Proceeds from the sale of the parties' 
Virginia home 45,659 . 00 
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TOTAL $189,225.00. 
(Tr. 203-204). 
25. The plaintiff makes $3,242 per month in gross pay from 
her employment with the United States Government. The defendant 
makes $4,225 per month in retirement pay and disability benefits. 
The defendant's military retirement pay is $3,734 per month and the 
disability benefit is $491.00 per month. (Tr. 194). 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Under Utah law a party is awarded alimony after the court 
applies a three (3) part test. This test was announced in Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) . The three (3) parts of this test 
are: 
A. The financial conditions and needs of the spouse; 
B. The ability of the spouse to produce a sufficient income 
for himself or herself; and 
C. The ability of the other spouse to provide support. 
This Court held in Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333 that: 
"An alimony award should, to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living 
standards and maintain them at a level as close as 
possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. . . . Failure to consider these factors 
constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion." 
The trial court erred by awarding the plaintiff alimony in 
this case and abused its discretion by failing to consider and 
apply the above three (3) factors when the court entered its order 
of alimony. The trial court erred in failing to include the 
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plaintiff's separate sources of income in the court's assessment of 
the plaintiff's financial situation, the award of the alimony and 
the requirement of the payment of child support beyond age 18. 
2 . The trial court erred when it ordered the division of the 
gross amount of the military retirement benefits and disability 
benefits which are being paid to the defendant/appellee. The trial 
court ordered that 3 0% of the gross amount be awarded to the 
plaintiff/appellant. In interpreting the federal law, the United 
States Supreme Court clearly held that a state court order can only 
divide the retiree's "net" retirement pay. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 
US 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989). The state District 
Court failed to apply the governing federal law which is setforth 
in 10 USC §1408. Disability benefits are not subject to any 
division by the state courts. 
3. The trial court cannot impute income to the defendant to 
determine the amount of alimony or child support obligations. The 
trial court must base its award of alimony upon the factors that 
are presented at the time of the trial and cannot speculate on 
future employment or the possibility of future income. See Rudman 
v. Rudman, 812 P. 2d 73 (Utah App. 1991) . No evidence was presented 
to the trial court concerning the defendant's ability or 
opportunity for future employment and the court found that such 
earnings would require additional training in any event. 
4. The trial court also erred when it ordered the defendant 
to provide the maximum coverage available under the Survivors 
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Benefit Plan. The member of the military and their spouse are the 
proper persons to decide if the spouse or children should be 
covered by the SBP and not the trial Court. See 10 USC 
§1448 (a) (3) . A state court may order participation in the plan but 
may not order a specific level of participation. In this case the 
parties agreed that the defendant would provide a minimum amount of 
coverage under the SBP and not the maximum amount available. 
5. The trial court's decision with respect to the issues of 
the level of child support for the minor child and the tax 
deduction allowed to the defendant for Sean Varallo should be 
upheld. 
6. The trial court erred with respect to the issues of the 
payment of additional educational expenses for the adult children 
of the parties when no specific need for the education or training 
was shown. 
7. It was error for the trial court to order the defendant 
to maintain all present insurance policies inasmuch as the 
insurance companies were no longer financially secure and it would 
be imprudent for the defendant to maintain those insurance policies 
when alternative carriers are available. 
8. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
order defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $4,250.00 for 
reinstatement of the plaintiff's retirement plan while failing to 
divide said retirement plan according to the Woodward formula. See 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 1431 (Utah 1982) . No findings were 
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made as to how the court offset or considered this asset when 
dividing the defendant's benefits. 
9. The Bank of Scotland Bond should be divided equally 
between the parties as part of the marital estate even though the 
plaintiff received the bond through an inheritance. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
the plaintiff alimony. 
The trial court did not sufficiently or properly determine the 
plaintiff's need for spousal support in the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The law in Utah states that the trial court 
must take into consideration the following: (1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the recipient's 
ability to provide her own income, and (3) the payor spouse's 
ability to provide the necessary or desired level or support. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), Cox v. Cox, 242 
Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1994) . The District Court entered 
findings of fact on the first two (2) parts of this, test but never 
made any determinations about the defendant's ability to pay 
support to the plaintiff. (tr. 198). The District Court did not 
enter sufficient findings of facts concerning the plaintiff's need 
for support. It made no determination as to the needs of the 
defendant and his ability to earn income in excess of a minimal 
standard of living for himself. 
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The District Court simply stated that the plaintiff should be 
awarded $500.00 per month in alimony. No specific findings of fact 
as to the plaintiff's need for spousal support were entered by the 
court. A general finding was entered stating that the plaintiff is 
in need of support to maintain the standard of living which the 
parties enjoyed while they were married. The District Court made 
a general finding as to the monthly expenses of the parties. The 
court did not make any findings of the plaintiff's ability to 
provide support for herself with the monthly income she was found 
to be earning. Nor did the District Court take into consideration 
the parties' financial condition from other monetary sources, such 
as the plaintiff's income from her investments. 
The District Court found that the plaintiff was making 
$3,643.42 per month with reasonable living expenses of $2,496.00 
per month. The defendant was found to be making $4,475.00 per 
month from the retirement benefits he receives from the United 
States Army and the defendant's monthly living expenses were 
determined to be $2,300.00 per month. (Tr. 195) The plaintiff 
thus has a net income of $1,147.42 per month and the defendant has 
a net income, before alimony and child support, of $2,175.0 0 per 
month. The District Court ordered the defendant to pay child 
support in the amount of $401.86 per month and alimony of $500.00 
per month thus leaving him with $1,273.14 per month in net income. 
The plaintiff would then have net income per month of $2,049.28. 
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. 86 
Source of income Plaintiff 
Gross monthly income 3,643.42 
less expenses 2 , 496.00 
subtotal 1,147.42 
alimony + 500.00 
subtotal 1,647.42 
child support + 401.86 
NET MONTHLY INCOME 2,04 9.28 1,273.14. 
Additionally, the defendant was ordered to pay the costs associated 
with providing Survivor's Benefit Plan at the maximum rate in lieu 
of paying the plaintiff 30% of the defendant's net retirement pay. 
It is clear that the plaintiff is in a much better financial 
position than the defendant, after the District Court entered its 
order of support. This award also is based on an erroneous 
premises that the court had the right and ability to divide 
disability benefits of the defendant. 
Any finding of fact that the a spouse is in need of support 
should be specific enough for this court to properly review the 
District Court's analysis and computation of the award. This Court 
has stated that " [f ] indings are adequate only if they are 
'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual 
issue was reached.'" Action, 737 P.2d at 999 (Utah 1987), quoting 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979). The District Court 
failed to make adequate findings of fact to support the decision to 
award alimony to the plaintiff. The findings of fact are not 
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specific enough to show how the court came to its ultimate 
conclusion to award alimony to the plaintiff and the amount 
thereof. 
This Court needs to be able to review the findings of the 
District Court in order to make a proper decision on appeal. To 
properly review the District Court's decision to award alimony 
sufficient findings of fact should have been entered that would 
show this Court how the District Court made its decision. No such 
findings of fact were entered by the District Court. 
The District Court did not address the important fact that the 
plaintiff has approximately $57,000.00 in liquid assets or near 
liquid assets, as valued at the time of the trial, from an 
inheritance from her mother's estate and its earnings potential. 
The plaintiff was further awarded one-half (1/2) of the marital 
estate which is valued at approximately $188,246.00 in liquid 
assets. The Defendant had approximately the same amount from the 
marital estate awarded to him in the Decree of Divorce. The 
plaintiff has a greater amount of assets available to her for her 
benefit than does the defendant. 
The plaintiff did not prove that she was in need of spousal 
support from the defendant. However, this court cannot properly 
review this determination because the District Court did not enter 
the specific findings of fact that would allow this court to 
properly review the matter. 
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The issue of spousal support should be returned to the 
District Court so that adequate findings of fact may be made as to 
the plaintiff's actual need for continuing support from the 
defendant and his ability to provide the same. 
B. The plaintiff should not be entitled to thirty 
percent of Bob's disposable retirement benefits. 
The plaintiff argues that she should also be entitled to 
thirty (30%) percent of the defendant's disposable retirement 
income. This would amount to a lump sum payment to the plaintiff 
of $185,058.00 or a monthly payment to the plaintiff from the 
defendant of $1,028.00. See Appellant's brief at page 17. The 
state District Court failed to properly address this issue in its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The District Court found that the plaintiff should have been 
awarded thirty percent (30%) of the defendant's gross retirement 
pay. The United State Supreme Court has held that only the "net" 
or "disposable" retirement pay of United States Military personnel 
can be divided in a Decree of Divorce. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589, 
101 S.Ct. at 2028. The Supreme Court found that the definition for 
"disposable" pay is contained directly in the language of 10 USC 
§1408 (a) (4). This section of the United States Code reads as 
follows: 
"The term "disposable retired pay" means the total 
monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less 
amounts which 
(A) are owed by that member to the United States 
for previous overpayments of retired pay and for 
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recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to 
retired pay; 
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such other 
member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered 
by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver of retired 
pay required by law in order to receive compensation 
under title 5 or title 38; 
(C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay 
under chapter 61 of this title [10 USC §§1201 et seq.], 
are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member 
under that chapter computed using the percentage of the 
member's disability on the date when the member was 
retired (or the date on which the members' name was 
placed on the temporary disability retired list); or 
(D) are deducted because of an election under 
chapter 73 of this title [10 USC §§1431 et seq.] to 
provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom 
payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is 
being made pursuant to a court order under his section." 
The District Court erroneously ordered that the plaintiff 
receive thirty percent (30%) of the defendant's gross retirement 
pay. The plaintiff is only entitled to a portion of the 
defendant's disposable retirement pay, if any. The District Court 
failed to make any findings of fact as to what the net pay of the 
defendant would be when all lawful deductions are taken out of the 
gross retirement pay and the defendant's disability benefits are 
excluded from the monthly income and analysis. 
The plaintiff argues that the expert introduced at trial gave 
an accurate life expectancy for the defendant based upon the 
actuarial tables used by the plaintiff's expert. The District 
Court found that the method used by the plaintiff's expert was too 
speculative to accurately determine a present value of the 
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defendant's retirement fund. The District Court is correct in this 
determination. The retirement fund for the defendant will end upon 
the defendant's death. See 10 USC §1408 (d)(4). This makes the 
present value of the defendant's retirement fund too speculative to 
determine at any point in time. The proper way to determine the 
present value of any income stream, such as the defendant's 
military retirement fund, is to know exactly how long the income 
stream lasts. It is impossible to determine the present value of 
an income stream when it is unknown how long the income stream will 
last. If the income stream lasts one period longer or one period 
shorter than the amount of time used to determine the present value 
of the income stream, the value of the income stream is different 
than what it was originally determined to be. 
If the defendant dies then the value of the retirement 
benefits is nothing. If the defendant lives for a period of time 
longer than the time period used by the expert witness then the 
present value is greater than what the plaintiff's expert estimated 
it to be. It is too uncertain to determine a present value of the 
defendant's retirement income at this or any time in the future. 
If the District Court had ordered a lump sum payment of the 
retirement income, as estimated by the plaintiff's expert witness, 
it is almost a certainty that one party would be harmed by either 
receiving an award that is too small in terms of the actual value 
of the retirement benefits or would be paying out too much of the 
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marital estate to fulfill the court's order to divide the 
defendant's retirement fund. 
The District Court determined that one way to solve this 
problem would be to provide the plaintiff a type of retirement fund 
by having the defendant provide the maximum amount available in the 
survivor's benefit plan. This way the plaintiff forgoes receiving 
a portion of the defendant's retirement plan at the present time in 
order to receive a secured income for the beneficiary upon the 
death of the defendant. When the defendant dies the plaintiff will 
receive survivor benefits for the remainder of her lifetime. This 
benefit will only decrease if the plaintiff begins to take social 
security benefits due to her from the defendant's work history. An 
offset does not occur for her own earned social security benefits. 
The plaintiff is actually gaining financial security in the long 
run because she will receive the secured income rather than a 
portion of the defendant's retirement fund that will end at the 
death of the defendant. 
The District Court determined that a more equitable solution 
would be found in one of the two options presented by the court to 
the parties. The parties both finally choose the option where the 
plaintiff would forego the thirty percent of the defendant's net 
retirement pay and have the defendant provide the maximum 
survivors' benefit plan available. The defendant was ordered to 
pay for the costs of increasing the survivor's benefit plan in lieu 
of paying the plaintiff thirty percent of the retirement fund. The 
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court also ordered the defendant to pay $500.00 per month in 
alimony to the plaintiff as part of this option. 
The defendant, by providing the maximum survivor's benefits 
available, is providing a type of retirement benefit for the 
plaintiff. This is an equitable and fair resolution by the 
District Court to the problem of the division of the defendant's 
retirement fund. 
The District Court acted properly in allowing the defendant to 
provide the plaintiff with the maximum survivor's benefit plan, 
which provides for the plaintiff's future needs, instead of 
ordering the defendant to pay thirty percent of the net retirement 
benefits. The District Court's order should be upheld by this 
Court and the defendant should keep the survivor's benefit plan at 
the current level. 
C. Income for purposes of alimony and child support 
should not be imputed to the Defendant. 
The plaintiff argues that the District Court should have 
imputed income to the defendant in an amount at least equal to the 
plaintiff's monthly income. The plaintiff's assertion of this 
argument is wholly unsupported by the evidence. The plaintiff 
relies upon Olson v. Olson, 704 P. 2d 564 (Utah 1985) and Osauthorpe 
v. Osguthorpe, 804 P. 2d 530 (Utah App. 1990) in her argument to say 
that the District Court should have imputed income to the 
defendant. The plaintiff relies upon the statements made in these 
decisions that historical income should be used by the court when 
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making an award of alimony. The cases cited by the plaintiff can 
easily be distinguished from this case. 
The Olson court found that the defendant had a total lack of 
income even though he was working. This finding by the District 
Court allowed the court to impute income to the defendant for the 
determination of the alimony and child support awards. The 
Osauthorpe case imputed income to the defendant because the 
District Court found that the defendant was either overpaid when he 
began his career or was underpaid at the time of the trial. Again, 
the court made a specific finding as to why income should be 
imputed to the defendant in awarding alimony and child support. In 
this case the District Court has not made any findings of fact as 
to why any income should be imputed to the defendant. Neither did 
the plaintiff introduce any evidence at the trial that would allow 
the District Court to impute income to the defendant for any 
purpose. 
The District Court found that the defendant received a monthly 
income in the form of a military retirement and disability income. 
The District Court also found that the defendant was unemployed. 
There were no findings that would support the District Court's 
imputing income to the defendant. 
This Court has stated that "... the trial court must make 
adequate factual findings on all material issues unless the facts 
in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment.'" Rudman, 812 P.2d at 
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76. There were no findings of fact by the court as to the 
defendant's ability or opportunity to obtain employment comparable 
to what he had or enjoyed in the military or with Unisys. There 
were no findings of fact that would support the court in imputing 
income to the defendant. 
The District Court's finding that the defendant was receiving 
a retirement benefit and a disability benefit was sufficient for 
the court to award alimony based upon these sources of income. The 
plaintiff's appeal does not take into account Utah Code Annotated 
§78-45-7.5(2). This section states that for child support purposes 
income from earned income sources is to be limited to the 
equivalent of one full-time job. The defendant's retirement pay 
should be considered the equivalent of one full-time job for 
purposes of computing child support. The defendant's retirement 
income from the military is sufficient income to base an alimony 
and child support award on. The disability income should be 
considered a separate source of income. The District Court used 
the combined retirement fund amount to base the award of support 
on. The District Court acted improperly in using this amount for 
the support award. This Court should uphold the District Court's 
decision, except for including the disability benefit amount as part 
of the defendant's monthly income used to determine the child 
support award, and not impute any income to the defendant. 
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D. The District Court's order for maximum coverage 
under the Survivor's Benefit Plan should be overturned. 
The trial court also erred when it ordered the defendant to 
provide the maximum coverage available under the Survivors Benefit 
Plan. The Court lacks the proper power to make an order of this 
type under 10 USC §1448(a) (3) (A) . The member of the military and 
their spouse are the proper persons to decide if the spouse or 
children should be covered by the SBP and at what level the 
coverage should be at, not the trial Court. It could be argued 
that a court may order participation in the plan but it may not 
order a specific level of participation. The federal law is set up 
so that the payor and the payor's spouse determine what the 
coverage amount should be. Congress' intent is shown in 10 USC 
§1448(a) (3) (A), which reads as follows: 
"A married person who is eligible to provide a 
standard annuity may not without the concurrence of the 
person's spouse elect--
(i) not to participate in the Plan; 
(ii) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse 
at less than the maximum level; or 
(iii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child 
but not for the person's spouse." 
The parties in this case agreed that the defendant would 
provide a minimum amount of coverage under the SBP and not the 
maximum amount available. (Tr. 27). This agreement is in accord 
with the provisions of the Survivor's Benefit Plan as it was 
enacted by Congress. The defendant should not have been ordered by 
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the District Court to provide the maximum amount of coverage when 
the parties had already agreed that the defendant would provide a 
different amount of coverage for the plaintiff. The District 
Court's order regarding the Survivor's Benefit Plan should be 
reversed and the parties original agreement for coverage should be 
given full credit. This was a bargained for consideration by the 
parties which should not be disturbed on appeal. 
E. The trial court's decision with respect 
to the issues of child support and the tax 
deduction allowed to the defendant 
for Sean Varallo should be upheld. 
The District Court found that Sean Varallo is not a dependant 
for purposes of child support needs. (Tr. 194). Sean Varallo was 
examined by Dr. Chris Wale, a clinical psychologist who was called 
to testify on behalf of the plaintiff. Dr. Wale testified that 
Sean had an auditory processing difficulty with some difficulties 
in verbal expression and with his memory. (Tr. 119) . Dr. Wale 
further testified that Sean might have trouble with self-motivation 
and would be a good candidate for "vocational rehabilitation." Dr. 
Wale did not know for certain what Sean's motivational level is. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued that there was no other evidence to show 
that Sean was not in need of further support from his father. 
However, this argument is unsupported by the evidence presented at 
the time of trial. 
Sean Varallo testified at the trial that he does not have any 
physical disabilities. He did testify that he has an audio 
-28-
auditor V iiscnmin.:" . :: * -;-r a::e~r,- rh- > -.v he hears and the way 
• ] !: . -
testified that ,- thought :i- -;uic ae- ir ;r :ie were --ni^ed -...v. 
into ~~- \^-r" ' H-' - " <= - ^^^-ifiec "h^* he can be higiily m u L i v v ^a 
once hp. ran do a good ^ b _ •_ i^ 
made up his mind to do so. (Tr. 153-154). Sean has held jobs 
t j i e p a s t a n (j j.ias enjoyed those jobs. (Tr, 3 <;. S-
competent to testify about his physical condition and testified 
that he did not: have any physical impairment that would stop him 
from obta :i ning a h igl :i school degree : i a j DI: Tl: i :i s test:! mony :i s :i n 
direct conflict to Dr. Wale's testimony. 
The District Court found that there was no need to order 
:ioi it: i n id Jig cl :i i I d suppor t: f :>:i : Sea i i \i ai a ] ] :>. There were no 
demonstrated special circumstances that w< *>i require support 
payments to continue beyond the statutory p e n u u lor / •• . -.h i ch 
ends when a child, reaches the age of eighteen years
 w-e-- Utah Code 
Annotated §78 4 5 7.1! 0 (1) . 
The Disti i ct: G ::n irt nn ist ma k:e spec: fi c fi nd ii lgs of fact a s tr :> 
the need of the chil d for continued supper : : L, ; .:.^  pai^nrs, V..-
District Court must: make specific finding.- . r ^ s t - ustify -i:: 
order of chi] d si ipp> Dirt c o n t i in ii i lg . - . -. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Uta*. . ;-.„ :T> in-.. 
has the power to order continuing child support bey-.c =3T- eighteen 
whei e ,l"1 exd gent i:i rcumstances ex:i st: - o . -J -
support of dependant children rather than allowing them to become 
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dependant on the State." Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1978) . The evidence considered in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff does not suggest the child will be dependant on the 
state. 
In this case the District Court specifically found that Sean 
Varallo is not a dependant for child support purposes. (Tr. 194) . 
This finding by the court is specific enough for this court to 
properly review this determination under the standard of review 
stated above. No abuse of discretion has been committed by the 
District Court when it entered its findings on this issue. The 
District Court referred to the testimony of the parties, Sean 
Varallo and the psychologist to properly make the findings of fact 
in support of this decision. 
The plaintiff argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in allowing the defendant the tax deduction for Sean 
Varallo as a dependant. The plaintiff urges this Court to overturn 
the District Court's decision and allow the plaintiff the tax 
deduction. The plaintiff relies upon Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d 232, 
239, (Utah App. 1990) cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), to 
say that the plaintiff should be allowed the tax deduction for Sean 
because under the Motes decision the tax deduction should be given 
to the parent who provides the "majority of support for the child." 
The plaintiff maintains that she is providing virtually all of 
the support for Sean. She conveniently forgets to inform this 
Court that the defendant is providing the majority of support for 
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the minor daughter, Cara, who is still receiving child support fi om, 
the defendant IJn ier t:l le Motes i ati ona] the defendant si lould 1: e 
given the tax deduction for the minor daughter because he is paying 
the majority of the support under the order of the District Court. 
• • : i lit C : 'i n t: foi ind the defer idant: w 01; 1] d be ei it it led to the tax 
deduction for one child and the plaintiff would be entitled to the 
tax deduction for the two other children. See Findings of Fact 
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F. The District Court erred when it ordered the 
defendant to pay one-half of the education 
expenses for the children of the marriage 
until each child reaches the age of 
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court to modify this statutory law the court must make specific and 
detailed findings of fact supporting its financial determinations. 
"Findings are adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Action, 
737 P. 2d at 999. The District Court made the finding that each 
parent was committed to the education of the children. See 
Findings of Fact No. 14. Based solely upon this finding the Court 
ordered each parent to pay one-half of the educational expenses for 
each child. Specifically, the parties were to pay for Valerie 
Varallo to complete the requirements for her degree at Westminster 
College, a private school. See Findings of Fact No. 14. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that it is improper for 
a court to compel a parent to assist a child in securing a college 
education. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1978) . The 
Ferguson Court went on to say that a trial court may make such an 
order if some unusual circumstance exists. The Ferguson court did 
not list any such unusual circumstances as an example that would 
allow this type of order. No such facts exist in this case. 
The District Court committed error in its order because the 
law states that support, including support so that the child may 
obtain a college education, for a child ends when the child reaches 
his or her majority. The District Court abused its discretion in 
making this order. The order of continuing support for education 
should be overturned by this court and the support order should 
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reflect the law of Utah and have the support terminate when each 
child reaches the age of majority. 
G It was error for the District Court to order 
the defendant to maintain insurance 
policies with an insurance company 
in receivership. 
The District C :i)urt ordered the defendant to maintain the life 
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held that if the company winch holds the 1Lte insurance policies 
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H. The District Court abused its discretion 
when it ordered the defendant to pay one-half 
of the cost of restoring the plaintiff's 
retirement plan without also dividing the 
retirement plan as marital property. 
The District Court ordered that all marital property be 
divided equally between the parties. The District Court also 
ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $4,250.00 
so that the plaintiff could reinstate her government employee's 
retirement fund. However, the Court did not order the division of 
the plaintiff's retirement fund as marital property. It also did 
not determine how must the plaintiff's retirement benefits were 
accrued prior to the marriage. 
When a court makes a division of marital property in a divorce 
the court may take into consideration all of the pertinent 
circumstances to the property. The Court in Woodward stated that 
these circumstances "encompass all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever 
source derived; and that this includes any such pension fund or 
insurance." Woodward, 656 P. 2d at 432. The plaintiff's retirement 
fund was obtained from her employment with the federal government 
while the parties were married. (Tr. 7-8) . The portion of her 
retirement fund that was earned while the parties were married 
should have been included in the marital estate for division by the 
District Court. 
The District Court abused its discretion when it failed to 
properly divide this asset of the marriage. This Court should 
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return the case to the trial court so that the trial court can 
properly divide the retirement fund according to the Woodward 
criteria. 
I The Bank of Scotland Bond should be divided 
equally between the parties as part of the 
marital estate. 
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Decree of Divorce. The plaintiff did not segregate these funds 
from those of the marital estate. If she had intended to do so she 
would have bought the bond in her name alone. The trial court 
abused its discretion in not including the Bank of Scotland Bond 
with the marital estate. This Court should remand this issue to 
the trial court to make the findings of fact necessary to include 
the bond in the marital estate and to divide the proceeds from the 
bond equally between the parties. 
J. The District court does not have jurisdiction to 
divide the defendant's disablitv benefits 
as part of the marital estate. 
Under the Act, the state court is still prohibited from 
dividing any portion of retirement pay that a veteran waives in 
order to receive disability compensation. Disability benefits of 
a veteran are separate property that can not be divided by the 
state court. In Re: Stenauist 582 P.2d 96 (Calif. 1978). The 
District Court divided the defendant's total monthly benefits, 
including the disability benefits the defendant receives. 
The District court committed an error when it included the 
disability benefits as part of the defendant's monthly divisible 
income. This Court should return the issue of the defendant's 
monthly income to the District court for a determination of the 
amount that is divisible for support purposes. 
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X CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE the defendant in this matter respectfully requests 
that: . : 
r:.:. *" " ' h~- ~; strict Court the issue of alimony i n 
order for that couii to peio.^ determine if alimony should be 
paid ..her oartv ace-.: :..na to t-he Jones analysis; 
B. Direct the District Court to amend the Decree of Divorce 
£ Q conform the division of the def»jn< lai ii ' :: i ^f i r^Tn^nt ini'ume t : tl le 
current law; 
C. Deny the plaintiff's demand that income be imputed to the 
defendant s : • that tl le plai nt : • ha « = - eater amount • :: f 
a] imony and child support; 
D Overturn the District Court's order for the defendant ' 
obtazi i i and pa;\, f :: :i : tl le n: ta :;: :::i i i: n IIII ] e v e] • of the Sui: v i v 0:1 : s Bei lef it: Pi an 
available to the defendant; 
E. Uphold the District Court's order allowing the defendant 
the tax deduction for Sean Varallo and not having the defendant pay 
child support to the plaintiff for Sean; 
p^ Overturn the District court's oxuer c: av-ient for the 
college educational expenses for the parties ch: ire:;; 
G. 0verturn the District Court' s •: ;i~ r zhar. •; he def endant 
nia intai i i :ii ns i irance coverage v • • e - *ipan^ / i i 1 
conservatorship; 
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H. Return the issue of the division of the marital property 
to the District Court to make a full division of marital property 
including the plaintiff's pension fund; and 
I. Return the issue of the Bank of Scotland Bond to the 
District Court so that proper findings of fact as to the bond being 
marital property can be entered by the court. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
? 
W. 2CEVINT JACKSON 
&> y^A^^ ,fay& 
DOUGLAS P. HOYT 
Attorneys for Defendant-Cross Appellant 
VARA-APP.BRF 
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Adaendum "A." 
10 USC 1408 
Ill 11 ill., i «i) II4IJ/ G E N . M I L . L A W — P E R S O N N E L 
36 months (whether or not consecutive) of active duty as a membei of a 
uniformed service. 
(Added Sept. 8, 198U, P. L. 96-342, Title VIII, § 813(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1100; 
Dec. 12, 1980, P. L. 96-513, Title I, § 113(c), Title V, Part A, §501(21), 
Part B, § 511(53), 94 Stat 2877, 2908, 2925.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1980. Act Dec. 12, 1980 (effective upon enactment on 12/12/80, as 
provided by § 701(b)(3) of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 101 
note), in subsec. (a)(1), substituted "after September 7, 1980" for "on 
or after the date of the enactment of the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act, 1981". 
Such Act further (effective 9/15/81, as provided by § 701(a) of such 
Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 101 note), in subsec. (b)(4) inserted 
"633, 634, 635, 636, 1251,"; in subsec. (d)(1) substituted "or 6383" for 
"6381, 6383, 6390, 6394, 6396, 6398, or 6400". 
Other provisions: 
Effective date of 1980 amendment. Act Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513, 
Title VII, § 701(a), 94 Stat. 2955, provided that the amendment made 
to this section "shall take effect on September 15, 1981", except as 
provided in § 701(b)(1) of such Act Dec. 12, 1980, which appears as 10 
USCS § 101 note. 
CROSS REFERENCES: 
This section is referred to in 10 USCS §§ 1401, 1402, 1402a, 3991, 3992, 
6151, 6322, 6323, 6325, 6326, 6330, 6383, 8991, 8992; 14 USCS §423; 33 
USCS § 853o; 42 USCS §§ 211, 212. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Erroneous payments of basic pay are not limited to basic pay service member was legally 
includable in computation of service member's entitled to receive. (1983) 62 Op Comp Gen p 
retirement pay base; provision that retired pay 157. 
base is computed on basic pay *""i eceived" is 
§ 1408, Payment compliance 
court orders 
(a) In this section: 
(1) "Court" means— 
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American 
Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 
28 [28 USCS § 451]) having competent jurisdiction; and 
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(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country with 
which the United States has an agreement requiring the United States 
to honor any court order of such country. 
(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annul-
ment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, 
or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a 
final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce, 
dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, 
or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued 
decree), which— 
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that 
court; 
(B) provides for— 
(i) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 662(b)) [42 USCS § 662(b)]); 
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(c)) [42 USCS § 662(c)]); or 
(iii) division of property (including a division of community prop-
erty); and 
(C) in the case of a division of property, specifically provides for the 
payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of 
disposable retired or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or 
retainer pay of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that 
member. 
(3) "Final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken 
or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for 
taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a 
decree from which timely appeal has been taken and such appeal has 
been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
(4) "Disposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly retired 
or retainer pay to which a member is entitled (other than the retired pay 
of a member retired for disability under chapter 61 of this title [10 
USCS §§ 1201 et seq.]) less amounts which— 
(A) are owed by that member to the United States; 
(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or 
retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures ordered 
by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts waived in 
order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38 [5 USCS §§101 
et seq.; 38 USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; 
(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax 
purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is authorized or re-
quired by law and to the extent such amounts withheld are not 
greater than would be authorized if such member claimed all depen-
dents to which he was entitled; 
(D) are withheld under section 3402(f) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3402(i)) [26 USCS § 3402(i)] if such member 
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presents evidence of a tax obligation which supports such withhold-
ing; 
(E) are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not includ-
ing amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or 
(F) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title 
[10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] to provide an annuity to a spouse or 
former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member's 
retired or retainer pay is being made pursuant to a court order under 
this section. 
(5) "Member" includes a former member. 
(6) "Spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former 
husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date of 
a court order, was married to that member. 
(b) For the purposes of this section— 
(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated for 
receipt of service court orders under regulations prescribed pursuant 
to subsection (h) or, if no agent has been so designated, the Secretary 
concerned, is personally served or is served by certified or registered 
mail, return receipt requested; 
(B) the court order is regular on its face; 
(C) the court order or other documents served with the court order 
identify the member concerned and include, if possible, the social 
security number of such member; and 
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court order 
certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) [50 USCS Appx 
§§ 501 et seq.] were observed; and 
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order— 
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(B) is legal in form; and 
(C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice that it 
is issued without authority of law. 
(c)(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable 
retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning 
after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as 
property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of 
the jurisdiction of such court. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not 
create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, trans-
ferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse 
or former spouse. 
(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to 
apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate 
any payment under this section. 
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(4) A court may not treat the disposal retired or retainer pay of a 
member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has 
jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than 
because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, 
(B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his 
consent to the jursidiction of the court. 
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order 
providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect 
to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of an 
amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay from a member to the 
spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall make 
payments (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable 
retired or retainer pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse in 
an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and alimony 
set forth in the court order and, with respect to a division of property, 
in the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay specifically provided 
for in the court order. In the case of a member entitled to receive retired 
or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, 
such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date of 
effective service. In the case of a member ^iot entitled to receive retired 
or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, 
such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which 
the member first becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay. 
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made 
under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 
years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of 
service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or 
retainer pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent 
that they include an amount resulting from the treatment by the court 
under subsection (c) of disposable retired or retainer pay of the member 
as property of the member or property of the member and his spouse. 
(3) Payments under this section shall not be made more frequently than 
once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to 
vary normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired or retainer pay in 
order to comply with a court order. 
(4) Payments from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member 
pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of 
the applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of 
the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to 
whom payments are being made, whichever occurs first. 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of 
property (including a division of community property) in addition to an 
amount of child support or alimony or the payment of an amount of 
disposable retired or retainer pay as the result of the court's treatment of 
such pay under subsection (c) as property of the member and his spouse, 
the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of this 
section) from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member to the 
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spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount payable 
to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon 
effective service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount 
from such retired or retainer pay. 
(e)(1) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such 
disposable retired or retainer pay. 
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which 
provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to 
more than one former spouse the disposable retired or retainer pay of 
the member shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of 
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, first-served basis. Such 
court orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph 
(1)) out of that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which 
remains after the satisfaction of all court orders which have been 
previously served. 
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under 
this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid 
during a month to the same spouse or former spouse of the same 
member, the Secretary concerned shall— 
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired or 
retainer pay the least amount directed to be paid during that 
month by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the 
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains avail-
able for payment of such courts orders based on when such court 
orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) 
and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); -
(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay that is 
equal to the lesser of— 
(I) the difference between the largest amount required by any 
conflicting court order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse 
and the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under 
clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which 
remains available for payment of any conflicting court order 
based on when such court order was effectively served and the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph 
(4); and 
(hi) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount 
of that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less any 
amount paid during such month pursuant to legal process served 
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42 
USCS § 659] and any amount paid during such month pursuant to 
court orders effectively served under this section, other than such 
conflicting court orders) minus— 
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(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid under 
clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay retained 
under clause (ii). 
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under 
clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is 
provided with a court order which has been certified by the member 
and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable to the 
retained amount. Upon being provided with such an order, the 
Secretary shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the order. 
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this 
section and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42 USCS § 659], both of which 
provide for payments during a month from the same member, 
satisfaction of such court orders and legal process from the retired or 
retainer pay of the member shall be on a first-come, first-served basis. 
Such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys 
which are subject to such orders and legal process and which remain 
available in accordance with the limitations of paragraph (1) and 
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the 
satisfaction of all court orders or legal process which have been 
previously served. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of 
the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the 
Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section 
and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42 USCS § 659] with respect to a member may 
not exceed 65 percent of the disposable retired or retainer pay payable 
to such member. 
(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court 
orders provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the 
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay available for payment 
because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of 
previously served court orders or legal process previously served under 
section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42 USCS § 659], 
provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum amount 
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), 
shall not be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. 
However, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for 
purposes of this section by the payment to the spouse or former spouse 
of the maximum amount of disposable retired or retainer pay permitted 
under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). 
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of 
liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments 
required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of 
disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in 
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the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph 
(B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may 
be enforced by any means available under law other than the means 
provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount 
permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 659) [42 USCS § 649] in any case in 
which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of 
paragraph (4) has been paid. 
(f)(1) The United States and any officer or employee of the United States 
shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from retired or 
retainer pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse pursuant to a 
court order that is regular on its face if such payment is made in 
accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to 
subsection (h). 
(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations 
prescribed pursuant to subsection (h), has the duty to respond to 
interrogatories shall not be subject under any law to any disciplinary 
action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any 
disclosure of information made by him' in carrying out any of his duties 
which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories. 
(g) A person receiving effective service of a court order under this section 
shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the date on 
which effective service is made, send a written notice of such court order 
(together with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court 
order at his last known address. 
(h) The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the 
administration of this section. 
(Added Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730; Oct. 
19, 1984, P. L. 98-525, Title VI, Part E, § 643(a)-(d), 98 Stat. 2547.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Effective date of section: 
Act Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1006, 96 Stat. 737, which 
appears as a note to this section, provided that this section, as added 
by such Act, is effective on the first day of the first month which begins 
more than one hundred and twenty days after enactment on Sept. 8, 
1982. 
Amendments: 
1984. Act Oct. 19, 1984, in subsec. (a)(2)(C), inserted "in the case of a 
division of property,"; in subsec. (b)(1)(C), inserted ", if possible,"; in 
subsec. (d), in para. (1), substituted "After effective service on the 
Secretary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of 
child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of property, 
specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable 
retired or retainer pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse 
of the member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject to the 
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limitations of this section) from the disposable retired or retainer pay of 
the member to the spouse or former spouse in an amount sufficient to 
satisfy the amount of child support and alimony set forth in the court 
order and, with respect to a division of property, in the amount of 
disposable retired or retainer pay specifically provided for in the court 
order." for "After effective service on the secretary concerned of a 
court order with respect to the payment of a portion of the retired or 
retainer pay of a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the 
member, the Secretary shall, subject to the limitations of this section, 
make payments to the spouse or former spouse in the amount of the 
disposable retired or retainer pay of the member specifically provided 
for in the court order/*, in para. (5), substituted "child support or 
alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired or retainer 
pay as the result of the court's treatment of such pay under subsection 
(c) as property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned 
shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable 
retired or retainer pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse of 
the member, any part" for "disposable retired or retainer pay, the 
Secretary concerned shall, subject to the limitations of this section, pay 
to the spouse or former spouse of the member, from the disposable 
retired or retainer pay of the member, any part"; and in subsec. (e), in 
para. (2), substituted ", the disposable retired or retainer pay of the 
member" for "from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member, 
such pay", in para. (3)(A), in the introductory matter, deleted "from 
the disposable retired or retainer pay" following "former spouse", in cl. 
(i), substituted "from the member's disposable retired or retainer pay 
the least amount" for "the least amount of disposable retired or 
retainer pay", in cl. (ii)(I), deleted "of retired or retainer pay" follow-
ing "largest amount", in para. (4)(A), deleted "the retired or retainer 
pay o f following "month from", and substituted "satisfaction of such 
court orders and legal process from the retired or retainer pay of the 
member shall be" for "such court orders and legal process shall be 
satisfied", and in para. (5), deleted "of disposable retired or retainer 
pay" in two places following "payment of an amount", and substituted 
"disposable retired or retainer pay" for "such pay" following "which 
exceeds the amount of. 
Other provisions: 
Commissary and exchange privileges. Act Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, 
Title X, § 1005, 96 Stat. 737, effective on the first day of the first 
month which begins more than 120 days after enactment on Sept. 8, 
1982, as provided by U 1006(a) of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS 
§ 1408 note, provided: "The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such 
regulations as may be necessary to provide that an unremarried former 
spouse described in subparagraph (F)(i) of section 1072(2) of title 10, 
United States Code [10 USCS § 1072(2)(F)(i)] (as added by section 
1004), is entitled to commissary and post exchange privileges to the 
same extent and on the same basis as the surviving spouse of a retired 
member of the uniformed services.". 
Effective dates and transition of amendments by Act Sept. 8, 1982; 
application of subsec. (d). Act Sept 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, 
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§ 1006, 96 Stat. 737; Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D, 
§ 941(c)(4), 97 Stat. 654; Oct. 19, 1984, P. L. 98-525, Title VI, Part E, 
§ 645(b), 98 Stat. 2549, effective Jan. 1, 1985, as provided by § 645(d) 
in part of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1072 note, provided: 
"(a) The amendments made by this title [which, among other things, 
enacted this section; for full classification, consult USCS Tables vol-
umes] shall take effect on the first day of the first month which begins 
more than one hundred and twenty days after the date of the enact-
ment of this title [enacted Sept. 8, 1982]. 
"(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title 10, United States Code 
[subsec. (d) of this section], as added by section 1002(a), shall apply 
only with respect to payments of retired or retainer pay for periods 
beginning on or after the effective date of this title [subsec, (a) of this 
note], but without regard to the date of any court order. However, in 
the case of a court order that became final before June 26, 1981, 
payments under such subsection may only be made in accordance with 
such order as in effect on such date and without regard to any 
subsequent modifications. 
"(c) The amendments made by section 1003 of this title [10 USCS 
§§ 1447, 1448 and 1450] shall apply to persons who become eligible to 
participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan provided for in subchapter II of 
chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], 
before, on, or after the effective date of such amendments [subsec. (a) 
of this note]. 
"(d) The amendments made by section 1004 of this title [10 USCS 
§§ 1072, 1076 and 1086] and the provisions of section 1005 of this title 
[note to this section] shall apply in the case of any former spouse of a 
member or former member of the uniformed services whether the final 
decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment of the marriage of the 
former spouse and such member or former member is dated before, on, 
or after February 1, 1983. 
"(e) For the purposes of this section— 
"(1) the term 'court order' has the same meaning as provided in 
section 1408(a)(2) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (a)(2) of 
this section] (as added by section 1002 of this title); 
"(2) the term 'former spouse' has the same meaning as provided in 
section 1408(a)(6) of such title [subsec. (a)(6) of this section] (as 
added by section 1002 of this title); and 
"(3) the term 'uniformed services* has the same meaning as provided 
in section 1072 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS § 1072].". 
Application of Oct. 19, 1984 amendments. Act Oct. 19, 1984, P. L. 98-
525, Title VI, Part E, § 643(e), 98 Stat. 2548, provides: "The amend-
ments made by this section [amending this section] shall apply with 
respect to court orders for which effective service (as described in 
section 1408(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (b)(1) of this 
section], as amended by subsection (b) of this section) is made on or 
after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 19, 1984].". 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Establishment of policy and authorization for direct payments to former 
spouse of member of armed forces from retired pay in response to court-
order alimony, child support, or division of property, 32 CFR Part 63. 
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CROSS REFERENCES: 
This section is referred to in 10 USCS § 1447. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Am JUT: 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation § 909. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
VERALEX™: Cases and annotations referred to herein can be further 
researched through the VERALEX electronic retrieval system's two ser-
vices, Auto-Cite® and SHOWME™. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for 
form, parallel references, prior and later history, and annotation refer-
ences. Use SHOWME to display the full text of cases and annotations. 
1. Generally 
2. Purpose 
3. Retroactivity 
4. Pay subject to apportionment and direct pay-
ment 
5. 10-year marriage requirement 
1. Generally 
Requirement in predecessor to 10 USCS 
§ 1448(a) that spouse be notified if person eligi-
ble to participate in plan elects not to participate 
applies only to service member who is automati-
cally enrolled in Survivor Benefit Plan because 
he retires on or after effective date of § 1448; 
requirement does not apply with respect to ser-
vice member who was already entitled to retired 
or retainer pay and who was permitted by Con-
gress but declined to elect to participate in Plan. 
Passaro v United States (1985, CA F Q 774 F2d 
456. 
Trial court erred in declaring military pension 
to be husband's separate property, notwithstand-
ing that Uniformed Services Former Spouse's 
Protection Act (10 USCS § 1408) gives each 
state power to deal with military pensions as it 
sees fit. In re Marriage of Sarles (1983, 4th Dist) 
143 Cal App 3d 24, 191 Cal Rptr 514. 
Fact that § 1408 is effective February 1, 1983 
does nor bar action by former wife, divorced 
from serviceman in 1966, for community interest 
in serviceman's military retirement pension, 
where former wife does not seek to modify or 
reopen 1966 judgment, and where her action is 
independent one to divide asset which was not 
before divorce court in 1966 and was not altered 
by divorce decree. Casas v Thompson (1985, 4th 
Dist) 111 Cal App 3d 458, 217 CaJ Rptr 471. 
Division of value by state Family Court of 
right of United States Public Health veterinarian 
to retire and receive benefits does not violate 10 
USCS § 1408. Wallace v Wallace (1984) 5 Ha-
waii App 55, 677 P2d 966. 
Section 1048(c)(1) does not mandate that mili-
tary retirement pension be shared by recipient 
and recipient's former spouse; it only authorizes 
division, and leaves to state courts decision re-
garding whether any allocation is to be made. Re 
Marriage of Habermehl (1985, 5th Dist) 135 111 
App 3d 105, 89 111 Dec 939, 481 NE2d 782. 
Former Spouses' Protection Act (10 USCS 
§ 1408) allowing courts to consider retirement 
pay in fashioning divorce settlements permits but 
does not command state courts to consider mili-
tary retirement benefit as marital property; Act 
provides power to each state to deal with mili-
tary pensions in manner in which it had previ-
ously treated them or chooses to treat them in 
future. Koenes v Koenes (1985, Ind App) 478 
NE2d 1241. 
Prior judgment awarding approximately one-
half of military retiree's future benefits is res 
judicata, notwithstanding subsequent decision by 
United States Supreme Court in McCarty v 
McCarty (1981) 453 US 210, 69 L Ed 2d 589, 
101 S Ct 2728, 2 EBC 1502 (superseded by 
statute as stated in Chase v Chase (Alaska) 662 
P2d 944) and (superseded by statute as stated in 
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"(c) Computation of high-three average. (1) Formula. For the purposes of this section, a 
member's high-three average is the amount equal to— 
"(A) the total amount of monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled for the 
member's high-36 months, divided by 
"(B) 36. 
"(2) High-36 months defined. (A) General rule. A member's high-36 months are the 36 
months out of all the months of active duty served by the member as a member of a 
uniformed service for which the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled 
was the highest. 
"(B) Rule for non-regular service retirees. In the case of a member who is entitled to 
retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title or under chapter 67 of this title, a 
member's high-36 months are the 36 months out of all the months the member was 
a member of a uniformed service before becoming entitled to retired pay for which 
the monthly basic pay to which the member would have been entitled had he served 
on active duty during those months was the highest.". 
Such Act further redesignated former subsec. (d) as subsec. (e); added new subsecs* (c) and 
(d); and deleted former subsecs. (e)-(g), which read: 
"(e) Special rules for short-term disability retirees. (1) Members entitled to retired pay under 
section 1201 or 1202. In the case of a member who— 
"(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1201 or 1202 of this title; and 
"(B) served on active duty for less than 36 months, the months (including any fraction 
thereof) that the member served on active duty shall be deemed to be the member's 
high-36 months. 
"(2) Members entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205. In the case of a member 
who— 
"(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title; and 
"(B) was a member of a uniformed service for less than 36 months, the months 
(including any fraction thereof) that the member was such a member shall be deemed 
to be the member's high-36 months. 
"(f) Special rule for members retiring with non-regular service. (1) Disability retirement. In 
the case of a member of a uniformed service who is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 
or 1205 of this title (relating to members on active duty for 30 days or less), the high-36 
average is determined as if the member served on active duty and was entitled to basic pay 
for the member's high-36 months. 
"(2) Chapter 67 retirement. In the case of a person who is entitled to retired pay under 
section 1331 of this title (relating to retired pay for non-regular service), the person's 
high-36 average is determined as if the person served on active duty and was entitled to 
basic pay for the person's high-36 months. 
"(g) Definition. In this section, the term 'years of creditable service' means the number of 
years of service creditable to a member in computing the member's retired or retainer pay 
(including V12 of a year for each full month of service that is in addition to the number of 
full years of service of the member).". 
§ 1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders 
(a) Definitions. In this section: 
(1) The term "court" means— 
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) any court of the United States (as denned in section 451 of title 28) having competent 
jurisdiction; and 
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country with which the United States 
has an agreement requiring the United States to honor any court order of such country. 
(2) The term "court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal 
separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement 
incident to such a decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued 
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, 
or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued decree), which— 
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that court; 
(B) provides for— 
(i) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 662(b))); 
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 662(c))); or 
(iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and 
(C) in the case of a division of property, specifically provides for the payment of an 
153 
10 USCS § 1408 ARMED FORCES 
amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay, from the 
disposable retired pay of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that member. 
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken or from 
which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for taking such appeals under the 
laws applicable to such appeals, or a decree from which timely appeal has been taken and 
such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
(4) The term "disposable retired pay" means the total monthly retired pay to which a 
member is entitled less amounts which— 
(A) are owed by that member to the United States for previous overpayments of retired 
pay and for recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to retired pay; 
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired 
pay ordered by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law 
in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; 
(Q in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title [10 
USCS §§ 1201 et seq.], are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that 
chapter computed using the percentage of the member's disability on the date when the 
member was retired (or the date on which the member's name was placed on the 
temporary disability retired list); or 
(D) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title [10 USCS §§ 1431 
et seq J to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion 
of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order under this section. 
(E), (F) [Redesignated] 
(5) The term "member" includes a former member entitled to retired pay under section 
1331 of this title. 
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former husband or 
wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date of a court order, was married to 
that member. 
(7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer pay. 
(b) Effective service of process. For the purposes of this section— 
(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated for receipt of service 
court orders under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i) or, if no agent has 
been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by certified 
or registered mail, return receipt requested; 
(B) the court order is regular on its face; 
(Q the court order or other documents served with the court order identify the member 
concerned and include, if possible, the social security number of such member; and 
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court order certify that the 
rights of the member under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. 
App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and 
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order— 
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(B) is legal in form; and 
(Q includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice that it is issued without 
authority of law. 
(c) Authority for court to treat retired pay as property of the member and spouse. (1) Subject 
to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired pay payable to a 
member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the 
member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the 
jurisdiction of such court A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding 
to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the property of the member 
and the member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of divorce, dissolution, 
annulment, or legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property 
settlement incident to such decree) affecting the member and the member's spouse or former 
spouse (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to 
treat) any amount of retired pay of the member as property of the member and the member's 
spouse or former spouse. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not create any right, title, 
or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by 
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Payments by the Secretary concerned under 
subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect to a division of retired pay as the 
property of a member and the member's spouse under this subsection may not be treated as 
amounts received as retired pay for service in the uniformed services. 
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(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply for retirement or 
retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section. 
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of a member m the manner described 
in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his 
residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or ( Q his consent to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
(d) Payments by Secretary concerned to spouse or7onner spouse. (1) After effective service on 
the Secretary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of child support or 
alimony or, with respect to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of 
an amount of the disposable retired pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse 
of the member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject to the limitations of this section) 
from the disposable retired pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse in an amount 
sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and alimony set forth m the court order 
and, with respect to a division of property, m the amount of disposable retired pay 
specifically provided for m the court order In the case of a member entitled to receive 
retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin 
not later than 90 days after the date of effective service In the case of a member not entitled 
to receive retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments 
shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which the member first becomes entitled 
to retired pay 
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made under this section was 
not married to the member for a period of 10 years or more during which the member 
performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for 
retired pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they mclude 
an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable 
retired pay of the member as property of the member or property of the member and his 
spouse 
(3) Payments under tins section shall not be made more frequently than once each month, 
and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement 
cycles for retired pay in order to comply with a court order 
(4) Payments from the disposable retired pay of a member pursuant to this section shall 
terminate m accordance with the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the 
date of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to 
whom payments are being made, whichever occurs first 
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of property (including 
a division of community property) m addition to an amount of child support or alimony or 
the payment of an amount of disposable retired pay as the result of the court's treatment of 
such pay under subsection (c) as property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary 
concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired 
pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount 
payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon effective service 
of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired pay 
(e) Limitations. (1) The total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable under 
all court orders pursuant to subsection (c) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable 
retired pay 
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which provide for payment 
to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more than one former spouse the 
disposable retired pay of the member shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of 
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, first-served basis Such court orders shall 
be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable 
retired pay which remains after the satisfaction of all court orders which have been 
previously served 
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which 
assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the same spouse or 
former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall— 
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired pay the least amount 
directed to be paid during that month by any such conflicting court order, but not 
more than the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment 
of such courts orders based on when such court orders were effectively served and the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), 
(u) retain an amount of disposable retired pay that is equal to the lesser of— 
(I) the difference between the largest amount required by any conflicting court 
order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the 
spouse or former spouse under clause (l), and 
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(II) the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment of 
any conflicting court order based on when such court order was effectively served 
and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
(iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of that member's 
disposable retired pay (less any amount paid during such month pursuant to legal 
process served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any 
amount paid during such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this 
section, other than such conflicting court orders) minus— 
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay paid under clause (i); and 
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay retained under clause (ii). 
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause (ii) of 
subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a court order which 
has been certified by the member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and 
applicable to the retained amount. Upon being provided with such an order, the Secretary 
shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the order. 
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section and the service of 
legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of 
which provide for payments during a month from the same member, satisfaction of such 
court orders and legal process from the retired pay of the member shall be on a first-
come, first-served basis. Such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of 
moneys which are subject to such orders and legal process and which remain available 
in accordance with the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this 
paragraph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal process 
which have been previously served. 
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the disposable 
retired pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders 
pursuant to this section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of 
the amount of the retired pay payable to such member that is considered under section 
462 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that 
is payable by the United States. 
(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the 
payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposable retired pay available for 
payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously 
served court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum 
amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be 
considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, such order shall be 
considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by the payment to the spouse or 
.former spouse of the maximum amount of disposable retired pay permitted under paragraph 
(1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). 
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment 
of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that 
payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the 
maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). 
Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under 
law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum 
amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid. 
(f) Immunity of officers and employees of United States. (1) The United States and any officer 
or employee of the United States shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from 
retired pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse pursuant to a court order that is 
regular on its face if such payment is made in accordance with this section and the 
regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i). 
(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations prescribed pursuant 
to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to interrogatories shall not be subject under any 
law to any disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any 
disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or 
indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories. 
(g) Notice to member of service of court order on Secretary concerned. A person receiving 
effective service of a court order under this section shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 
30 days after the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of such court 
order (together with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court order at his 
last known address. 
GENERAL 
(h) Benefits fc 
(1) If, in 
paragraph 
for the paj 
member (a 
member or 
such court 
or former s 
(2) A spous 
to receive { 
(A) the 
becomin 
eligibilit 
involvin 
the Seer 
the Nav 
(B) the J 
(i)WJ 
the ti 
(ii) is 
meml 
(3) The am 
member or 
deemed to 1 
of this subs 
(4) Upon tl 
former men 
civil action 
the Secretai 
that the me 
the certifica 
(A)ifthj 
as descri 
(B) if, i 
immedia 
member 
(5) A court 
under sectic 
the court or 
paragraph ( 
pay of the n 
member wa 
(6) Notwith 
forces referr 
any amount 
former merr 
(7)(A)Ifaf( 
or forme 
begin, tl 
subsectio 
(B) Apt 
under su 
terminati 
divorce, 
which th 
amount 
interrupt 
(8) Paymen 
Department 
or, in the c 
Transportati 
(9)(A) A sp 
referred 
subsectio 
156 
RMED FORCI 
aole for payment ol 
as effectively served 
paragraph (4); and 
it of that member's 
h pursuant to legal f] 
J.S.C 659) and any 1 
ly served under this y 
and 
J(ii). 
ider clause (ii) of 
i court order which ' 
se to be valid and * 
Drder, the Secretary ] 
l and the service of 
I.S.C. 659), both of 
satisfaction of such 
shall be on a first-
be satisfied out of 
:h remain available 
.graph (B) of this 
rs or legal process 
of the disposable 
jr all court orders 
459 of the Social 
ceed 65 percent of ' 
ered under section 
r employment that 
rs provides for the ** 
I pay available for f 
ause of previously " 
459 of the Social < 
eeds the maximum '' 
h (4), shall not be t 
uch order shall be | 
it to the spouse or f 
d under paragraph $ 
GENERAL MILITARY LAW 10 USCS §1408 
ty for the payment | 
i the grounds that * 
been made in the | 
of paragraph (4). f 
ns available under 2\ 
ich the maximum 
459 of the Social 
t permitted under 
tes and any officer 
yment made from 
3urt order that is 
i section and the 
escribed pursuant 
subject under any 
3r because of, any 
which directly or 
person receiving 
but not later than 
tice of such court 
:ourt order at his ;l 
(h) Benefits for dependents who are rictims of abuse by members losing right to retired pay. 
(1) If, in the case of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in 
paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in the manner applicable to a division of property) 
for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former 
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to an eligible spouse or former spouse of that 
member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of 
such court order, shall pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse 
or former spouse. 
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces is eligible 
to receive payment under this subsection if— 
(A) the member or former member, while a member of the armed forces and after 
becoming eligible to be retired from the armed forces on the basis of years of service, has 
eligibility to receive retired pay terminated as a result of misconduct while a member 
involving abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as defined in regulations prescribed by 
the Secretary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in 
the Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation); and 
(B) the spouse or former spouse— 
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was married to the member or former member at 
the time of that abuse; or 
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a dependent child of the member or former 
member who was the victim of the abuse. 
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to a 
member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be 
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that member or former member for the purposes 
of this subsection. 
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible spouse or former spouse of a member or 
former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a 
civil action for the issuance of a court order in the case of that member or former member, 
the Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay 
that the member or former member would have been entitled to receive as of the date of 
the certification— 
(A) if the member or former member's eligibility for retired pay had not been terminated 
as described in paragraph (2)(A); and 
(B) if, in the case of a member or former member not in receipt of retired pay 
immediately before that termination of eligibility for retired pay, the member or former 
member had retired on the effective date of that termination of eligibility. 
(5) A court order under this subsection may provide that whenever retired pay is increased 
under section 1401a of this title (or any other provision of law), the amount payable under 
the court order to the spouse or former spouse of a member or former member described in 
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same time by the percent by which the retired 
pay of the member or former member would have been increased if the member, or former 
member were receiving retired pay. 
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member or former member of the armed 
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall have no ownership interest in, or claim against, 
any amount payable under this section to a spouse or former spouse of the member or 
former member. 
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments under this subsection with respect to a member 
or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) marries again after such payments 
begin, the eligibility of the former spouse to receive further payments under this 
subsection shall terminate on the date of such marriage. 
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments under this subsection that is terminated 
under subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall be resumed in the event of the 
termination of that marriage by the death of that person's spouse or by annulment or 
divorce. The resumption of payments shall begin as of the first day of the month in 
which that marriage is so terminated. The monthly amount of the payments shall be the 
amount that would have been paid if the continuity of the payments had not been 
interrupted by the marriage. 
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsection shall be made out of funds in the 
Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund established by section 1461 of this title 
or, in the case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department of 
Transportation for payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard. 
(9)(A) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces 
referred to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving payments in accordance with this 
subsection, shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use commissary and 
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exchange stores, and to receive any other benefit that a spouse or a former spouse of a 
retired member of the armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis of being a spouse 
or former spouse, as the case may be, of a retired member of the armed forces in the 
same manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2XA) was 
entitled to retired pay. 
(B) A dependent child of a member or former member referred to in paragraph (2XA) 
who was a member of the household of the member or former member at the time of 
the misconduct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to receive medical and 
dental care, to use commissary and exchange stores, and to have other benefits provided 
to dependents of retired members of the armed forces in the same manner as if the 
member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay. 
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a dependent child eligible or entitled to receive a 
particular benefit under this paragraph is eligible or entitled to receive that benefit under 
another provision of law, the eligibility or entitlement of that spouse or former spouse 
or dependent child to such benefit shall be determined under such other provision of law 
instead of this paragraph. 
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of a member of the armed forces who 
has been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a punishment that will terminate the 
eligibility of that member to receive retired pay if executed, the eligibility of that member 
to receive retired pay may, as determined by the Secretary concerned, be considered 
terminated effective upon the approval of that sentence by the person acting under section 
860(c) of this title (article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice). 
(B) If each form of the punishment that would result in the termination of eligibility to 
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside, or mitigated to a punishment that does not 
result in the termination of that eligibility, a payment of benefits to the eligible recipient 
under this subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated 
shall cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first 
month following the month in which the Secretary concerned notifies the recipient of 
such benefits in writing that payment of the benefits will cease. The recipient may not be 
required to repay the benefits received before that effective date (except to the extent 
necessary to recoup any amount that was erroneous when paid). 
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent child", with respect to a member or former 
member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legitimate 
child, including an adopted child or a stepchild of the member or former member, who— 
(A) is under 18 years of age; 
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a mental or physical incapacity that existed 
before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for 
over one-half of the child's support; or 
( Q if enrolled in a full-time course of study in an institution of higher education 
recognized by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this subparagraph, is under 
23 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for over one-half of 
the child's support, 
(i) Regnlatioiis. The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the adminis-
tration of this section. 
(As amended Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D, § 644(a), 100 Stat. 3887; 
Apr. 21, 1987, P. L. 100-26, §§ 3(3) in part, 7(h)(1) in part, 101 Stat. 273, 282; Nov. 29, 1989, 
P. L. 101-189, Div A, Title VI, Part F, § 653(a)(5), Title XVI, Part C, § 1622(e)(6), 103 Stat. 
1462, 1605; Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A, Title V, Part E, § 555(a)-(d), (f), (g), 104 Stat. 
1569, 1570; Dec. 5, 1991, P. L. 102-190, Div A, Title X, Part E, § 1061(a)(7), 105 Stat 1472; 
Oct. 23, 1992, P. L. 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle E, § 653(a), 106 Stat 2426; Nov. 30, 
1993, P..L. 103-160, Div A, Title V, Subtitle E, § 555(a), (b), Title XI, Subtitle H, § 1182(a)(2), 
107 Stat 1666, 1771.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1986. Act Nov. 14, 1986, § 644(a) (applicable as provided by § 644(b) of such Act, which 
appears as a note to this section), as amended Act Apr. 21, 1987, § 3(3), (applicable as if 
included in Act Nov. 14, 1986 when enacted on 11/14/86, as provided by § 12(a) of Act 
Apr. 21, 1987, which appears as 10 USCS § 774 note), in subsec. (a), in para. (4), in the 
introductory matter, deleted "(other than the retired pay of a member retired for disability 
under chapter 61 of this title)" following "member is entitled", and substituted subpara. (E) 
for one which read: "are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not including 
amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or". 
1987. Act Apr. 21, 1987, in subsec. (aX4)(D), substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" 
for "Internal Revenue Code of 1954". 
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Such Act further made a technical correction to the directory language of § 644(a) of Act 
Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, which did not affect the text of this section. 
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989, in subsec (a), in para. (4)(D), deleted "(26 U.S.C. 3402®)" 
following "1986", and, in para. (5), inserted "entitled to retired pay under section 1331 of 
this title". 
Such Act further, in subsec (a), in the introductory matter of paras. (1H^)» and in paras. 
(5) and (6), inserted 'The term" and revised the first word in quotation marks in each. para, 
so that the initial letter of such word is lower case. 
1990. Act Nov. 5, 1990 deleted "or retainer" following "retired", wherever appearing, and 
added the subsection headings in subsecs. (a)-(h). 
Such Act further (applicable as provided by § 555(eXO of such Act, which appears as. a note 
to this section), in subsec (c)(1), added the sentence beginning "A court may not treat retired 
pay as property . . .". 
Such Act further (applicable as provided by § 555(e)(2) of such Act, which appears as a note 
to this section), in subsec. (aX*), in subpara. (A), substituted "for previous overpayments of 
retired pay and for recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to retired pay;" 
for the semicolon, substituted subpara. (B) for one which read: "(B) are required by law to 
be and are deducted from the retired or retainer pay of such member, including fines and 
forfeitures ordered by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts waived in 
order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38;", redesignated former subparas. (E) 
and (F) as subparas. (Q and (D), and deleted former subparas. (C) and (D), which read: 
"(Q are properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax purposes, if the 
withholding of such amounts is authorized or required by law and to the extent such 
amounts withheld are not greater than would be authorized if such member claimed all 
dependents to which he was entitled; 
"(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 
3402(i)) if such member presents evidence of a tax obligation which supports such 
withholding;". 
Such Act further (applicable as above), in subsec. (c)(2), added the sentence beginning 
"Payments by the Secretary concerned under subsection (d) . . ."; and, in subsec (e), in 
para. (1), substituted "payable under ail court orders pursuant to subsection (c)" for "payable 
under subsection (d)", and, in para. (4)(B), substituted "the amount of the retired pay 
payable to such member that is considered under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that is payable by the United States" for 
"the disposable retired or retainer pay payable to such member". 
1991. Act Dec. 5, 1991 substituted the section heading for one which read: "§ 1408. Payment 
of retired pay in compliance with court orders". 
1992. Act Oct. 23, 1992 (applicable as provided by § 653(c) of such Act, which appears as a 
note to this section) redesignated subsec. (h) as subsec (i); and added new subsec (h). 
1993. Act Nov. 30, 1993 (applicable as provided by § 1182(h) of such Act, which appears as 
10 USCS § 101 note), in subsecs. (b), in para. (1)(A), and in subsec (0, in paras. (1) and 
(2), substituted "subsection (i)" for "subsection (h)"; and, in subsec (h)(4)(B), inserted "of* 
after "of that termination". 
Such Act further (effective as of 10/23/92 and applicable as if the provisions of subsec. 
(h)(10) added by such Act were included in the amendment made by § 653(aX2) of Act Oct 
23, 1992, P. L. 102-484, as provided by § 555(c) of the 1993 Act), in subsec (h), in para. 
(2)(A), inserted "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, 
by the Secretary of Transportation", in para. (8), inserted "or, in the case of the Coast Guard, 
out of funds appropriated to the Department of Transportation for payment of retired pay 
for the Coast Guard", redesignated para. (10) as para. (11), and added a new para. (10). 
Other provisions: 
Repeal of provision for commissary and exchange privileges. Act Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, 
Title X, § 1005, 96 Stat. 737, which formerly appeared as a note to this section, and which 
was effective on the first day of the first month which began more than 120 days after 
enactment on Sept 8, 1982, as provided by fl 1006(a) of such Act, which appears as 10 
USCS § 1408 note, was repealed by Act July 19, 1988, P. L. 100-370, § l(cX5% 102 Stat. 
841. It provided for rules and regulations to be prescribed for commissary and post exchange 
privileges for surviving spouses of retired uniformed services members. Similar provisions are 
now contained in 10 USCS § 1062. 
Applicability of 1986 amendments. Act Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Tide VI, Part 
D, § 644(b), 100 Stat 3887, provides: "The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply 
with respect to court orders issued after the date of the enactment of this Act". 
Applicability of 1990 amendments. Act Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A Title V, Part E, 
§ 555(e), 104 Stat 1570; Dec 5, 1991, P. L. 102-190, Div A, Title X, Part E, § 1062(a)(1), 
105 Stat. 1475, provides: 
"(1) The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending subsec (c)(1) of this section] shall 
apply with respect to judgments issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act. In the case of a judgment issued before the date of the enactment of this Act, such 
amendment shall not relieve any obligation, otherwise valid, to make a payment that is due 
to be made before the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 
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"(2) The amendments made by subsections (b), (c), and (d) [amending subsecs. (a), (cX2) and 
(e) of this section] apply with only respect to divorces, dissolutions of marriage, annulments, 
and legal separations that become effective after the end of the 90-day period beginning on 
the date of the enactment of this Act'* 
Applicability of subsec (h). Act Oct 23, 1992, P L 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle E, 
§ 653(c), 106 Stat 2429, provides "No payments under subsection (h) of section 1408 of title 
10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)), shall accrue for periods before the date 
of the enactment of this Act" 
Study required. Act Oct 23, 1992, P L 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle E, § 653(e), 106 
Stat 2429, provides 
"(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study in order to estimate— 
"(A) the number of persons who will become eligible to receive payments under 
subsection (h) of section 1408 of title 10, Umted States Code (as added by subsection (a)), 
during each of fiscal years 1993 through 2000, and 
"(B) for each of fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the number of members of the Armed 
Forces who, after having completed at least one, and less than 20, years of service m that 
fiscal year, will be approved in that fiscal year for separation from the Armed Forces as 
a result of having abused a spouse or dependent child 
"(2) The study shall mclude a thorough analysis of— 
"(A) the effects, if any, of appeals and requests for clemency m the case of court-martial 
convictions on the entitlement to payments m accordance with subsection (h) of section 
1408 of title 10, Umted States Code (as added by subsection (a)), 
"(B) the socio-economic effects on the dependents of members of the Armed Forces 
described m subsection (h)(2) of such section that result from terminations of the 
eligibility of such members to receive retired or retainer pay, and 
"(Q the effects of separations of such members from the Armed Forces on the mission 
readiness of the units of assignment of such members when separated and on the Armed 
Forces m general 
"(3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
submit to Congress a report on the results of the study " 
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INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
1. Generally 
Statute does not grant state courts power to treat 
as property divisible upon divorce military retire-
ment pay that retiree had waived pursuant to 38 
USCS § 3105 m order to receive veterans' disability 
benefits, it cannot be read merely as garnishment 
statute designed not to pre-empt authonty of state 
courts but solely to set out circumstances under 
which federal government will make direct pay-
ments of retirement pay to retiree's former spouse 
pursuant to court order because statute provides 
that court may treat disposable retired or retainer 
pay but not total retired pay as property of retiree 
and spouse, and term "disposable retired or retainer 
pay" is defined to exclude military retirement pay 
waived m order to receive veterans' disability bene-
fits, and other subsections of statute impose sub-
stantive limits on state courts' power to divide 
military retirement pay Mansell v Mansell (1989, 
US) 104 L Ed 2d 675, 109 S a 2023, 10 EBC 2521 
Court otherwise having jurisdiction of parties is 
not allowed to mvoke powers of Federal Uniform 
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (10 USCS 
§ 1408) unless personal jurisdiction has been ac-
quired by domicile or consent or residence other 
than by military assignment, careful reading of 10 
USCS § 1408(c)(1) reveals that provision is limita-
tion on subject-matter, rather than personal juris-
diction Steel v Umted States (1987, CA9 Cal) 813 
F2dl545 
passage of Uniform Services Former Spouse's 
Protection Act (10 USCS § 1468(c)(1) (USFSPA) 
did not result m taking of former military person-
nel's property (portion of then* military retired pay) 
in violation of Fifth Amendment to Constitution as 
Act merely removed federal pre-emption which 
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Effective date and application of amendments made by Act Nov. 8, 
1985. Act Nov. 8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part C, § 731, 99 Stat. 
678, provided: 
"(a) Effective date. Except as otherwise provided in this title [this note, 
among other things; for full classification, consult USCS Tables vol-
umes], the amendments made by this title [this note, among other 
things; for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] shall take 
effect on the first day of the first month beginning more than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985]. 
"(b) Prospective benefits only. No benefit shall accrue to any person by 
reason of the enactment of this title [this note, among other things; for 
full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] for any period before 
the effective date under subsection (a).". 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Surviving spouse does not qualify under 10 
USCS § 1447(3)(A) for any annuity at time of 
her husband's death where service member had 
elected spouse and children coverage, had di-
vorced, remarried and died prior to first anniver-
say of remarriage; however since spouse was 
pregnant and later gave birth to service mem-
ber's child, she qualifies as eligible widow for 
annuity purposes effective on date of child's 
birth. (1981) 60 Op Comp Gen p 240. 
Annuity may properly be suspended if evi-
dence exists demonstrating that beneficiary has 
become independently capable of earning 
amounts sufficient for own pesonal needs 
through substantial and gainful employment; 
determination in any given case of whether 
handicapped beneficiary has become capable of 
self-support depends upon individual facts of 
case; in absence of evidence that saiary of handi-
capped beneficiary is sufficient for her own par-
ticular personal needs, annuity should be not be 
suspended. (1983) 62 Op Comp Gen p 193. 
§ 1448. Application of Plan 
(a)(1) The program established by this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447 et 
seq.] shall be known as the Survivor Benefit Plan. The following persons 
are eligible to participate in the Plan: 
(A) Persons entitled to retired pay. 
(B) Persons who would be eligible for retired pay under chapter 67 of 
this title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.] but for the fact that they are 
under 60 years of age. 
(2) The Plan applies— 
(A) to a person who is eligible to participate in the Plan under 
paragraph (1)(A) and who is married or has a dependent child when 
he becomes entitled to retired pay, unless he elects (with his spouse's 
concurrence, if required under paragraph (3)) not to participate in the 
Plan before the first day for which he is eligible for that pay; and 
(B) to a person who (i) is eligible to participate in the Plan under 
paragraph (1)(B), (ii) is married or has a dependent child when he is 
notified under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS § 1331(d)] that 
he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for 
retired pay under chapter 67 of this title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.], 
and (iii) elects to participate in the Plan (and makes a designation 
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under subsection (e)) before the end of the 90-day period beginning 
on the date he receives such notification. 
A person described in subclauses (i) and (ii) of clause (B) who does not 
elect to participate in the Plan before the end of the 90-day period 
referred to in such clause shall remain eligible, upon reaching 60 years 
of age and otherwise becoming entitled to retired pay, to participate in 
the Plan in accordance with eligibility under paragraph (1)(A). 
(3)(A) A married person who is eligible to provide a standard annuity 
may not without the concurrence of the person's spouse elect— 
(i) not to participate in the Plan; 
(ii) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse at less than the 
maximum level; or 
(iii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for the 
person's spouse. 
(B) A married person who elects to provide a reserve-component 
annuity may not without the concurrence of the person's spouse 
elect— 
(i) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse at less than the 
maximum level; or 
(ii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for the 
person's spouse. 
(C) A person may make an election described in subparagraph (A) or 
(B) without the concurrence of the person's spouse if the person 
establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary concerned— 
(i) that the spouse's whereabouts cannot be determined; or 
(ii) that, due to exceptional circumstances, requiring the person to 
seek the spouse's consent would otherwise be inappropriate. 
(D) This paragraph does not affect any right or obligation to elect to 
provide an annuity for a former spouse (or for a former spouse and 
dependent child) under subsection (b)(2). 
(E) If a married person who is eligible to provide a standard annuity 
elects to provide an annuity for a former spouse (or for a former 
spouse and dependent child) under subsection (b)(2), that person's 
spouse shall be notified of that election. 
(4)(A) An election under paragraph (2)(A) not to participate in the Plan 
is irrevocable if not revoked before the date on which the person first 
becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay. 
(B) An election under paragraph (2)(B) to participate in the Plan is 
irrevocable if not revoked before the end of the 90-day period referred 
to in such paragraph. 
(5) A person who is not married when he becomes eligible to participate 
in the Plan but who later marries or acquires a dependent child may 
elect to participate in the Plan, but his election must be written, signed 
by him, and received by the Secretary concerned within one year after 
he marries or acquires that dependent child. Such an election may not 
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be revoked except in accordance with subsection (b)(3). His election is 
effective as of the first day of the first calendar month following the 
month in which his election is received by the Secretary concerned. In 
the case of a person providing an annuity by virtue of eligibility under 
paragraph (1)(B), such an election shall include a designation under 
subsection (e). 
(6)(A) A person— 
(i) who is a participant in the Plan and is providing coverage for a 
spouse or a spouse and child; 
(ii) who does not have an eligible spouse beneficiary under the 
Plan; and 
(iii) who remarries, 
may elect not to provide coverage under the Plan for the person's 
spouse. 
(B) If such an election is made, no reduction in the retired pay of 
such person under section 1452 of this title [10 USCS § 1452] may be 
made. An election under this paragraph— 
(i) is irrevocable; 
(ii) shall be made within one year after the person's remarriage; 
and 
(iii) shall be made in such form and manner as may be prescribed 
in regulations under section 1455 of this title [10 USCS § 1455]. 
(C) If a person makes an election under this paragraph— 
(i) not to participate in the Plan; 
(ii) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse at less than the 
maximum level; or 
(iii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for the 
person's spouse, 
the person's spouse shall be notified of that election. 
(D) This paragraph does not affect any right or obligation to elect to 
provide an annuity to a former spouse under subsection (b). 
(b)(1) A person who is not married and does not have a dependent child 
when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan may elect to provide 
an annuity to a natural person with an insurable interest in that person. 
In the case of a person providing a reserve-component annuity, such an 
election shall include a designation under subsection (e). 
(2) A person who has a former spouse when he becomes eligible to 
participate in the Plan may elect to provide an annuity to that former 
spouse. In the case of a person with a spouse or a dependent child, such 
an election prevents payment of an annuity to that spouse or child 
(other than a child who is a beneficiary under an election under 
paragraph (4)), including payment under subsection (d). If there is more 
than one former spouse, the person shall designate which former spouse 
is to be provided the annuity. In the case of a person providing a 
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reserve-component annuity, such an election shall include a designation 
under subsection (e). 
(3)(A) A person— 
(i) who is a participant in the Plan and is providing coverage for a 
spouse or a spouse and child (even though there is no beneficiary 
currently eligible for such coverage), and 
(ii) who has a former spouse who was not that person's former 
spouse when he became eligible to participate in the Plan, 
may (subject to subparagraph (B)) elect to provide an annuity to that 
former spouse. Any such election terminates any previous coverage 
under the Plan and must be written, signed by the person, and received 
by the Secretary concerned within one year after the date of the decree 
of divorce, dissolution, or annulment. 
(B) A person may not make an election under subparagraph (A) to 
provide an annuity to a former spouse who that person married after 
becoming eligible for retired pay unless— 
(i) the person was married to that former spouse for at least one 
year, or 
(ii) that former spouse is the parent of issue by that marriage. 
(C) An election under this paragraph may not be revoked except in 
accordance with section 1450(f) of this title [10 USCS § 1450(0] and 
is effective as of the first day of the first calendar month following the 
month in which it is received by the Secretary concerned. This 
paragraph does not provide the authority to change a designation 
previously made under subsection (e). 
(D) If a person who is married makes an election to provide an 
annuity to a former spouse under this paragraph, that person's spouse 
shall be notified of that election. 
(4) A person who elects to provide an annuity for a former spouse under 
paragraph (2) or (3) may, at the time of the election, elect to provide 
coverage under that annuity for both the former spouse and a dependent 
child, if the child resulted from the person's marriage to that former 
spouse. 
(5) A person who elects to provide an annuity to a former spouse under 
paragraph (2) or (3) shall, at the time of making the election, provide 
the Secretary concerned with a written statement (in a form to be 
prescribed by that Secretary and signed by such person and the former 
spouse) setting forth whether the election is being made pursuant to a 
written agreement previously entered into voluntarily by such person as 
a part of or incident to a proceeding of divorce, dissolution, or annul-
ment and (if so) whether such voluntary written agreement has been 
incorporated in, or ratified or approved by, a court order. 
(c) The application of the Plan to a person whose name is on the 
temporary disability retired list terminates when his name is removed from 
that list and he is no longer entitled to disability retired pay. 
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(d)(1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter 
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the surviving spouse of a member who dies 
on active duty after— 
(A) becoming eligible to receive retired pay; 
(B) qualifying for retired pay except that he has not applied for or 
been granted that pay; or 
(C) completing 20 years of active service but before he is eligible to 
retire as a commissioned officer because he has not completed 10 
years of active commissioned service. 
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter 
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the dependent child of a member described 
in paragraph (1) if the member and the member's spouse die as a result 
of a common accident. 
(3) If a member described in paragraph (1) is required under a court 
order or spousal agreement to provide an annuity to a former spouse 
upon becoming eligible to be a participant in the Plan or has made an 
election under subsection (b) to provide an annuity to a former spouse, 
the Secretary— 
(A) may not pay an annuity under paragraph (1) or (2); but 
(B) shall pay an annuity to that former spouse as if the member had 
been a participant in the Plan and had made an election under 
subsection (b) to provide an annuity to the former spouse, or in 
accordance with that election, as the case may be, if the Secretary 
receives a written request from the former spouse concerned that the 
election be deemed to have been made in the same manner as 
provided in section 1450(0(3) of this title [10 USCS § 1450(f)(3)]. 
(4) An annuity that may be provided under this subsection shall be 
provided in preference to an annuity that may be provided under any 
other provision of this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] on account 
of service of the same member. 
(5) The amount of an annuity under this subsection is computed under 
section 1451(c) of this title [10 USCS § 1451(c)]. 
(e) In any case in which a person electing to participate in the Plan is 
required to make a designation under this subsection, the person making 
such election shall designate whether, in the event he dies before becoming 
60 years of age, the annuity provided shall become effective on the day 
after the date of his death or on the 60th anniversary of his birth. 
(f)(1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter 
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the surviving spouse of a person who is 
eligible to provide a reserve-component annuity and who dies— 
(A) before being notified under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS 
§ 1331(d)] that he has completed the years of service required for 
eligibility for retired pay under chapter 67 of this title [10 USCS 
§§ 1331 et seq.]; or 
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(B) during the 90-day period beginning on the date he receives 
notification under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS § 1331(d)] 
that he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for 
retired pay under chapter 67 of this title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.] if 
he had not made an election under subsection (a)(2)(B) to participate 
in the Plan. 
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter 
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the dependent child of a person described 
in paragraph (1) if the person and the person's spouse die as a result of 
a common accident. 
(3) If a person described in paragraph (1) is required under a court 
order or spousal agreement to provide an annuity to a former spouse 
upon becoming eligible to be a participant in the Plan or has made an 
election under subsection (b) to provide an annuity to a former spouse, 
the Secretary— 
(A) may not pay an annuity under paragraph (1) or (2); but 
(B) shall pay an annuity to that former spouse as if the person had 
been a participant in the Plan and had made an election under 
subsection (b) to provide an annuity to the former spouse, or in 
accordance with that election, as the case may be, if the Secretary 
receives a written request from the former spouse concerned that the 
election be deemed to have been made in the same manner as 
provided in section 1450(0(3) of this title [10 USCS § 1450(0(3)]. 
(4) The amount of an annuity under this subsection is computed under 
section 1451(c) of this title [10 USCS § 1451(c)]. 
(g)(1) A person— 
(A) who is a participant in the Plan and is providing coverage under 
subsection (a) for a spouse or a spouse and child, but at less than the 
maximum level; and 
(B) who remarries, 
may elect, within one year of such remarriage, to increase the level of 
coverage provided under the Plan to a level not in excess of the current 
retired pay of that person. 
(2) Such an election shall be contingent on the person paying to the 
United States the amount determined under paragraph (3) plus interest 
on such amount at a rate determined under regulations prescribed by 
the Secretary of Defense. 
(3) The amount referred to in paragraph (2) is the amount equal to the 
difference between— 
(A) the amount that would have been withheld from such person's 
retired pay under section 1452 of this title [10 USCS § 1452] if the 
higher level of coverage had been in effect from the time the person 
became a participant in the Plan; and 
(B) the amount of such person's retired pay actually withheld. 
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(4) An election under paragraph (1) shall be made in such manner as 
the Secretary shall prescribe and shall become effective upon receipt of 
the payment required by paragraph (2). 
(5) A payment received under this subsection by the Secretary of 
Defense shall be deposited into the Department of Defense Military 
Retirement Fund. Any other payment received under this subsection 
shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 
(Added Sept. 21, 1972, P. L. 92-425, § 1(3), 86 Stat. 707; Oct. 14, 1976, P. 
L. 94-496, § 1(2), 90 Stat. 2375; Sept. 30, 1978, P. L. 95-397, Title II, 
§ 202, 92 Stat 844; Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1003(b), 96 Stat. 
735; Oct. 12, 1982, P. L. 97-295, § 1(18), 96 Stat. 1290; Sept. 24, 1983, P. 
L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D, § 941(a)(1), (2), (c)(2), 97 Stat. 652, 653; Nov. 
8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title V, Part B, § 513(b), Title VII, Part A, 
§§ 712(a), 713(a), 715, 716(a), 719(3), (8)(A) in part, Part B, § 721(a), 99 
Stat. 628, 670, 671, 673-676.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1976. Act Oct. 14, 1976 (effective 9/21/72, as provided by § 3 of such 
Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note), in subsec. (a), inserted 
"or elects to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for his 
spouse". 
1978. Act Sept. 30, 1978, substituted subsec. (a) for one which read: 
"The Plan applies to a person who is married or has a dependent child 
when he becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay unless he elects not 
to participate in the Plan before the first day for which he is eligible for 
that pay. If a person who is married elects not to participate in the 
Plan at the maximum level, or elects to provide an annuity for a 
dependent child but not for his spouse that person's spouse shall be 
notified of the decision. An election not to participate in the Plan is 
irrevocable if not revoked before the date on which the person first 
becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay. However, a person who is 
not married when he becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay but 
who later marries, or acquires a dependent child, may elect to partici-
pate in the Plan but his election must be written, signed by him, and 
received by the Secretary concerned within one year after he marries, 
or acquires that dependent child. Such an election may not be revoked. 
His election is effective as of the first day of the month after his 
election is received by the Secretary concerned."; in subsec. (b), 
substituted "eligible to participate in the Plan" for "entitled to retired 
or retainer pay" and added "In the case of a person providing an 
annuity under this subsection by virtue of eligibility under subsection 
(a)(1)(B), such an election shall include a designation under subsection 
(e)."; and added subsec. (e). 
1982. Act Sept. 8, 1982 (effective on the first day of the first month 
which begins more than 120 days after enactment on 9/8/82), in 
subsec. (a)(3), in subparas. (A) and (B), inserted "or elects to provide 
an annuity under subsection (b)(2) of this section,"; and substituted 
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subsec. (b) for one which read; "A person who is not married and does 
not have a dependent child when he becomes eligible to participate in 
the Plan may elect to provide an annuity to a natural person with an 
insurable interest in that person. In the case of a person providing an 
annuity under this subsection by virtue of eligibility under subsection 
(a)(1)(B), such an election shall include a designation under subsection 
(e).". 
Act Oct. 12, 1982, in the section heading, substituted "Plan" for 
"plan", s 
1983. Act Sept. 24, 1983, in subsec. (a)(3), in subparas. (A) and (B), 
inserted "for a former spouse" and deleted "of this section" following 
"(b)(2)", in each instance, in para. (5), inserted "except in accordance 
with subsection (b)(3)"; and substituted subsec. (b) for one which read: 
"(b)(1) A person who is not married and does not have a dependent 
child when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan may elect 
to provide an annuity to a natural person with an insurable interest 
in that person or to provide an annuity to a former spouse. 
"(2) A person who is married or has a dependent child may elect to 
provide an annuity to a former spouse instead of providing an 
annuity to a spouse or dependent child if the election is made in 
order to carry out the terms of a written agreement entered into 
voluntarily with the former spouse (without regard to whether such 
agreement is included in or approved by a court order). 
"(3) In the case of a person electing to provide an annuity under 
paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection by virtue of eligibility under 
subsection (a)(1)(B), the election shall include a designation under 
subsection (e). 
"(4) Any person who elects under paragraph (1) or (2) to provide an 
annuity to a former spouse shall, at the time of making such 
election, provide the Secretary concerned with a written statement, 
in a form to be prescribed by that Secretary, signed by such person 
and the former spouse setting forth whether the election is being 
made pursuant to a voluntary written agreement previously entered 
into by such person as a part of or incident to a proceeding of 
divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, and if so, 
whether such voluntary written agreement has been incorporated in 
or ratified or approved by a court order.". 
1985. Act Nov. 8, 1985, in subsec. (c), inserted "disability" before 
"retired pay". 
Such Act further (effective on the first day of the first month beginning 
more than 90 days after enactment on 11/8/85, as provided by § 731(a) 
of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note), in subsec. (a), in 
para. (1)(A), deleted "or retainer" preceding "pay", in para. (2)(A), 
deleted "or retainer" following "to retired", and inserted "(with his 
spouse's concurrence, if required under paragraph (3))", and substi-
tuted para. (3) for one which read: 
"(3)(A) If a person who is eligible under paragraph (1)(A) to 
participate in the Plan and who is married elects not to partici-
pate in the Plan at the maximum level, or elects to provide an 
annuity for a dependent child but not for his spouse, or elects to 
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provide an annuity for a former spouse under subsection (b)(2), 
that person's spouse shall be notified of that election. 
"(B) If a person who is eligible under paragraph (1)(B) to 
participate in the Plan and who is married does not elect to 
participate in the Plan at the maximum level, or elects to provide 
an annuity for a dependent child but not for his spouse, or elects 
to provide an annuity for a former spouse under subsection (b)(2), 
that person's spouse shall be notified of that action.". 
Such Act further, in subsec. (a), added para. (6); in subsec. (b), in para. 
(1), substituted "a reserve-component annuity" for "an annuity under 
this paragraph by virtue of eligibility under subsection (a)(1)(B)", in 
para. (2), inserted "(other than a child who is a beneficiary under an 
election under paragraph (4))" and substituted "a reserve-component 
annuity" for "an annuity under this paragraph by virtue of eligibility 
under subsection (a)(1)(B)", in para. (3)(B), deleted "or retainer" 
preceding "pay", redesignated para. (4) as para. (5), and added new 
para. (4); substituted subsec. (d) for one which read: "If a member of 
an armed force dies on active duty after he has become entitled to 
retired or retainer pay, or after he has qualified for that pay except that 
he has not applied for or been granted that pay, and his spouse is 
eligible for dependency and indemnity compensation under section 
411(a) of title 38 in an amount that is less than the annuity the spouse 
would have received under this subchapter if it had applied to the 
member when he died, the Secretary concerned shall pay to the spouse 
an annuity equal to the difference between that amount of compensa-
tion and 55 percent of the retired or retainer pay to which the 
otherwise eligible spouse described in section 1450(a)(1) of this title 
would have been entitled if the member had been entitled to that pay 
based upon his years of active service when he died."; and added 
subsecs. (0 and (g). 
Other provisions: 
Election to participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan and withdraw from 
the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan. 
Act Sept. 21, 1972, P. L. 92-425, § 3, 86 Stat. 711; Nov. 16, 1973, P. L. 
93-155, Title VIII, § 804, 87 Stat. 615, provided: 
"(a) The Survivor Benefit Plan established pursuant to clause (3) of the 
first section of this Act [adding 10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] applies to any 
person who initially becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay on or 
after the effective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972]. An election 
made before that date by such a person under section 1431 of title 10, 
United States Code [10 USCS § 1431], is canceled. However, a person 
who initially becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay within 180 
days after the effective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972] may, 
within 180 days after becoming so entitled, elect— 
"(1) not to participate in such Survivor Benefit Plan if he is married 
or has a dependent child; or 
"(2) to participate in that Plan, if he is a person covered by section 
1448(b) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (b) of this section]. 
"(b) Any person who is entitled to retired or retainer pay on the 
effective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972] may elect to 
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participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan established pursuant to clause 
(3) of the first section of this Act [adding 10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] at 
any time within eighteen months after such date. However, such a 
person who is receiving retired or retainer pay reduced under section 
1436(a) of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS § 1436(a)], or who is 
depositing amounts under section 1438 of that title [10 USCS § 1438], 
may elect at any time within eighteen months after the eflFective date of 
this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972]— 
"(1) to participate in the Plan and continue his participation under 
chapter 73 of that title [10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] as in effect on the 
day before the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972], 
except that the total of the annuities elected may not exceed 100 
percent of his retired or retainer pay; or 
"(2) to participate in the Plan and, notwithstanding section 1436(b) 
of that title [10 USCS § 1436(b)], terminate his participation under 
chapter 73 of that title [10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] as in effect on the 
day before the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972]. 
A person who elects under clause (2) of this subsection is not entitled 
to a refund of amounts previously deducted from his retired or retainer 
pay under chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1431 
et seq.], as in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act 
[enacted Sept. 21, 1972], or any payments made thereunder on his 
behalf. A person who is not married or does not have a dependent 
child on the first anniversary of the eflFective date of this Act [enacted 
Sept. 21, 1972], but who later marries or acquires a dependent child, 
may elect to participate in the Plan under the fourth sentence of 
section 1448(a) of that title [subsec. (a) of this section]. 
"(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Survivor Benefit Plan 
established pursuant to clause (3) of the first section of this Act [adding 
10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], and except as otherwise provided in this 
section [this note], subchapter I of chapter 73 of title 10, United States 
Code [10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] (other than the last two sentences of 
section 1436(a), section 1443, and section 1444(b)), as in effect on the 
day before the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972], shall 
continue to apply in the case of persons, and their beneficiaries, who 
have elected annuities under section 1431 or 1432 of that title [10 
USCS § 1431 or 1432] and who have not elected under subsection 
(b)(2) of this section [this note] to participate in that Plan. 
"(d) In this section [this note], 'base amount' means— 
"(1) the monthly retired or retainer pay to which a person— 
"(A) is entitled on the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 
1972]; or 
"(B) later becomes entitled by being advanced on the retired list, 
performing active duty, or being transferred from the temporary 
disability retired list to the permanent disability retired list; or 
"(2) any amount less than that described in clause (1) designated by 
that person at the time he makes an election under subsection (a)(2) 
or (b) of this section [this note], but not less than $300; as increased 
from time to time under section 1401a of title 10, United States 
Code [10 USCS § 1401a]. 
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"(e) An election made under subsection (a) or (b) of this section [this 
note] is effective on the date it is received by the Secretary concerned, 
as defined in section 101(5) of title 37, United States Code [37 USCS 
§ 101(5)]. 
"(0 Sections 1449, 1453, and 1454 of title 10, United States Code [10 
USCS §§ 1449, 1453, 1454], as added by clause (3) of the first section 
of this Act [adding 10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], are applicable to persons 
covered by this section [this note].". 
Income supplement for certain widows of retired members of the 
uniformed forces; special annuity for widows of commissioned person-
nel of the Public Health Service and National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration in lieu of VA Pension. Act Sept. 21, 1972, P. L. 
92-425, §4, 86 Stat. 712; Oct. 14, 1976, P. L. 94-496, §2, 90 Stat. 
2375; Sept. 30, 1978, P. L. 95-397, Title II, § 209, 92 Stat. 848; Oct. 9, 
1980, P. L. 96-402, § 6, 94 Stat. 1708; Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title 
IX, Part D, § 942(a), 97 Stat. 654 (effective for payments after Sept. 
1983, as provided by § 942(b) by such Act), provided: 
"(a) A person— 
"(1) who, on September 21, 1972, was, or during the period 
beginning on September 22, 1972, and ending on March 20, 1974, 
became, a widow of a person who was entitled to retired or retainer 
pay when he died;" 
"(2) who is eligible for a pension under subchapter III of chapter 15 
of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS §§ 531 et seq.], or section 
306 of the Veterans' and Survivors' Pension Improvement Act of 
1978 [38 USCS § 521 note]; and 
"(3) whose annual income, as determined in establishing that eligi-
bility, is less than $2,340; 
shall be paid an annuity by the Secretary concerned unless she is 
eligible to receive an annuity under the Survivor Benefit Plan estab-
lished pursuant to clause (3) of the first section of this Act [adding 10 
USCS §§ 1447 et seq.]. However, such a person who is the widow of a 
retired officer of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, and who would otherwise be eligible for 
an annuity under this section except that she does not qualify for the 
pension described in clause (2) of this subsection because the service of 
her deceased spouse is not considered active duty under section 101(21) 
of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS § 101(21)], is entitled to an 
annuity under this section [this note]. 
"(b) The annuity under subsection (a) of this section [this note] shall be 
in an amount which when added to the widow's income determined 
under subsection (a)(3) of this section [this note], plus the amount of 
any annuity being received under sections 1431-1436 of title 10, United 
States Code [10 USCS §§ 1431-1436], but exclusive of a pension 
described in subsection (a)(2) of this section [this note], equals $2,340 a 
year. In addition, the Secretary concerned shall pay to the widow, 
described in the last sentence of subsection (a) of this section [this 
note], an amount equal to the pension she would otherwise have been 
eligible to receive under subchapter III of chapter 15 of title 38, United 
States Code [38 USCS §§531 et seq.], if the service of her deceased 
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spouse was considered active duty under section 101(21) of that title 
[38 USCS §§ 101(21)]. 
"(c) The amounts specified in subsections (a)(3) and (b) shall be 
increased by the Secretary concerned whenever there is an increase 
under section 3112 of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS § 3112], in 
the maximum annual rate of pension under section 541(b) of such title 
[38 USCS § 541(b)]. Any such increase under the preceding sentence 
shall be in the same amount, and shall have the same effective date, as 
such increase in the maximum annual rate of pension. 
"(d) Subsection 1450(i) and section 1453 as added to title 10, United 
States Code, by clause 3 of the first section of this Act [10 USCS 
§§ 1450(i), 1453], are applicable to persons covered by this section [this 
note].". 
90-day period. Act Sept. 30, 1978, P. L. 95-397, Title II, § 208, 92 Stat. 
848, provided that for certain individuals, the 90-day period referred to 
in subsec. (a)(2) and (4)(B) of this section shall be considered to end at 
the end of the one-year period beginning on the effective date of Title 
II of that Act; see 10 USCS § 1447 note. 
Effective date and application of 1978 amendments. Act Sept. 30, 1978, 
P. L. 95-397, Title II, §210, 92 Stat. 848, which appears as 10 USCS 
§ 1447 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by 
such Act are effective on Oct. 1, 1978 and applicable to annuities 
payable by vinue of such amendments for months beginning on or 
after such date. 
Surviving spouse; annuity payment and reduction provisions; election of 
annuity; definitions; effective date. Act Oct. 9, 1980, P. L. 96-402, § 5, 
94 Stat. 1707 (effective Dec. 1, 1980, and applicable as provided by § 7 
of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note), provided: 
"(a)(1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity to any individual 
who is the surviving spouse of a member of the uniformed services 
who— 
"(A) died before September 21, 1972; 
"(B) was serving on active duty in the uniformed services at the 
time of his death and had served on active duty for a period of 
not less than 20 years; and 
"(C) was at the time of his death entitled to retired or retainer 
pay or would have been entitled to that pay except that he had 
not applied for or been granted that pay. 
"(2) An annuity under paragraph (1) shall be paid under the 
provisions of subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States 
Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], in the same manner as if such 
member had died on or after September 21, 1972. 
"(b)(1) The amount of retired or retainer pay to be used as the basis 
for the computation of an annuity under subsection (a) is the 
amount of the retired or retainer pay to which the member would 
have been entitled if the member had been entitled to that pay based 
upon his years of active service when he died, adjusted by the 
overall percentage increase in retired and retainer pay under section 
1401a of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS § 1401a] (or any 
prior comparable provision of law), during the period beginning on 
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the date of the member's death and ending on the day before the 
effective date of this section [effective Dec. 1, 1980]. 
"(2) In addition to any reduction required under the provisions of 
subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS 
§§ 1447 et seq.], the annuity paid to any surviving spouse under this 
section shall be reduced by any amount such surviving spouse is 
entitled to receive as an annuity under subchapter I of such chapter 
[10 USCS §§ 1431 etseq.]. 
"(c) If an individual entitled to an annuity under this section is also 
entitled to an annuity under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, 
United States Code [10 USCS §§1447 et seq.], based upon a subse-
quent marriage, the individual may not receive both annuities but must 
elect which to receive. 
"(d) As used in this section: 
"(1) The term 'uniformed services' means the Armed Forces and the 
commissioned corps of the Public Health Service and of the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
"(2) The term 'surviving spouse' has the meaning given the terms 
'widow' and 'widower' in section 1447 of title 10, United States 
Code [10 USCS § 1447]. 
"(3) The term 'Secretary concerned' has the meaning given such 
term in section 101(8) of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS 
§ 101(8)], and includes the Secretary of Commerce, with respect to 
matters concerning the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, with 
respect to matters concerning the Public Health Service.". 
Open enrollment period for Survivor Benefit Plan. Act Aug. 13, 1981, 
P. L. 97-35, Title II, Subtitle B, § 212, 95 Stat. 383; Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 
97-252, Title XI, § 1119, 96 Stat. 753, provided: 
"(a)(1) Any eligible member who on the date of the enactment of this 
Act [enacted Aug. 13, 1981] is not a participant in the Survivor 
Benefit Plan may elect to participate in the Plan during the open 
enrollment period specified in subsection (b). 
"(2) Any eligible member who on the date of the enactment of this 
Act [enacted Aug. 13, 1981] is a participant in the Plan but elected 
not to participate in the Plan at the maximum level or (in the case 
of an eligible member who is married) elected to provide an annuity 
under the Plan for a dependent child and not for the member's 
spouse may during the open enrollment period elect to participate in 
the Plan at a higher level or to provide an annuity under the Plan 
for the eligible member's spouse at a level not less than the level 
provided for the dependent child. 
"(3) Any such election shall be made in the same manner as an 
election under section 1448 of such title [10 USCS § 1448] and shall 
be effective when received by the Secretary concerned. Notwith-
standing the last sentence of section 1452(a) of such title [10 USCS 
§ 1452(a)], the reduction in retired or retainer pay prescribed by the 
first sentence of such section shall, in the case of an individual 
making an election under paragraph (1), begin on the first day of the 
first month beginning after such election is effective. 
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"(b) The open enrollment period is the period beginning on October 1, 
1981, and ending on September 30, 1982, in the case of a member or 
former member of the uniformed services who on August 13, 1981, was 
entitled to retired or retainer pay, and the period beginning on October 
1, 1982, and ending on September 30, 1983, in the case of a member or 
former member who on August 13, 1981, would have been entitled to 
retired pay under chapter 67 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS 
§§ 1331 et seq.], but for the fact that he was under sixty years of age 
on that date. 
"(c) If an individual making an election under subsection (a) dies 
before the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of that 
election, the election is void and the amount of any reduction in the 
retired or retainer pay of such individual that is attributable to the 
election shall be paid in a lump sum to that individual's beneficiary 
under the Plan (as designated under that election). 
"(d) Sections 1449, 1453, and 1454 of title 10, United States Code [10 
USCS §§ 1449, 1453, 1454], are applicable to individuals making 
elections and to elections under this section. 
"(e) For the purposes of this section: 
"(1) The term 'eligible member' means a member or former member 
of the uniformed services who on August 13, 1981 (A) was entitled 
to retired or retainer pay, or (B) would have been entitled to retired 
pay under chapter 67 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS 
§§ 1331 et seq.], but for the fact that he was under sixty years of age 
on that date. 
"(2) The term 'Survivor Benefit Plan' or 'Plan' means the program 
established under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United 
States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.]. 
"(3) The term 'Secretary concerned' has the meaning given such 
term in section 101(5) of title 37, United States Code [37 USCS 
§ 101(5)].". 
Application of Sept. 8, 1982 amendment of this section. For provisions 
as to the application of the amendment of this section by Act Sept. 8, 
1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1003 (see the 1982 Amendments note to 
this section), see § 1006(c) of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS 
§ 1408 note. 
Application and construction of the Oct. 12, 1982 amendment of this 
section. For provisions as to the application and construction of the 
Oct. 12, 1982 amendment of this section (see the Amendments note to 
this section), see § 5 of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 101 
note. 
Application of subsec. (b) to person described in subsec. (b)(3)(A). Act 
Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D, § 941(b), 97 Stat. 653, 
provided: "In the case of a person who on the date of the enactment of 
this Act [enacted Sept. 24, 1983] is a person described in subparagraph 
(A) of subsection (b)(3) of section 1448 of title 10, United States Code 
[subsec. (b)(3)(A) of this section] (as amended by subsection (a)(2) [see 
the 1983 Amendments note to this section]), such subsection shall 
apply to that person as if the one-year period provided for in subpara-
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graph (A) of such subsection began on the date of the enactment of 
this Act [enacted Sept. 24, 1983].". 
Annuity payable after September 1983. Act Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, 
Title IX, Part D, § 942(b), 97 Stat. 654, provided: "Any annuity 
payable by reason of subsection (a) [amending Act Sept 21, 1972, P. L. 
92-425, § 4, 86 Stat. 712, which appears as a note to this section] shall 
be payable only for months after September 1983.". 
Option for certain participants to withdraw from Survivor Benefit 
Plan. Act Nov. 8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part A, § 711(c), 99 
Stat. 670, provided: "A person who during the period beginning on 
October 19, 1984, and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act 
[enacted Nov. 8, 1985] became a participant in the Survivor Benefit 
Plan under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code 
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], may elect to withdraw from the Plan before 
the end of the one-year period beginning on the date of the enactment 
of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985]. Any person who makes a with-
drawal shall be paid the amount of the contributions by such person 
under the Plan, plus interest on such amount as determined by the 
Secretary of Defense/'. 
Application of Nov. 8, 1985 amendment to subsec. (d). Act Nov. 8, 
1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part A, § 712(b), 99 Stat. 671, provided: 
"(1) Section 1448(d) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (d) of 
this Section], as amended by subsection (a) applies to the surviving 
spouse and dependent children of a person who dies on active duty 
after September 20, 1972, and the former spouse of a person who 
dies after September 7, 1982. 
"(2) In the case of the surviving spouse and children of a person 
who dies during the period beginning on September 21, 1972, and 
ending on October 1, 1985, the Secretary concerned shall take 
appropriate steps to locate persons eligible for an annuity under 
section 1448(d) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (d) of this 
section], as amended by subsection (a). Any such person must 
submit an application to the Secretary for such an annuity before 
October 1, 1988, to be eligible to receive such annuity. Any such 
annuity shall be effective only for months after the month in which 
the Secretary receives such application.". 
Application of subsec. (f). Act Nov. 8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, 
Part A, § 713(c), 99 Stat. 672, provided: 
"(1) Section 1448(f) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (f) of 
this section], as added by subsection (a), shall apply to the surviving 
spouse and dependent children of any person who dies after Septem-
ber 30, 1978, and the former spouse of a person who dies after 
September 7, 1982. 
"(2) In the case of the surviving spouse and dependents of a person 
who dies during the period beginning on September 30, 1978, and 
ending on October 1, 1985, the Secretary concerned shall take 
appropriate steps to locate persons eligible for an annuity under 
section 1448(0 of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (0 of this 
section], as added by subsection (a). Any such person must submit 
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an application to the Secretary for such an annuity before October 1, 
1988, to be eligible to receive such annuity. Any such annuity shall 
be effective only for months after the month in which the Secretary 
receives such application.'*. 
Revision for former spouse coverage already in effect. Act Nov. 8, 
1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part A, § 716(b), 99 Stat. 674, provided: 
"A person who before the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted 
Nov. 8, 1985] made an election under section 1448(b) of title 10, 
United States Code [subsec. (b) of this section], to provide an annuity 
for a former spouse may elect, within the one-year period beginning on 
that date of enactment, to change that election so as to provide an 
annuity for the former spouse and the dependent children of the 
person, as authorized by paragraph (4) of that section [subsec. (b)(4) of 
this section] added by subsection (a). Such an election may be made 
even though the former spouse for whom the annuity was provided has 
died.". 
One-year open period to switch computation of SBP annuity. Act Nov. 
8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part B, § 723(c), 99 Stat. 677, 
provided: "A person who, before the effective date of this title [see 10 
USCS § 1447 note], participated in the Survivor Benefit Plan under 
subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS 
§ 1447 et seq.], and had elected to provide an annuity to a former 
spouse may, with the concurrence of such former spouse, elect to 
terminate such annuity and provide an annuity to such former spouse 
under section 1450(a)(1) of such title [10 USCS § 1450(a)(1)]. Any such 
election shall be made before the end of the 12-month period beginning 
on the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985].". 
One-year open period for new former spouse coverage. Act Nov. 8, 
1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part B, § 723(d), 99 Stat. 677, provided: 
"A person who before the effective date of this part [see 10 USCS 
§ 1447 note] was a participant in the Survivor Benefit Plan and did not 
elect to provide an annuity to a former spouse may elect to provide an 
annuity to a former spouse under the Plan. Any such election shall be 
made before the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date of 
the enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985].". 
Application of amendments by Act Nov. 8, 1985. For provisions as to 
the application of amendments to this section by Act Nov. 8, 1985, see 
Act Nov. 8, 1985, P.L. 99-145, Title VII, Part C, § 731(b), 99 Stat. 
678, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
This section is referred to in 10 USCS §§ 1447, 1449, 1450-1452, 1455; 38 
USCS §410. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
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Hauserman and Fethke, Military Pensions as Divisible Assets: The 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act. 11 J Legis 27, 
Winter, 1984. 
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INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
1. Relationship to other law 
2. Election to participate; timeliness 
3. —Notice 
4. —Incorrect listing of spouse's name 
1. Relationship to other law 
Limitation contained in 10 USCS § 8963(a) 
restricting use of promotion to temporary grade 
for retired pay computation purposes is not 
applicable in establishing survivor benefit plan 
annuity under 10 USCS § 1448(d). (1980) 59 Op 
Comp Gen p 276. 
Children of deceased Air Force Reserve officer 
killed while on active duty for training after 
having elected coverage for his children under 
Survivor Benefit Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.) 
and subsequently qualifying for retirement under 
§8911, are entitled to annuity payments under 
Survivor Benefit Plan, where officer was not 
actually retired and entitled to retired pay under 
§8911, since merely qualifying for retirement 
under another statute does not void election to 
participate in Survivor Benefit Plan where elec-
tion was valid when made. (1982) 61 Op Comp 
Gen p 441. 
2. Election to participate; timeliness 
Where member had opportunity to elect for 
dependent children during 18-month period au-
thorized by Public Law 92-425, § 3(b), 86 Stat 
711, and failed to do so before March 21, 1974, 
when his election period for Survivor Benefits 
Plan closed, he is precluded from thereafter 
amending his coverage to include dependent 
children. (1977) 56 Op Comp Gen 1022. 
Pre-Survivor Benefit Plan effective date retiree, 
who is unmarried with dependent child on first 
anniversary date of Survivor Benefit Plan, may 
elect spouse coverage under fourth sentence of 
10 USCS § 1448(a) upon marriage after close of 
18-month election period authorized under sub-
section 3(b) of Public Law 92-425 (10 USCS 
§ 1448 note) notwithstanding fact that he could 
have elected coverage for his dependent child 
during that period and failed to do so. (1977) 57 
Op Comp Gen 98. 
3. —Notice 
Widow and surviving dependent child of re-
tired serviceman are entitled to recover survi-
vors' annuity benefits under Survivor Benefit 
Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.), notwithstanding 
that day before being discharged, serviceman 
elected not to participate in plan, after having 
earlier elected full plan coverage for his family, 
where Air Force did not furnish wife notice of 
husband's election not to be covered by plan, as 
required by § 1448(a). Barber v United States 
(1982) 230 *Ct CI 287, 676 F2d 651. 
Spouses of * pre-Survivor Benefit Plan (10 
USCS §§ 1447 et seq.) are entitled to notice from 
government of retiree's election not to participate 
in SBP; retiree's election not to participate in 
Plan has no effect until government fulfils its 
ministerial duty to notify retiree's spouse. Pas-
saro v United States (1984) 4 CI Ct 395, adhered 
to, on reconsideration 5 CI Ct 754. 
Failure of government of notify spouse of 
military retiree's election not to participate in 
Survivor Benefits Plan violates 10 USCS 
§ 1448(a) and gives rise to claim for damages on 
part of surviving spouse cognizable in claims 
court. Passaro v United States (1984) 5 CI Ct 
754. 
4. —Incorrect listing of spouse's name 
While incorrect listing of spouse's name on 
Survivor Benefit Plan form by member automati-
cally covered by Plan under 10 USCS § 1448(a) 
would not ordinarily be sufficient to remove 
member from coverage nor would it affect legal 
spouse's right to annuity under Plan since in 
such case listing of spouse's name on form is 
primarily for administrative convenience; how-
ever, in case of retired member who must make 
affirmative election to participate in Plan pursu-
ant to Public Law 92-425 § 3(b) (10 USCS 
§ 1448 note), completion of form is evidence of 
member's election to participate and where 
member made election to participate for purpose 
of providing annuity to ineligible beneficiary, in 
this case second spouse whose marriage was 
nullity due to continued validity of previous 
marriage, election to participate is defective and 
must be considered invalid and no annuity may 
be paid although amounts deducted from retired 
pay as cost of Plan coverage should be paid to 
proper beneficiary under 10 USCS § 2771. (1978) 
57 Op Comp Gen 426. 
§ 1449. Mental incompetency of member 
If a person to whom section 1448 of this title [10 USCS § 1448] applies is 
determined to be mentally incompetent by medical officers of the armed 
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(11) The term "retired pay" includes retainer pay paid under section 6330 of this title. 
(12) The term "standard annuity" means an annuity provided by virtue of eligibility under 
section 1448(a)(1)(A) of this title. 
(13) The term "reserve-component annuity" means an annuity provided by virtue of 
eligibility under section 1448(a)(1)(B) of this title. 
(14) The term "reserve-component retired pay" means retired pay under chapter 67 of this 
title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.]. 
(As amended July 1, 1986, P. L. 99-348, Title III. § 301(a)(1), 100 Stat. 702; Nov. 14, 1986, P. 
L. 99-661, Div A, Title XIII, Part E, § 1343(a)(8)(A), 100 Stat 3992; Dec. 4, 1987, P. L. 100-
180, DivA, Title XII, Part D, § 1231(17), 101 Stat. 1161; Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div 
A, Title XIV, § 1407(a)(l)-(3), 103 Stat. 1589; Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A, Title XIV, 
Part H, § 1484f/;(4)(C)(i), 104 Stat. 1719.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1986. Act July 1, 1986, in para. (2)(A), in the introductory matter, inserted "(determined 
without regard to any reduction under section 1409(b)(2) of this title)". 
Act Nov. 14, 1986, in para. (2)(A), in the introductory matter, deleted "or retainer" 
following "retired or" in two places. 
1987. Act Dec. 4, 1987, m paras. (1M13), inserted "The term" and, in paras. (2M13V revised 
the first quoted word in each para, so that the initial letter of such word is lower case. 
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989,. in paras. (2)(B), in the introductory matter, and (Q(ii), substituted 
"reserve-component retired pay" for "retired pay under chapter 67 of this title", in para. 
(2)(C)(i), and the introductory matter in paras. (3) and (4), deleted "or retainer" following 
"retired", in para. (5), in the concluding matter, substituted "this paragraph" for "this 
clause" wherever appearing, in para. (11), inserted "paid under section 6330 of this title", 
and added para. (14). 
1990. Act Nov. 5, 1990 (effective 11/29/89 as provided by § 1484(1)(4XC) of this Act) 
corrected the statutory instructions of Act Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, § 1407(a), so that 
the amendment to para. (5) concluding matter substituting "this paragraph" for "this clause" 
was effected each place it appears. 
Short title: 
Act Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div A, Title XIV, § 1401, 103 Stat 1577, provides: "This 
title may be cited as the 'Military Survivor Benefits Improvement Act of 1989'.". For full 
classification of this Title, consult USCS Tables volumes. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Law Review Articles: 
Polchek, Recent property settlement issues for legal assistance attorneys. 1992 Army Law 4, 
December, 1992. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Children of Survivor Benefit Plan (10 USCS 
§§ 1447 et seq.) participants who are over 18 years 
old and are not attending school may become 
eligible for annuity at any time until they reach age 
of 22 by undertaking full-time course of study, as 
Congress in establishing plan indicated that chil-
dren aged anywhere between 18 and 22 years old 
who are students should be regarded as eligible 
dependents for purposes of annuity coverage; (1986) 
65 Op Comp Gen p 767. 
If Survivor Benefit Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et 
seq.) participant's child who is between 18 and 22 
years old becomes full-time student and thus be-
comes eligible for annuity under plan, any resulting 
adjustment that may be necessary in participant's 
cost for beneficiary coverage should be made effec-
tive on first day of month after child has resumed 
school attendance, as costs for benefit coverage 
generally are assessed on monthly basis and should 
be predicated on beneficiary status in beginning on 
first day of month for that month. (1986) 65 Op 
Comp Gen p 767. 
Generally, valid marriage entered into by Survi-
§ 1448. Application of Plan 
(a)(1) [Introductory matter unchanged] 
vor Benefit Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.) partici-
pant's child terminates child's annuity eligibility for 
all time, as valid marriage operates to end child's 
dependence upon parents, and relationship of de-
pendency cannot be renewed by subsequent divorce; 
if marriage is ended not by ordinary divorce but 
rather by annulment, or there is otherwise judicial 
decree rendered by court of competent jurisdiction 
declaring marriage void, there would be proper 
basis for concluding marriage was invalid, and 
child's annuity coverage could be reinstated. (1986) 
65 Op Comp Gen p 767. 
Former wife is not entitled to be designated as 
former spouse beneficiary under survivor benefit 
plan of retired service member where court order 
merely reiterated earlier divorce decree requirement 
that service member provide former spouse cover-
age, since court order is not "modification" of 
previous court order as that term is used in 10 
USCS § 1447(8) and does not establish new statu-
tory one year filing period for election of coverage. 
Nawanna Driggers (1992) 71 Comp Gen 475; Con-
stance L. Posner (1992) 71 Comp Gen 478. 
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(A) [Unchanged] 
(B) Persons who would be eligible for reserve-component retired pay but for the fact that 
they are under 60 years of age. 
(2) [Introductory matter unchanged] 
(A) [Unchanged] 
(B) to a person who (i) is eligible to participate in the Plan under paragraph (1)(B), (ii) 
is married or has a dependent child when he is notified under section 1331(d) of this title 
that he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for reserve-component 
retired pay, and (iii) elects to participate in the Plan (and makes a designation under 
subsection (e)) before the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date he receives such 
notification. 
[Concluding matter unchanged] 
(3) [Unchanged] 
(4)(A) An election under paragraph (2)(A) not to participate in the Plan is irrevocable if 
not revoked before the date on which the person first becomes entitled to retired pay. 
(B) [Unchanged] 
(5) A person who is not married when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan but 
who later marries or acquires a dependent child may elect to participate in the Plan, but 
his election must be written, signed by him, and received by the Secretary concerned within 
one year after he marries or acquires that dependent child. Such an election may not be 
revoked except in accordance with subsection (b)(3). His election is effective as of the first 
day of the first calendar month following the month in which his election is received by the 
Secretary concerned. In the case of a person providing a reserve-component annuity, such 
an election shall include a designation under subsection (e). 
(6) [Unchanged] 
(b)(l)-(4) [Unchanged] 
(5) A person who elects to provide an annuity to a former spouse under paragraph (2) or 
(3) shall, at the time of making the election, provide the Secretary concerned with a written 
statement (in a form to be prescribed by that Secretary and signed by such person and the 
former spouse) setting forth (A) whether the election is being made pursuant to the 
requirements of a court order, or (B) whether the election is being made pursuant to a 
written agreement previously entered into voluntarily by such person as a part of or incident 
to a proceeding of divorce, dissolution, or annulment and (if so) whether such voluntary 
written agreement has been incorporated in, or ratified or approved by, a court order. 
(c) [Unchanged] 
(d)(1) [Unchanged] 
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447 
et seq.] to the dependent child of a member described in paragraph (1) if* there is no surviving 
spouse or if the member's surviving spouse subsequently dies. 
(3)-(5) [Unchanged] 
(e) [Unchanged] 
(f)(1) [Introductory matter unchanged] 
(A) before being notified under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS § 1331(d)] that he 
has completed the years of service required for eligibility for reserve-component retired 
pay; or 
(B) during the 90-day period beginning on the date he receives notification under section 
1331(d) of this title that he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for 
reserve-component retired pay if he had not made an election under subsection (a)(2)(B) 
to participate in the Plan. 
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447 
et seq.] to the dependent child of a person described in paragraph (1) if there is no surviving 
spouse or if the person's surviving spouse subsequently dies. 
(3), (4) [Unchanged] 
(g) [Unchanged] 
(As amended Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D, §§ 641(b)(1), 642(a), 100 
Stat. 3885, 3886; Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Title XIII, Part E, § 1343(a)(8)(B), 100 
Stat. 3992; Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div A, Title XIV, § 1407(a)(2), (3), 103 Stat. 1588.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1986. Act Nov. 14, 1986 (applicable as provided by § 641(c) of such Act, which appears as 
10 USCS § 1450 note), in subsec. (b), in para. (5), inserted "(A) whether the election is being 
made pursuant to the requirements of a court order, or (B)". 
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Such Act further (applicable as provided by § 642(c) of such Act, which appears as a note 
to this section), in subsec. (d), substituted "if there is no surviving spouse or if the member's 
surviving spouse subsequently dies'* for "if the member and the member's spouse die as a 
result of a common accident"; and in subsec. (f), m para. (2), substituted "if there is no 
surviving spouse or if the person's surviving spouse subsequently dies" for "if the person and 
the person's spouse die as a result of a common accident". 
Such Act further, in subsec. (aX5), substituted "a reserve-component annuity" for "an 
annuity by virtue of eligibility under paragraph (1)(B)" 
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989, in subsec. (a), m paras. (1)(B) and (2)(B), substituted "reserve-
component retired pay" for "retired pay under chapter 67 of this title", deleted "or retainer" 
following "retired", and, in subsec. (f)(1)(A) and (B), substituted "reserve-component retired 
pay" for "retired pay under chapter 67 of this title". 
Other provisions: 
Income supplement for certain widows of retired members of the uniformed forces; special 
annuity for widows of commissioned personnel of the Public Health Service and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in lieu of VA Pension. Act Sept. 21, 1972, P. L. 
92-425, § 4, 86 Stat. 712; Oct. 14, 1976, P. L. 94-496, § 2, 90 Stat. 2375; Sept. 30, 1978, P. 
L. 95-397, Title II, § 209, 92 Stat. 848; Oct. 9, 1980, P. I. 96-402, § 6, 94 Stat. 1708; Sept 
24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D, § 942(a), 97 Stat. 654 (effective for payments after 
Sept. 1983, as provided by § 942(b) by such Act), provided: 
(a), (b) [Unchanged] 
"(c) The amounts specified in subsections (a)(3) and (b) shall be increased by the Secretary 
concerned whenever there is an increase under section 3112 [now section 5112] of title 38, 
United States Code, in the maximum annual rate of pension under section 541(b) of such 
title. Any such increase under the preceding sentence shall be in the same amount, and shall 
have the same effective date, as such increase in the maximum annual rate of pension." 
(d) [Unchanged] 
Revision for former spouse coverage already in effect. Act Nov 8, 1985, P L. 99-145, Title 
VII, Part A, § 716(b), 99 Stat. 674; Nov 14, 1986, P L, 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D, 
§ 645, 100 Stat. 3887, provides: 
"A person who before March 1, 1986 made an election under section 1448(b) of title 10, 
United States Code [subsec. (b) of this section], to provide an annuity for a former spouse 
may elect to change that election so as to provide an annuity for the former spouse and the 
dependent children of the person, as authorized by paragraph (4) of that section [subsec. 
(b)(4) of this section] added by subsection (a). Such an election may be made even though 
the former spouse for whom the annuity was provided has died. Such an election must be 
made— 
"(1) not later than March 1, 1987, m the case of a person who made the election to 
provide an annuity for a former spouse before November 8, 1985; and 
"(2) not later than the end of the one-year period beginning on the date of the enactment 
of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987 [enacted Nov. 14, 1986], in the 
case of a person who made the election to provide an annuity for a former spouse during 
the period beginning on November 8, 1985, and ending on February 28, 1986.". 
Application of the amendments made by § 642 of Act Nov. 14, 1986. Act Nov. 14, 1986, P. 
L. 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D, § 642(c), 100 Stat. 3886, provides: "The amendments 
made by subsection (a) shall apply only to claims ansmg on or after March 1, 1986. The 
amendments made by subsection (b) shall apply to payments for periods after February 28, 
1986.". 
Authority for certain remarried Survivor Benefit Plan participants to withdraw from Plan. 
Act Dec. 4, 1987, P. L. 100-180, Div A, Title VI, Part D, § 631, 101 Stat. 1104, provides: 
"(a) Authority to withdraw. (1) An individual who is a participant in the Survivor Benefit 
Plan under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 
et seq.], and is described m paragraph (2) may, with the consent of such individual's 
spouse, withdraw from participation in the Plan. 
"(2) An individual referred to m paragraph (1) is an individual who— 
"(A) is providing coverage for a spouse or for a spouse and child under the Plan; and 
"(B) remained before March 1, 1986, and at a time when such individual was a 
participant in the Plan but did not have an eligible spouse beneficiary under the Plan. 
"(b) Applicable provisions. An election under subsection (a) shall be subject to subparagraphs 
(B) and (D) of section 1448(a)(6) of title 10, United States Code, except that in applying such 
subparagraph (B) to subsection (a), the one-year period referred to in clause (u) of such 
subparagraph shall extend until the end of the one-year period beginning 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
"(c) Treatment of prior contributions. No refund of amounts by which the retired pay of a 
participant in the Survivor Benefit Plan has been reduced by reason of section 1452 of title 
10, United States Code, may be made to an individual who withdraws from the Survivor 
Benefit Plan under subsection (a).". 
Annuity for certain surviving spouses. Act Sept. 29, 1988, P. L. 100-456, Div A, Title VI, 
Part F, § 653, 102 Stat. 1991, provides: 
"(a) Annuity (1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity to the qualified surviving 
spouse of each member of the uniformed services who— 
10 USCS § 1448 ARMED FORCES 
"(A) died before November 1, 1953; and 
"(B) was entitled to retired or retainer pay on the date of death. 
"(2) A qualified surviving spouse for purposes of this section is a surviving spouse who 
has not remained and who is eligible for an annuity under section 4 of Public Law 92-
425(10U.S.C 1448 note). 
"(b) Amount of annuity. (1) An annuity payable under this section shall be paid at the rate 
of $165 per month, as adjusted from time to time under subsection (c). 
"(2) An annuity paid to a surviving spouse under this section shall be reduced by the 
amount of dependency and indemnity compensation (DIQ to which the surviving spouse 
is entitled under section 411(a) of title 38, United States Code. 
"(c) Cost-of-living mcreases. Whenever retired or retainer pay is mcreased under section 
1401a(bX2) of title 10, United States Code, each annuity that is payable under this section 
shall be mcreased at the same time and by the same total percent The amount of the mcrease 
shall be based on the monthly annuity payable before any reduction under this section. 
"(d) Relationship to other programs. An annuity paid to a surviving spouse under this section 
is m addition to any pension to which the surviving spouse is entitled under subchapter III 
of chapter 15 of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS §§ 532 et seq.], or section 306 of the 
Veterans' and Survivors' Pension Improvement Act of 1978 (38 U.S.C. 521 note), and any 
payment made under the provisions of section 4 of Public Law 92-425 [note to this section]. 
An annuity paid under this section shall not be considered as income for the purposes of 
eligibility for any such pension. 
"(e) Definitions. For purposes of this section. 
"(1) The terms 'uniformed services' and 'Secretary concerned* have the meanings given 
those terms m section 101 of title 37, United States Code. 
"(2) The term Surviving spouse' has the meaning given the terms 'widow' and 'widower' 
in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section 1447 of title 10, United States Code. 
"(f) Effective date. Annuities under this section shall be paid for months beginning after the 
month m which this Act is enacted. No benefit shall accrue to any person by reason of the 
enactment of this section for any period before the first month referred to m the preceding 
sentence. No benefit shall be paid to any person under this section unless an application for 
such benefit has been filed with the Secretary concerned by or on behalf of such person.". 
Open enrollment period. Act Nov. 29, 1989, P L. 101-189, Div A, Title XIV, § 1405, 103 
Stat. 1586; Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A, Tide VI, Part D, § 631(2), Title XIV, Part 
H, § 14840X4)(B), 104 Stat. 1580, 1719; Dec. 5, 1991, P. L. 102-190, Div A, Title VI, Part 
E, § 653(aXl), (c)(2), 105 Stat. 1388; Oct. 23, 1992, P. L. 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitie 
D, § 643, 106 Stat. 2425, provides 
"(a) Persons not currently participating m Survivor Benefit Plan (1) Election of SBP 
coverage. An eligible retired or former member may elect to participate in the Survivor 
Benefit Plan during the open enrollment period specified m subsection (f). 
"(2) Election of supplemental annuity coverage. An eligible retired or former member 
who elects under paragraph (1) to participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan at the 
maximum level may also elect during the open enrollment penod to participate m the 
Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan established under subchapter III of chapter 73 of 
title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1456 et seq.], as added by section 1404 
"(3) Eligible retired or former member. For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), an eligible 
retired or former member is a member or former member of the uniformed services who 
on the day before the first day of the open enrollment penod is not a participant m the 
Survivor Benefit Plan and— 
"(A) is entitled to retired pay; or 
"(B) would be entitled to retired pay under chapter 67 of title 10 [10 USCS §§ 1331 
et seq.], Umted States Code, but for the fact that such member or former member is 
under 60 years of age. 
"(4) Status under SBP of persons making elections. (A) Standard annuity A person 
making an election under paragraph (1) by reason of eligibility under paragraph 
(3XA) shall be treated for all purposes as providing a standard annuity under the 
Survivor Benefit Plan. 
"(B) Reserve-component annuity. A person making an election under paragraph (1) 
by reason of eligibility under paragraph (3)(B) shall be treated for all purposes as 
providing a reserve-component annuity under the Survivor Benefit Plan. 
"(b) Election to mcrease coverage under SBP. A person who on the day before the first day 
of the open enrollment period is a participant m the Survivor Benefit Plan but is not 
participating at the maximum base amount or is providing coverage under the Plan for a 
dependent child and not for the person's spouse or former spouse may, during the open 
enrollment penod elect to— 
"(1) participate m the Plan at a higher base amount (not in excess of the participant's 
retired pay), or 
'•(2) provide annuity coverage under the Plan for the person's spouse or former spouse 
at a base amount not less than the base amount provided for the dependent child. 
"(c) Election for current SBP participants to participate in supplemental SBP. (1) Election. 
A person who is eligible to make an election under this paragraph may elect during the 
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open enrollment period to participate in the Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan estab-
lished under subchapter III of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS 
§§ 1456 et seq ], as added by section 1404 
"(2) Persons eligible Except as provided in paragraph (3), a person is eligible to make 
an election under paragraph (1) if on the day before the first day of the open enrollment 
period the person is a participant in the Survivor Benefit Plan at the maximum level, or 
during the open enrollment period the person increases the level of such participation to 
the maximum level under subsection (b) of this section, and under that Plan is providing 
annuity coverage for the person's spouse or a former spouse 
"(3) Limitation on eligibility for certain SBP participants not affected by two-tier annuity 
computation A person is not eligible to make an election under paragraph (1) if (as 
determined by the Secretary concerned) the annuity of a spouse or former spouse 
beneficiary of that person under the Survivor Benefit Plan will be computed under section 
1451(e) of title 10, United States Code However, such a person may during the open 
enrollment period waive the right to have that annuity computed under such section. 
Any such election is irrevocable. A person makmg such a waiver may make an election 
under paragraph (1) as in the case of any other participant m the Survivor Benefit Plan. 
"(d) Manner of makmg elections An election under this section must be made in writing, 
signed by the person makmg the election, and received by the Secretary concerned before the 
end of the open enrollment period Any such election shall be made subject to the same 
conditions, and with the same opportunities for designation of beneficiaries and specification 
of base amount, that apply under the Survivor Benefit Plan or the Supplemental Survivor 
Benefit Plan, as the case may be A person makmg an election under subsection (a) to provide 
a reserve-component annuity shall make a designation described in section 1448(e) of title 
10, United States Code 
"(e) Effective date for elections Any such election shall be effective as of the first day of the 
first calendar month following the month m which the election is received by the Secretary 
concerned 
"(f) Open enrollment period defined The open enrollment period is the one-year period 
beginning on April 1, 1992 
"(g) Effect of death of person makmg election within two years of makmg election (1) If a 
person makmg an election under this section dies before the end of the two-year period 
beginning on the effective date of the election, the election is void and the amount of any 
reduction m retired pay of the person that is attributable to the election shall be paid m 
a lump sum to the person who would have been the deceased person's beneficiary under 
the voided election if the deceased person had died after the end of such two-year period 
"(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply m the case of the death of a person makmg an election 
under subsection (a) if the beneficiary of that person under the election is the person's 
spouse and that spouse was entitled, before November 1, 1990, to receive dependency and 
indemnity compensation benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs based on a 
previous marriage to another member or former member of the uniformed services. 
"(h) Applicability of certain provisions of law The provisions of sections 1449, 1453, and 
1454 of title 10, Umted States Code, are applicable to a person makmg an election, and to 
an election, under this section m the same manner as if the election were made under the 
Survivor Benefit Plan or the Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan, as the case may be 
"(l) Report concerning open season Not later than June 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives a report on the open season authorized by this section for the Survivor Benefit Plan 
The report shall include— 
"(1) a description of the Secretary's plans for implementation of the open season, 
"(2) the Secretary's estimates of the costs associated with the open season, including any 
anticipated effect of the open season on the actuarial status of the Department of Defense 
Military Retirement Fund, and 
"(3) any recommendation by the Secretary for further legislative action 
"(j) Additional premium The Secretary of Defense may require that the SBP premium for a 
person makmg an election under subsection (aXl) or (b) include, in addition to the amount 
required under section 1452(a) of title 10, Umted States Code, an amount determined under 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this subsection Any 
such amount shall be stated as a percentage of the base amount of the person makmg the 
election and shall reflect the number of years that have elapsed smce the person retired, but 
may not exceed 4 5 percent of that person's base amount " 
Definitions. Act Nov 29, 1989, P L 101-189, Div A, Title XTV, § 1406, 103 Stat 1588, 
Dec 5, 1991, P L 102-190, Div A, Title VI, Part E. § 653(a)(2), 105 Stat 1388, provides 
"For the purpose of this title [for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] 
"(1) The term 'Survivor Benefit Plan' means the program established under subchapter 
II of chapter 73 of title 10, Umted States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq ] 
"(2) The term 'retired pay' mcludes retainer pay paid under section 6330 of title 10, 
United States Code 
"(3) The terms 'uniformed services' and *Secretary concerned' have the meanings given 
those terms in section 101 of title 37, Umted States Code 
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"(4) The term 'SBP premium' means the reduction in retired pay required as a condition 
afp/vvuiiffg &? JU2xv}/y uxder /2?<? Surveyor Ba^cdt Plan. 
"(5) The term 'base amount* has the meaning &vcn tha t t e r m m section 1447(2) of title 
10, United States Code.". 
RESEARCH GXJTDE 
Law Review Articles: 
Polchek, Recent property settlement issues for legal assistance attorneys. 1992 Army Law 4, 
December, 1992. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
I 
5. Right of action 
2. Election to participate; timeliness 
Terminally ill retired officer's election of Survivor 
Benefit Plan (SBP) coverage for former spouse 
pursuant to clause in divorce settlement was irrevo-
cable, and precluded current spouse from SBP 
coverage where election in favor of former spouse 
was made in proper form, member was never adju-
dicated incompetent, and great weight of medical 
and other evidence presented supported former 
spouse's contention that he was mentally competent 
when he made election. (1985) 65 Op Comp Gen p 
134. 
3. —Notice 
Air Force's failure to notify spouses of service 
members' election to not participate in survivor 
annuity benefits under Survivor Benefit Plan (10 
USCS §§ 1447-1455) rendered such elections inef-
fective as Congress intended that election out would 
be void unless statutory notice requirement was 
satisfied. Kelly v United States (1987, CA F Q 826 
F2d 1049. 
Widow's affidavit containing assertion that she 
received no notice of late husband's decision to 
forego participation in annuity plan rebutted pre-
sumption that Air Force officials discharged their 
duties correctly, and thus presumption ceased to 
exist. Kelly v United States (1986) 10 CI Ct 579, 
aflfd (CA FQ 826 F2d 1049. 
Air Force was not contractually or statutorily 
obli§atecj t 0 notify estranged spouse of retired ser-
^ ^ member's failure to elect coverage under Survi-
v o r
 Benefit Plan that went into effect after his 
reti
*ement. Wirt v United States (1990) 21 CI a 
92. 
^i th respect to claims for annuities (survivor 
benefit plan annuities and minimum income widow 
annUities) by surviving spouses of deceased mem-
^ ^ of uniformed services, where member elected 
n o t
 to participate in annuity program but govern-
mexU failed to notify spouse of that fact (effect of 
which is to invalidate non-participation election), 31 
U S
^S § 3702(b), which limits General Accounting 
Ogee's jurisdiction to consider claims to those that 
are §Ied within six years after they arise, operates as 
stat^te 0f limitations, such that surviving spouse 
m u s t claim benefits within six years of member's 
death (or when all events have transpired necessary 
to
 $le claim) or be forever barred from doing so. 
Application of Barring Act to Annuity Claims 
0*92) 71 Comp Gen 398. 
5. %ght of action 
1Q USCS § 1448(a) creates substantive right, vio-
ktiQn of which gives rise to claim for money 
daaiages. Dean v United States (1986) 10 CI Ct 563. 
§ 1449. Mental incompetency of member 
If a person to whom section 1448 of this title applies \s determined to be mentally incompetent 
by medical oflfcers of the armed force concerned or
 0f t n e Department of Veterans Affairs, or 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, any election described in subsection (a)(2) or (b), of section 
1448 of this title may be made on behalf of that Person t>y foc Secretary concerned. If the 
person for whom the Secretary has made an election is later determined to be mentally 
competent by an authority named in the first sent^nCe> he may, within 180 days after that 
determination revoke that election. Any deductions
 m a c i e from retired pay by reason of such 
an election will not be refunded. 
(As amended Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div A, T ^ e XIV, § 1407(a)(3), Title XVI, Part C, 
§ 1621(a)(1), 103 Stat. 1588, 1602.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS A N D DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989 deleted "or retainer" folioving "retired" and substituted "Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs" for "Veterans* Adininistnrtjon". 
§ 1450. Payment of annuity: beneficiaries 
(a) [Unchanged] 
(b) An annuity payable to the beneficiary terminates effective as of the first day of the month 
in which eligibility is lost. An annuity for a widow, Widower, or former spouse shall be paid to 
the widow, widower, or former spouse while the wiflow, widower, or former spouse is living 
or, if the widow, widower, or former spouse remarries before reaching age 55, until the widow, 
widower, or former spouse remarries. If the widow, widower, or former spouse remarries before 
reaching age 55 and that marriage is terminated by fleath, annulment, or divorce, payment of 
the annuity will be resumed effective as of the first d a y 0f the month in which the marriage is 
so terminated. However, if the widow, widower, or fc)rmer spouse is also entitled to an annuity 
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490 U.S. 581 MANSELL v. MANSELL 
C l t e a i l W S.Ct. 2023 (1989) 
that statute. Thus, in its decision uphold-
ing jurisdiction of a claim against the Unit-
ed States for contribution—incidentally, a 
claim that was not expressly covered by 
the Act—the Court wrote: 
"This brings the instant cases within 
the principle approved in United States 
v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 
[TO S.Ct. 207, 216, 94 L.Ed. 171]: 
" 'In argument before a number of Dis-
trict Courts and Courts of Appeals, the 
Government relied upon the doctrine that 
statutes waiving sovereign immunity 
must be strictly construed. We think 
that the congressional attitude in passing 
the Tort Claims Act is more accurately 
reflected by Judge Cardozo's statement 
in Anderson v. \5^Hayes Construction 
Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-
30: 'The exemption of the sovereign 
from suit involves hardship enough 
where consent has been withheld. We 
are not to add to its rigor by refinement 
of construction where consent has been 
announced."' 
"Once we have concluded that the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act covers an action for 
contribution due a tort-feasor, we should 
not, by refinement of construction, limit 
that consent to cases where the proce-
dure is by separate action and deny it 
where the same relief is sought in a 
third-party action. As applied to the 
State of New York, Judge Cardozo said 
in language which is apt here: 'No sensi-
ble reason can be imagined why the 
State, having consented to be sued, 
should thus paralyze the remedy.' 243 
37. See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682. 709, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 
1470, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) ("In the course of a century or more a 
steadily expanding conception of public morali-
ty regarding 'governmental responsibility' has 
led to a 'generous policy of consent for suits 
against the government' to compensate for the 
negligence of its agents as well as to secure 
obedience to its contracts"); Great Northern Life 
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59, 64 S.Ct. 873, 
879, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944) (Frankfurter. J., dis-
senting) ("[CJonsent does not depend on some 
ritualistic formula. Nor are any words needed 
to indicate submission to the law of the land. 
The readiness or reluctance with which courts 
2023 
N.Y. at 147, 153 N.E. at 29. 'A sense of 
justice has brought a progressive relax-
ation by legislative enactments of the 
rigor of the immunity rule. As represen-
tative governments attempt to amelio-
rate inequalities as necessities will per-
mit, prerogatives of the government 
yield to the needs of the citizen 
When authority is given, it is liberally 
construed.' United States v. Shaw, 309 
U.S. 495, 501[, 60 S.Ct. 659, 661, 84 L.Ed. 
888]." United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 
340 U.S. 543, 554-555, 71 S.Ct. 399, 406-
407, 95 L.Ed. 523 (1951).37 
(sspToday we should be guided by the 
wisdom of Cardozo and Friendly rather 
than by the "unnecessarily grudging" ap-
proach that was unanimously rebuffed in 
Gibbs. See 383 U.S., at 725, 86 S.Ct., at 
1138. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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490 U.S. 581, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 
j^siGerald E. MANSELL, Appellant 
v. 
Gaye M. MANSELL. 
No. 87-201. 
Argued Jan. 10, 1989. 
Decided May 30, 1989. 
Former husband sought modification 
of divorce decree by removing the provision 
find such consent has naturally been influenced 
by prevailing views regarding the moral sanc-
tion to be attributed to a State's freedom from 
suability. Whether this immunity is an absolute 
survival of the monarchial privilege, or is a 
manifestation merely of power, or rests on ab-
stract legal grounds, it undoubtedly runs coun-
ter to modern democratic notions of the moral 
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts 
reflect a strong legislative momentum in their 
tendency to extend the legal responsibility of 
Government and to confirm MaitJand's belief, 
expressed nearly fifty years ago, that 'it is a 
wholesome sight to see "the Crown" sued and 
answering for its torts'"). 
2024 109 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 490 U S 581 
that required him to share his total retire-
ment pay with his former wife The Call 
forma Superior Court Merced County, de-
nied the request without opinion Former 
husband appealed The California Court of 
Appeal affirmed The California Supreme 
Court denied the former husband's petition 
for review Appeal was taken The Su-
preme Court, Justice Marshall, held that 
military retirement pay that had been 
waived b> the former husband in order to 
receive veterans disability benefits was not 
community property divisible upon divorce 
Reversed and remanded 
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Justice Blackmun joined 
Opinion on remand, 217 Cal App 219, 
265 Cal Rptr 227 
1. Husband and Wife <s=>249(3) 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act did not give state courts 
authority to treat total military retirement 
pay as community property, but rather, 
gave them authority to treat disposable 
retirement pay as community property 10 
U S C A § 1408(aX4)(B)ric)(D" 
2. Divorce <3=>252.3(4) 
Husband and Wife <s=>249(3) 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act imposes substantive limits 
on state courts' power to divide military 
retirement pay, and is not garnishment 
statute designed solely to limit when feder-
al government will make direct payment to 
former spouse, Act does not give state 
courts authonty to treat total retirement 
pay as community property 10 U S C A 
§ 1408(a)(4XB), (c)(1) 
3. Divorce <s»252.3(4) 
Husband and Wife <s=>249(3) 
Military retirement pay that had bedn 
waived by former husband m order to rec-
eive veterans' disability benefits was^rtoc 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re 
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
/ communitv propertv divisible upon divorce 
10 U S C A § 1408(a)(4)(B) (c)(1) 
Syllabus * 
In direct response to McCarty v 
McCarty, 453 I S 210 101 S Ct 2728, 69 
L Ed 2d 589 which held that federal law as 
it then existed completely pre-empted the 
application of s>tate community property 
law to military retirement pay, Congress 
enacted the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses' Protection "Act (Act), 10 U S C 
§ 1408 (1982 ed and Supp V) which autho-
rizes state courts to treat as community 
property "disposable retired or retainer 
pay,' § 1408(c)(1), bpecifically defining 
such pay to exclude, inter aha, any mili-
tary retirement pay waived in order for the 
retiree to receive veterans' disability bene-
fits, § 1408(a)(4)(B) The Act also creates a 
mechanism whereby the Federal Govern-
ment will make direct community property 
payments of up to 50 percent of disposable 
retired or retainer pay to certain former 
spouses who present state-court orders 
granting such pay A pre-McCarty proper-
ty settlement agreement between appellant 
and appellee, who were divorced in a coun-
ty Superior Court in California, a communi-
ty property State, provided that appellant 
would pay appellee 50 percent of his total 
military retirement pay, including that por-
tion of such pay which he had waived in 
order to receive military disability benefits 
After the Act's passage, the Superior Court 
denied appellant's request to modify the 
divorce decree by removing the provision 
requiring him to share his total retirement 
pay with appellee The State Court of Ap-
peal affirmed, rejecting appellant's conten-
tion that the Act precluded the lower court 
from treating as community property the 
military retirement pay appellant had 
waived to receive disability benefits In so 
holding, the court relied on a State Su-
preme Court decision which reasoned that 
the Act did not limit a state court's ability 
reader See imted States v Detroit Lumber Co, 
200 I S 321 337 26 S Ct 282 287 50 L Ed 
499 
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to treat total military retirement pay as 
community property and to enforce a for-
mer spouse's rights to such pay through 
remedies other than direct Federal Govern-
ment payments. 
Held: The Act does not grant state 
courts the power to treat as property divisi-
ble upon divorce military retirement pay 
waived by the retiree in order to receive 
veterans' disability benefits. In light of 
§ 1408(a)(4)(B)'s limiting language as to 
such waived pay, the Act's plain and pre-
cise language establishes that § 1408(c)(1) 
grants state courts the authority to treat 
only disposable retired pay, not total re-
tired pay, as community property. Appel-
lee's argument that the Act has no pre-
emptive | e f f e c t of its own and must be 
read as a garnishment statute designed 
solely to limit when the Federal Govern-
ment will make direct payments to a for-
mer spouse, and that, accordingly, 
§ 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "disposable retired 
or retainer pay" only because payments 
under the statutory direct payment mecha-
nism are limited to amounts defined by that 
term, is flawed for two reasons. First, the 
argument completely ignores the fact that 
§ 1408(c)(1) also uses the quoted phrase to 
limit specifically and plainly the extent to 
which state courts may treat military re-
tirement pay as community property. Sec-
ond, each of § 1408(c)'s other subsections 
imposes new substantive limits on state 
courts' power to divide military retirement 
pay, and it is unlikely that all of the sec-
tion, except for § 1408(c)(1), was intended 
to pre-empt state law. Thus, the garnish-
ment argument misplaces its reliance on 
the fact that the Act's saving clause ex-
pressly contemplates that a retiree will be 
liable for "other payments" in excess of 
those made under the direct payment mech-
anism, since that clause is more plausibly 
interpreted as serving the limited purpose 
of defeating any inference that the mecha-
nism displaced state courts' authority to 
divide and garnish property not covered by 
the mechanism. Appellee's contention that 
giving effect to the plain and precise statu-
tory language would thwart the Act's obvi-
ous purposes of rejecting McCarty and re-
storing to state courts their pre-McCarty 
authority is not supported by the legisla-
tive history, which, read as a whole, indi-
cates that Congress intended both to create 
new benefits for former spouses and to 
place on state courts limits designed to 
protect military retirees. Pp. 2028-2032. 
Reversed and remanded. 
MARSHALL. J., delivered the opinion 
of the Court, in which REHNQUIST. C.J., 
and BRENNAN; WHITE, STEVENS, 
SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. 
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 
2032. 
Douglas B. Cone, Merced, Cal., for appel-
lant. 
Dennis A. Cornell, Merced, Cal., for ap-
pellee. 
Is&Justice MARSHALL delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
In this appeal, we decide whether state 
courts, consistent with the federal Uni-
formed Services Former Spouses' Protec-
tion Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982 ed. and 
Supp. V) (Former Spouses' Protection Act 
or Act), may treat as property divisible 
upon divorce military retirement pay 
waived by the retiree in order to receive 
veterans' disability benefits. We hold that 
they may not. 
I 
A 
Members of the Armed Forces who serve 
for a specified period, generally at least 20 
years, may retire with retired pay. 10 
U.S.C. § 3911 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V) 
(Army); § 6321 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. 
V) (Navy and Marine Corps); § 8911 et seq. 
(1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Air Force). The 
amount of retirement pay a veteran is eligi-
ble to receive is calculated according to the 
number of years served and the rank 
2026 109 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 490 U.S. 583 
achieved. §§ 3926 and 3991 (Army); 
§§ 6325-6327 (Navy and Marine Corps); 
§ 8929 (Air Force). Veterans who became 
disabled as a result of military service are 
eligible for disability benefits. 38 U.S.C. 
§ 310 (wartime disability); § 331 (peace-
time disability). The amount of disability 
benefits a veteran is eligible to receive is 
calculated according to the seriousness of 
the disability and the degree to which the 
veteran's ability to earn a living has been 
impaired. §§ 314 and 355. 
In order to prevent double dipping, a 
military retiree may receive disability bene-
fits only to the extent that he waives a 
corresponding amount of his military re-
tirement pay. § 3105.1 Because disability 
benefits are exempt from federal, state, 
and local taxation, § 3101(a), military retir-
ees who waive their retirement pay in favor 
of disability benefits inprease^ their after-
tax income. Not surprisingly, waivers of 
retirement pay are common. 
California, like several other States, 
treats property acquired during marriage 
as community property. When a couple 
divorces, a state court divides community 
property equally between the spouses 
while each spouse retains full ownership of 
any separate property. See Cal.Civ.Code 
Ann. § 4800(a) (West 1983 and Supp.1989). 
California treats military retirement pay-
ments as community property to the extent 
they derive from military service per-
formed during the marriage. See, e.g., Ca-
sas v. Thompson, 42 Cal.3d 131, 139, 228 
Cal.Rptr. 33, 37-38, 720 P.2d 921, 925, cert, 
denied, 479 U.S. 1012, 107 S.Ct 659, 93 
L.Ed.2d 713 (1986). 
1. For example, if a military retiree is eligible for 
$1500 a month in retirement pay and $500 a 
month in disability benefits, he must waive $500 
of retirement pay before he can receive any 
disability benefits. 
2. The language of the Act covers both communi-
ty property and equitable distribution States, as 
does our decision today. Because this case con-
cerns a community property State, for the sake 
of simplicity we refer to § 1408(c)(1) as autho-
rizing state courts to treat "disposable retired or 
retainer pay" as community property. 
In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 
101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), we 
held that the federal statutes then govern-
ing military- retirement pay prevented state 
courts from treating military retirement 
pay as community property. We concluded 
that treating such pay as community prop-
erty would do clear damage to important 
military personnel objectives. Id., at 232-
235, 101 S.Ct.. at 2741-2743. We reasoned 
that Congress intended that military retire-
ment pay reach the veteran and no one 
else. Id., at 228, 101 S.Ct. at 2739. In 
reaching this conclusion, we relied particu-
larly on Congress' refusal to pass legisla-
tion that would have allowed former spous-
es to garnish military retirement pay to 
satisfy property settlements. Id., at 228-
232, 101 S.Ct., at 2739-2741. Finally, not-
ing the distressed plight of many former 
spouses of military members, we observed 
that Congress was free to change the stat-
utory framework. Id, at 235-236, 101 
S.Ct. at 2742-2743. 
In direct response to McCarty, Congress 
enacted the Former Spouses' Protection 
Act, which authorizes state courts to treat 
"disposable retired or retainer pay" as com-
munity property. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(cXD.2 
" 'Disposable retired orj^retainer pay' " is 
defined as "the total monthly retired or 
retainer pay to which a military member is-
entitled," minus certain deductions. 
§ 1408(a)(4) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). 
Among the amounts required to be deduct-
ed from total pay are any amounts waived 
in order to receive disability benefits. 
§ 1408(a)(4)(B).3 
3. Also deducted from total military retirement 
pay are amounts: (a) owed by the military 
member to the United States; (b) required by 
law to be deducted from total pay. including 
employment taxes, and fines and forfeitures or-
dered by courts-martial; (c) properly deducted 
for federal, state, and local income taxes; (d) 
withheld pursuant to other provisions under the 
Internal Revenue Code; (e) equal to the amount 
of retired pay of a member retired for physical 
disability; and (0 deducted to create an annuity 
for the former spouse. 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 1408(a)(4)(AMF) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). 
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The Act also creates a payments mecha-
nism under which the Federal Government 
will make direct payments to a former 
spouse who presents, to the Secretary of 
the relevant military service, a state-court 
order granting her a portion of the military 
retiree's disposable retired or retainer pay 
This direct payments mechanism is limited 
in two ways. § 1408(d). First, only a for-
mer spouse who was married to a military 
member "for a period of 10 years or more 
during which the member performed at 
least 10 years of service creditable in deter-
mining the member's eligibility for retired 
or retainer pay," § 1408(d)(2), is eligible to 
receive direct community property pay-
ments. Second, the Federal Government 
will not make community property pay-
ments that exceed 50 percent of disposable 
retired or retainer pay. § 1408(e)(1). 
B 
Appellant Gerald E. Mansell and appellee 
Gave M. Mansell were married for 23 years 
and are the parents of six children. Their 
marriage ended in 1979 with a divorce de-
cree from the Merced County, California, 
Superior Court. At that time, Major Man-
sell received both Air Force retirement pay 
and, pursuant to a waiver of a portion of 
that pay, disability benefits. Mrs. Mansell 
and Major Mansell enteredj^into a proper-
ty settlement which provided, in part, that 
Major Mansell would pay Mrs. Mansell 50 
percent of his total military retirement pay, 
including that portion of retirement pay 
waived so that Major Mansell could receive 
disability benefits. Civ. No. 55594 (May 29, 
4. That clause provides that veterans benefits 
"shall not be assignable except to the extent 
specifically authorized by law, and shall be 
exempt from the ciaim(s} of creditors, and shall 
not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by 
or under any legal or equitable process whatev-
er, either before or after receipt by the [veter-
an]." 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. 
V). 
5. In a supplemental brief, Mrs. Mansell argues 
that the doctrine of res judicata should have 
prevented this prc-McCarty property settlement 
from being reopened. KicCarty v. McCarty, 453 
V.S. 210, 101 SCt. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981). 
2027 
1979). In 1983, Major Mansell asked the 
Superior Court to modify the divorce de-
cree by removing the provision that re-
quired him to share his total retirement pay 
with Mrs Mansell. The Superior Court 
denied Major Mansell's request without 
opinion. 
Major Mansell appealed to the California 
Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, 
arguing that both the Former Spouses' 
Protection Act and the anti-attachment 
clause that protects a veteran's receipt of 
disability benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) 
(1982 ed. and Supp. IV)f4 precluded the 
Superior Court from treating military- re-
tirement pay that had been waived to re-
ceive disability benefits as community prop-
erty. Relying on the decision of the Su-
preme Court of California in Casas v. 
Thompson, supra, the Court of Appeal re-
jected that portion of Major Mansell's argu-
ment based on the Former Spouses' Protec-
tion Act. 5 Civ No. F002872 (Jan. 30, 
1987).5 Casas held that after the passage 
of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, fed-
eral law no longer pre-empted | ^ s tate com-
munity property law as it applies to mili-
tary retirement pay. The Casas court rea-
soned that the Act did not limit a state 
court's ability to treat total military retire-
ment pay as community property and to 
enforce a former spouse's rights to such 
pay through remedies other than direct 
payments from the Federal Government. 
42 Cal.3d, at 143-151, 228 Cal.Rptr., at 40-
46, 720 P2d, at 928-933. The Court of 
Appeal did not discuss the anti-attachment 
clause, 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a).6 The Supreme 
The California Court of Appeal, however, decid-
ed that it was appropriate, under California lav*, 
to reopen the settlement and reach the federal 
question. 5 Civ No F002872 (Jan 30. 1987) 
Whether the doctrine of res judicata, as applied 
in California, should have harred the reopening 
of pre- KicCarty settlements is a matter of state 
law over which we ha\e no jurisdiction. The 
federal question is therefore properlv before us 
6. Because we decide that the Former Spouses 
Protection Act precludes States from treating as 
community propertv retirement pay waived to 
receive veterans disability benefits, we need not 
decide whether the anti-attachment clause, 
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Court of California denied Major Mansell's 
petition for review. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, 487 U.S. 
1217, 108 S.Ct. 2868, 101 L.Ed.2d 904 
(1988), and now reverse. 
II 
Because domestic relations are preemi-
nently matters of state law, we have con-
sistently recognized that Congress, when it 
passes general legislation, rarely intends to 
displace state authority in this area. See, 
e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 628, 107 
S.Ct. 2029, 2035, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987); 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 
581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 808, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979). 
Thus we have held that we will not find 
preemption absent evidence that it is " 'pos-
itively required by direct enactment.'" 
Hisquierdo, supra, at 581, 99 S.Ct. at 808 
(quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 
77, 25 S.Ct. 172, 176, 49 L.Ed. 390 (1904)). 
The instant case, however, presents one of 
those rare instances where Congress has 
directly and specifically legislated in the 
area of domestic relations. 
It is clear from both the language of the 
Former Spouses' Protection Act, see, e.g., 
§ 1408(c)(1), and its legislative history, see, 
e.g., H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, p. 165 
(1982); S.Rep. No. 97-502, pp. 1-3, 16 
(1982), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 
1982, p. 1555, that Congress sought to 
change the legal landscape created by the 
McCarty decgion.sgg7 Because pre-existing 
federal law, as construed by this Court, 
completely pre-empted the application of 
state community property law to military 
retirement pay, Congress could overcome 
the McCarty decision only by enacting an 
affirmative grant of authority giving the 
States the power to treat military retire-
ment pay as community property. Cf. Mid-
§ 3101(a), independently protects such pay. 
See, e.g.t Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S.Ct. 
2029, 95 L.£d.2d 599 (1987); Wissner v. Wissner, 
338 U.S. 655, 70 S.Ct. 398, 94 L.£d. 424 (1950). 
7. Congress also demonstrated its focus on 
McCarty when it chose June 25, 1981, the day 
before McCarty was decided, as the applicable 
Ian tic Sat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of 
Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 
501, 106 S.Ct. 755, 759-60, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 
(1986). 
The appellant and appellee differ sharply 
on the scope of Congress' modification of 
McCarty. Mrs. Mansell views the Former 
Spouses' Protection Act as a complete con-
gressional rejection of McCarty 's holding 
that state law is pre-empted; she reads the 
Act as restoring to state courts all pre-
McCaHy authority. Major Mansell, sup-
ported by the United States, argues that 
the Former Spouses' Protection Act is only 
a partial rejection of the McCarty rule that 
federal law preempts state law regarding 
military retirement pay.8 
[1] Where, as here, the question is one 
of statutory construction, we begin with 
the language of the statute. See, e.g., 
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 
S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); 
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 
S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 
Mrs. Mansell's argument faces a formida-
ble obstacle in the language of the Former 
Spouses' Protection Act Section 1408(c)(1) 
of the Act affirmatively grants state courts 
the power to divide military retirement pay, 
yet its language is both precise and limited. 
It provides that "a court may treat disposa-
ble retired or retainer pay . . . either as 
property solely of the member or as proper-
ty of the member and his spouse in accor-
dance with the law of the jurisdiction of 
j^9such court." § 1408(c)(1). The Act's 
definitional section specifically defines the 
term "disposable retired or retainer pay" to 
exclude, inter alia, military retirement pay 
waived in order to receive veterans' disabil-
date for some of the Act's provisions. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408(c)(1); see also note following § 1408, 
Pub.L. 97-252, § 1006(b) (transition provisions). 
8. Although the United States has filed an amicus 
brief supporting Major Mansell, its initial ami-
cus brief, filed before the Court noted jurisdic-
tion, supported Mrs. Mansell. 
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ity payments § 1408(a)(4)(B)9 Thus, un-
der the Act's plain and precise language 
state courts have been granted the authori-
ty to treat disposable retired pay as com-
munity property, they have not been 
granted the authority to treat total retired 
pay as community property 
[2] Mrs Mansell attempts to overcome 
the limiting language contained in the defi-
nition, § 1408(a)(4)(B) by reading the Act 
as a garnishment statute designed solely to 
set out the circumstances under which, pur-
suant to a court order, the Federal Govern-
ment will make direct payments to a for-
mer spouse According to this view, 
§ 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "[disposable retired 
or retainer pay" only because payments 
under the federal direct payments mecha-
nism are limited to amounts defined by that 
term 
The garnishment argument relies heavily 
on the Act's saving clause That clause 
provides 
"Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to relieve a member of liability for 
the payment of alimony, child support, or 
other payments required by a court or-
der on the grounds that payments made 
out of disposable retired or retainer pay 
under this section have been made in the 
maximum amount permitted under [the 
direct payments mechanism] Any such 
unsatisfied obligation j ^ o f a member 
may be enforced by any means available 
under law other than the means provided 
under this section m any case m which 
the maximum amount permitted under 
[the direct payments mechanism] has 
been paid." § 1408(e)(6) (emphasis add-
ed) 
Mrs Mansell argues that, because the sav-
ing clause expressly contemplates "other 
9. The statute provides in pertinent part 
"Disposable retired or retainer pay means the 
total monthly retired or retainer pav to which a 
member is entitled less amounts which— 
'(B) are required bv law to be and are deduct 
ed from the retired or retainer pay of such 
member including fines and forfeitures ordered 
v MANSELL 2029 
Ct 2023 (1989) 
payments in excess of those made under 
the direct pavments mechanism the Act 
does not attempt to tell the state courts 
what thev may or may not do with the 
underlying property ' Brief for \ppellee 
17 For the reasons discussed below, we 
find a different interpretation more plausi-
ble In our view, the saving clause serves 
the limited purpose of defeating any infer-
ence that the federal direct pa>ments 
mechanism displaced the authority of state 
courts to divide and garnish property not 
covered by the mechanism Cf Hisquier-
do, 439 U S , at 584, 99 S Ct, at 809-10 (to 
prohibit garnishment is to prohibit division 
of property), Wissner v Wissner 338 U S 
655 70 SCt 398, 94 LEd 424 (1950) 
(same) 
First, the most serious flaw in the gar-
nishment argument is that it completely 
ignores § 1408(c)(1) Mrs Mansell pro-
vides no explanation for the fact that the 
defined term— 'disposable retired or retain-
er pay"—is used m § 1408(c)(1) to limit 
specifically and plainly the extent to which 
state courts may treat military retirement 
pay as community property 
Second, the view that the Act is solely a 
garnishment statute and therefore not in-
tended to pre-empt the authority of state 
courts is contradicted not only by 
§ 1408(c)(1), but also by the other subsec-
tions of § 1408(c) Sections 1408(c)(2), 
(c)(3), and (c)(4) impose new substantive 
limits on state courts' power to divide mili-
tary retirement pay Section 1408(c)(2) pre-
vents a former spouse from transferring, 
selling, or otherwise disposing of her com-
munity interest m the military retirement 
pay I0 Section 1408(c)(3) provides that a 
j^istate court cannot order a military mem-
ber to retire so that the former spouse can 
immediately begin receiving her portion of 
bv courts martials Federal emplovment taxes 
and amounts waived in order to receive com 
pensation under title 5 or title 38 [disability 
pavments] § 1408(a)(4)(B) 
10 The Senate Report expressly contemplates 
that § 1408(c)(2) will preempt state law S Rep 
No 97-502 p 16 (1982) 
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military retirement pay.11 And § 1408(c)(4) 
prevents spouses from forum shopping for 
a State with favorable divorce laws.12 Be-
cause each of these provisions pre-empts 
state law, the argument that the Act has 
no pre-emptive effect of its own must fail.13 
Significantly, Congress placed i592each of 
these substantive restrictions on state 
courts in the same section of the Act as 
§ 1408(c)(1). We think it unlikely that ev-
ery subsection of § 1408(c), except 
§ 1408(c)(1), was intended to pre-empt state 
law. 
In the face of such plain and precise 
statutory language, Mrs. Mansell faces a 
daunting standard. She cannot prevail 
without clear evidence that reading the lan-
guage literally would thwart the obvious 
purposes of the Act. See, e.g., Trans Alas-
11. There was some concern expressed at the 
Senate hearings on the Act that state courts 
could direct a military member to retire. See, 
e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Man-
power and Personnel of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 132-
133 (1982) (Sen. Exon); id., at 70-71 (veterans' 
group); id., at 184 (Air Force). Thus the Senate 
version of the bill contained § 1408(c)(3) in 
order to ensure that state courts did not have 
such power, S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 17, and 
at conference the House agreed to add the pro-
vision. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, p. 167 
(1982). 
12. A state court may not treat disposable retire-
ment pay as community property unless it has 
jurisdiction over the military member by reason 
of (1) residence, other than by military assign-
ment in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, 
(2) domicile, or (3) consent. § 1408(c)(4). Al-
though the Senate Committee had decided not 
to include any forum shopping restrictions, see-
ing "no need to limit the jurisdiction of the State 
courts by restricting the benefits afforded by 
this bill ...." S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 9, 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 1604. 
the House version of the bill contained the re-
strictions, and at conference, the Senate agreed 
to add them. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, supra, 
at 167. 
13. That Congress intended the substantive limits 
in § 1408(c)(1) to be, to some extent, distinct 
from the limits on the direct payments mecha-
nism contained in § 1408(d) is demonstrated by 
the legislative compromise that resulted in the 
direct payments mechanism being available 
only to former spouses who had been married 
ka Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643, 
98 S.Ct. 2053, 2061, 56 L.Ed.2d 591 (1978)! 
The legislative history does not indicate the 
reason for Congress' decision to shelter 
from community property law that portion 
of military retirement pay waived to re-
ceive veterans' disability payments.14 But 
the absence of legislative history on this 
decision is immaterial in light of the plain 
and precise language of the statute; Con-
gress is not required to build a record in 
the legislative history to defend its policy 
choices. 
Because of the absence of evidence of 
specific intent in the legislative history, 
Mrs. Mansell resorts to arguments about 
the broad purposes of the Act. But this 
reliance is misplaced because, at this gener-
al level, there are statements that both 
to the military retiree for 10 years or more. 
§ 1408(d)(2). Under the House version of the 
bill, military retirement pay could be treated as 
community property only if the couple had been 
married for 10 years or more. H.R.Conf.Rep. 
No. 97-749, supra, at 165. The Senate Commit-
tee had considered, but rejected, such a provi-
sion. S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 9-11. The 
conferees agreed to remove the House restric-
tion. Instead, they limited the federal direct 
payments mechanism to marriages that had 
lasted 10 years or more. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-
749, supra, at 166-167. Under this compromise, 
stale courts have been granted the authority to 
award a portion of disposable military retired 
pay to former spouses who were married to the 
military member for less than 10 years, but 
such former spouses may not take advantage of 
the direct payments mechanism. 
14. The only reference to the definitional section 
is contained in the Senate Report which states 
that the deductions from total retired pay, in-
cluding retirement pay waived in favor of veter-
ans' disability payments, "generally parallel 
those existing deductions which may be made 
from the pay of Federal employees and military 
personnel before such pay is subject to garnish-
ment for alimony or child support payments 
under section 459 of the Social Security Act. 
(42 U.S.C. 659)." S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 
14, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 
1609. This statement, however, describes the 
defined term in § 1408(a)(4). It is not helpful 
in determining why Congress chose to use the 
defined term—"disposable retired or retainer 
pay "—to limit state-court authority in 
§ 1408(c)(1). 
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contradict and support her arguments. 
Her argument that the Act contemplates 
no federal pre-emption is supported by 
statements in the Senate Report and the 
House Conference } .^Report that the pur-
pose of the Act is to overcome the McCarty 
decision and to restore power to the 
States.15 But the Senate Report and the 
House Conference Report also contain 
statements indicating that Congress reject-
ed the uncomplicated option of removing all 
federal pre-emption and returning unlimit-
ed authority to the States.16 Indeed, a bill 
that would have eliminated all federal pre-
emption died in the Senate Committee.17 
Her argument that Congress primarily in-
tended to protect former spouses is sup-
ported by evidence that Members of Con-
gress were moved by, and responding to, 
the distressed economic plight of military 
wives after a divorce.18 But the Senate 
Report and the House debates con£ain594 
statements which reveal that Congress was 
15. See. e.g., S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 1, 
U.S.Code Cong. &. Admin.News 1982, p. 1596 
('The primary purpose of the bill is to remove 
the effect of the United States Supreme Court 
decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 
101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981). The bill 
would accomplish this objective by permitting 
Federal, State, and certain other courts, consis-
tent with the appropriate laws, to once again 
consider military retired pay when fixing the 
property rights between the parties to a divorce, 
dissolution, annulment or legal separation"). 
See also id., at 5 and 16; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-
749, supra, at 165. 
16. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165, 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 1570 
('The House amendment would permit disposa-
ble military retired pay to be considered as 
property in divorce settlements under certain 
specified conditions") (emphasis added); ibid. 
('The House Amendment contained several pro-
visions that would place restrictions on the divi-
sion of retired pay"); S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, 
at 4, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 
1599 ("[Senate] 1814 imposes three distinct lim-
its on the division or enforcement of court or-
ders against military retired pay in divorce 
cases") (emphasis added). 
17. Entitled "Nonpreemption of State law" the 
bill provided that "[f\or purposes of division of 
marital property of any member or former 
member of the armed forces upon dissolution of 
such member's marriage, the law of the State in 
concerned as well with protecting the inter-
ests of military members.19 
Thus, the legislative history, read as a 
whole, indicates that Congress intended 
both to create new benefits for former 
spouses and to place limits on state courts 
designed to protect military retirees. Our 
task is to interpret the statute as best we 
can, not to second-guess the wisdom of the 
congressional policy choice. See, e.g., Rod-
riguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522. 526, 
107 S.Ct. 1391, 1393, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) 
(per curiam ) ("Deciding what competing 
values will or will not be sacrificed to the 
achievement of a particular objective is the 
very essence of legislative choice"). Given 
Congress' mixed purposes, the legislative 
history does not clearly support Mrs. Man-
sell's view that giving effect to the plain 
and precise language of the statute would 
thwart the obvious purposes of the Act. 
which the dissolution of marriage proceeding 
was instituted shall be dispositive on all matters 
pertaining to the division of any retired, retire-
ment, or retainer pay to which such member or 
former member is entitled or will become enti-
tled." S. 1453, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
18. The Senate Committee pointed out that "fre-
quent change-of-station moves and the special 
pressures placed on the military spouse as a 
homemaker make it extremely difficult to pur-
sue a career affording economic security, job 
skills and pension protection." S.Rep. No. 97-
502, supra, at 6. U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 
1982, p. 1601. The language of the Act, and 
much of its legislative history, is written in 
gender neutral terms, and there is no doubt that 
the Act applies equally to both former husbands 
and former wives. But "it is quite evident from 
the legislative history that Congress acted large-
ly in response to the plight of the military wife." 
Horkovich, Uniformed Services Former Spous-
es' Protection Act: Congress' Answer to McCarty 
v. McCarty Goes Beyond the Fundamental Ques-
tion, 23 Air Force L.Rev. 287, 308 (1982-1983) 
(emphasis in original). 
19. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 7, 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News \9S2, p. \b\\ 
("All agreed that some form of remedial legisla-
tion which is fair and equitable to both spouses 
was necessary to provide a solution to the 
McCarty decision"); see also id., at 11; nn. 10, 
11, 12, and 16, supra. 
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We realize that reading the statute liter-
ally may inflict economic harm on many 
former spouses. But we decline to misread 
the statute in order to reach a sympathetic 
result when such a reading requires us to 
do violence to the plain language of the 
statute and to ignore much of the legisla-
tive history. Congress chose the language 
that requires us to decide as we do, and 
Congress is free to change it. 
Ill 
[3] For the reasons stated above, we 
hold that the Former Spouses' Protection 
Act does not grant state courts the j 595POW-
er to treat as property divisible upon di-
vorce military retirement pay that has been 
waived to receive veterans' disability bene-
fits. The judgment of the California Court 
of Appeal is hereby reversed, and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice 
BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. 
Today the Court holds that the federal 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Pro-
tection Act (Former Spouses' Protection 
Act or Act) denies state courts the power 
to order in a divorce decree the division of 
military retirement pay unilaterally waived 
by a retiree in order to receive veterans' 
disability benefits. The harsh reality of 
this holding is that former spouses like 
Gaye Mansell can, without their consent, be 
denied a fair share of their ex-spouse's 
military retirement pay simply because he 
elects to increase his after-tax income by 
converting a portion of that pay into dis-
ability benefits. On the Court's reading of 
the Former Spouses' Protection Act, Gaye 
Mansell will lose nearly 30 percent of the 
monthly retirement income she would oth-
erwise have received as community proper-
ty. I view the Court's holding as inconsis-
tent with both the language and the pur-
poses of the Act, and I respectfully dissent. 
The Court recognized in McCarty v. 
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 
2742, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), that "the 
plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service 
member is often a serious one." In holding 
that federal law precluded state courts 
from dividing nondisabxlity military re-
tired pay pursuant to state community 
property laws, McCarty concluded with an 
invitation to Congress to reexamine the 
issue. Congress promptly did so and enact-
ed the Former Spouses' Protection Act. 
Today, despite overwhelming evidence that 
Congress intended to overrule McCarty 
completely, to alter pre-existing federal 
military retirement law so as to eliminate 
the pre-emptive effect ^discovered in 
McCarty, and to restore to the States au-
thority to issue divorce decrees affecting 
military retirement pay consistent with 
state law, the Court assumes that Congress 
only partially rejected McCarty and that 
the States can apply their community prop-
erty laws to military retirement pay only to 
the extent that the Former Spouses' Pro-
tection Act affirmatively grants them au-
thority to do so. Ante, at 2028. The 
McCarty decision, however, did not address 
retirement pay waived to receive disability 
benefits; nor did it identify any explicit 
statutory provision precluding the States 
from characterizing such waived retire-
ment pay as community property. Thus, I 
reject the Court's central premise that the 
States are precluded by McCarty from 
characterizing as community property any 
retirement pay waived to receive disability 
benefits absent an affirmative grant of au-
thority in the Former Spouses' Protection 
Act. 
In my view, Congress intended, by enact-
ing the Former Spouses' Protection Act, to 
eliminate the effect of McCarty 's pre-emp-
tion holding altogether and to return to the 
States their authority "to treat military 
pensions in the same manner as they treat 
other retirement benefits." S.Rep. No. 97-
502, p. 10 (1982), U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-
min.News 1982, p. 1604. See also td, at 1, 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 
1596 ("The primary purpose of the bill is to 
remove the effect of the United States Su-
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preme Court decision in McCarty v. 
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 
L.Ed.2d 589 (1981). The bill would accom-
plish this objective by permitting Federal, 
State, and certain other courts, consistent 
with the appropriate laws, to once again 
consider military retired pay when fixing 
the property rights between the parties to 
a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal 
separation"); id., at 5, U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News 1982, 1599 ("[T]he committee 
intends the legislation to restore the law to 
what it was when the courts were permit-
ted to apply State divorce laws to military 
retired pay"); id., at 16, U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News 1982, p. 1611 ("The provision 
is intended to remove the federal pre-emp-
tion found to exist by the United States 
Supreme Court and permit State and other 
courts of competent jurisdiction to apply 
pertinent State or other laws in determin-
ing I597whether military retired or retainer 
pay should be divisible"); 128 Cong.Rec. 
18314 (1982) ("The amendment simply re-
turns to State courts the authority to treat 
military retired pay as it does other public 
and private pensions") (remarks of Rep. 
Schroeder, bill sponsor). 
Family law is an area traditionally of 
state concern, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 
439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 808, 59 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1979), and we have not found 
federal pre-emption of state authority in 
this area absent a determination that "Con-
gress has 'positively required by direct en-
actment' that state law be pre-empted." 
Ibid, (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 
U.S. 68, 77, 25 S.Ct. 172, 176, 49 L.Ed. 390 
(1904)). The Former Spouses' Protection 
Act does not "positively require" States to 
abandon their own law concerning the divi-
sibility upon divorce of military retirement 
pay waived in order to obtain veterans' 
disability benefits. On the contrary, the 
whole thrust of the Act was to restore to 
the States their traditional authority in the 
area of domestic relations. Even beyond 
that restoration, Congress sought to pro-
vide greater federal assistance and protec-
tion to military spouses than existed before 
McCarty by creating a federal garnish-
ment remedy in aid of state court communi-
ty property awards. That, in fact, is the 
central purpose and preoccupation of the 
Act's complex statutory framework. The 
Former Spouses' Protection Act is primari-
ly a remedial statute creating a mechanism 
whereby former spouses armed with state 
court orders may enlist the Federal Gov-
ernment to assist them in obtaining some 
of their property entitlements upon divorce. 
The federal garnishment remedy created 
by the Act is limited, but it serves as 
assistance and not as the Court would 
have it, a hindrance to former spouses. 
Thus, the provision at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408(a)(4)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V) of 
the Act defining "[disposable retired or 
retainer pay" to exclude "amounts waived 
in order to receive compensation under title 
5 or title 38," and its incorporation into 
§ 1408(c)(l)'s community property provi-
sion, only limits the federal garnishment 
remedy created by the Act. It does not 
limit the authority i59eof States to charac-
terize such waived retirement pay as com-
munity property under state law. 
This reading is reinforced by the legisla-
tive history, which indicates that "[t]he spe-
cific deductions that are to be made from 
the total monthly retired and retainer pay 
generally parallel those existing deductions 
which may be made from the pay of Feder-
al employees and military personnel before 
such pay is subject to garnishment for 
alimony or child support payments under 
section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 659)." S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 
14, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 
1609 (emphasis added). The Court finds 
that this statement "is not helpful in deter-
mining why Congress chose to use the de-
fined term—'disposable retired or retainer 
pay'—to limit state-court authority in 
§ 1408(c)(1)." Ante, at 2030, n. 14. True, 
it is singularly unhelpful in supporting the 
Court's view that § 1408(c)(1) denies state 
courts authority to characterize retirement 
pay waived in lieu cf disability benefits as 
community property. By contrast, it is 
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helpful in determining why Congress chose 
to use "disposable retired or retainer pay" 
as the term limiting state court authority 
to garnish military retirement pay. In 
light of the fact that disability benefits are 
exempt from garnishment in most cases, 38 
U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), had 
Congress not excluded "amounts waived" 
in order to receive veterans' disability bene-
fits from the federal garnishment remedy 
created by the Former Spouses' Protection 
Act it would have eviscerated the force of 
the anti-attachment provisions of § 3101(a). 
To take advantage of the federal gar-
nishment remedy, which provides for direct 
payment by the Government to former 
spouses in specified circumstances, former 
spouses must serve on the appropriate ser-
vice Secretary court orders meeting certain 
requirements. In the case of a division of 
property, the court order must "specifically 
provid[e] for the payment of an amount, 
expressed in dollars or as a percentage of 
disposable retired or retainer pay, from the 
disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(aJ2XC)s99 
(1982 ed., Supp. V). It must contain certain 
information and be regular on its face. 
§§ 1408(b)(1)(B), 1408(bXD(C), 1408(b)(1)(D), 
1408(b)(2) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The Act 
sets forth the procedures to be followed by 
the Secretary in making payments directly 
to former spouses. § 1408(d) (1982 ed. and 
Supp. V). Finally, the Act places limits on 
the total amount of disposable retirement 
pay that may be paid by the Secretary to 
former spouses, §§ 1408(e)(1), 1408(e)(4)(B) 
(1982 ed. and Supp. V), and it clarifies the 
procedures to be followed in the event of 
multiple or conflicting court orders. 
§§ 1408(eX2), 1408(e)(3XA) (1982 ed., Supp. 
V). 
Subsection 1408(c)(1) authorizes the ap-
plication of this federal garnishment reme-
dy to community property awards by pro-
viding that "a court may treat disposable 
retired or retainer pay payable to a mem-
ber . . . either as property solely of the 
member or as property of the member and 
his spouse in accordance with the law of 
the jurisdiction of such court." (Emphasis 
added.) This provision should not be read 
to preclude States from characterizing re-
tirement pay waived to receive disability 
benefits as community property but only to 
preclude the use of the federal direct pay-
ments mechanism to attach that waived 
pay. Nor do §§ 1408(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) 
compel the conclusion that Congress in-
tended to pre-empt States from characteriz-
ing gross military retirement pay as com-
munity property divisible upon divorce. 
Those three provisions indicate what States 
may "not" do. That Congress explicitly 
restricted the authority of courts in certain 
specific respects, however, does not sup-
port the inference that § 1408(c)(1)—an af-
firmative grant of power—should be inter-
preted as precluding everything it does not 
grant. On the contrary, it supports the 
inference that Congress explicitly and di-
rectly precluded those matters it wished to 
pre-empt entirely, leaving the balance of 
responsibility in the area of domestic rela-
tions to the States. In this respect, the 
Court mischaracterizes Gaye Mansell's ar-
gument as insisting that "the Act contem-
plates no federal pre-emption " 
jfpoAnte, at 2030. Subsection 1408(c) has 
substantive effects on the power of state 
courts—its first paragraph expands those 
powers ("a court may treat"); its remain-
ing paragraphs restrict those powers ("this 
section does not create"; "[t]his section 
does not authorize"; "[a] court may not 
treat"). 
That States remain free to characterize 
waived portions of retirement pay as com-
munity property is unambiguously under-
scored by the broad language of the saving 
clause contained in the Act, § 1408(e)(6). 
That clause provides: 
"Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to relieve a member of liability for 
the payment of alimony, child support, or 
other payments required by a court or-
der on the grounds that payments made 
out of disposable retired or retainer pay 
under this section have been made in the 
maximum amount permitted under para-
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graph (1) or subparagraph (B) of para-
graph (4). Any such unsatisfied obli-
gation of a member may be enforced by 
any means available under law other 
than the means provided under this 
section in any case in which the maxi-
mum amount permitted under paragraph 
(1) has been paid and under section 459 
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) 
in any case in which the maximum 
amount permitted under subparagraph 
(B) of paragraph (4) has been paid." {Em-
phasis added.) 
The Court explains that the saving clause 
"serves the limited purpose of defeating 
any inference that the federal direct pay-
ments mechanism displaced the authority 
of state courts to divide and garnish prop-
erty not covered by the mechanism." 
Ante, at 2029 (emphasis added). I agree. 
What I do not understand is how the Court 
can read the Act's saving clause in this 
manner and yet conclude, without contra-
diction, that California may not character-
ize retirement pay waived for disability 
benefits as community property. All Cali-
fornia seeks to do is "divide and garnish 
property not covered by the [federal direct 
payments] mechanism." Ibid. Specifical-
ly, California wishes to exercise its tradi-
tional famjly6oi law powers to divide as 
community property that portion of Major 
Mansell's retirement pay which he unilater-
ally converted into disability benefits, and 
use state-law garnishment remedies to at-
tach the value of Gaye Mansell's portion of 
this community property. That is precisely 
what § 1408(e)(6) saves to the States by 
"defeating" any contrary inference, ante, 
at 8, that the Act has displaced the State's 
authority to enforce its divorce decrees "by 
any means available under law other than 
the means provided under this section...." 
§ 1408(e)(6). As the California Supreme 
Court so aptly put it, in the saving clause 
Congress emphasized that "the limitations 
on the service secretary's ability to reach 
the retiree's gross pay [are] not to be 
deemed a limitation on the state court's 
ability to define the community property 
interests at the time of dissolution." Ca-
sas v. Thompson, 42 Cal.3d 131, 150, 228 
Cal.Rptr. 33, 45, 720 P.2d 921, 933, cert, 
denied. 479 U.S. 1012, 107 S.Ct. 659, 93 
L.Ed.2d 713 (1986). In other words, while 
a former spouse may not receive communi-
ty property payments that exceed 50 per-
cent of a retiree's disposable retirement 
pay through the direct federal garnishment 
mechanism, § 1408(e)(1), a state court is 
free to characterize gross retirement pay 
as community property depending on the 
law of its jurisdiction, and former spouses 
may pursue- any other remedy "available 
under law" to satisfy that interest. "Noth-
ing" in the Former Spouses' Protection Act 
relieves military retirees of liability under 
such law if they possess other assets equal 
to the value of the former spouse's share 
of the gross retirement pay. 
Under the Court's reading of the Act as 
precluding the States from characterizing 
gross retirement pay as community proper-
ty, a military retiree has the power unilat-
erally to convert community property into 
separate property and increase his after-
tax income, at the expense of his ex-
spouse's financial security and property en-
titlements. To read the statute as permit-
ting a military retiree to pocket 30 percent, 
50 percent, even 80 percent of gross retire-
ment pay by converting it into disability 
benefits and thereby to avoid his obliga-
tions^ under state community property 
law, however, is to distort beyond recogni-
tion and to thwart the main purpose of the 
statute, which is to recognize the sacrifices 
made by military spouses and to protect 
their economic security in the face of a 
divorce. Women generally suffer a decline 
in their standard of living following a di-
vorce. See Weitzman, The Economics of 
Divorce: Social and Economic Conse-
quences of Property, Alimony and Child 
Support Awards, 28 UCLA L.Rev. 1181, 
1251 (1981). Military wives face special 
difficulties because "frequent change-of-
station moves and the special pressures 
placed on the military spouse as a home-
maker make it extremely difficult to pur-
sue a career affording economic security, 
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la and pension protection." S.Rep. 
-502, at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-
ws 1982, p. 1601. The average mili-
uple married for 20 years moves 
2 times, and military wives experi-
unemployment rate more than dou-
\t of their civilian counterparts, 
or Women's Equity Action League 
s Amici Curiae 10-11. Retirement 
loreover, is often the single most 
le asset acquired hy military couples. 
18. Indeed, the one clear theme that 
?s from the legislative history of the 
that Congress recognized the dire 
of many military wives after divorce 
ught to protect their access to their 
bands' military retirement pay. See 
No. 97-502/a t f>; 128 Cong.Rec. 
(1982) (4<[F]requent military moves 
ireclude spouses from pursuing their 
ireers and establishing economic in-
lence. As a result, military spouses 
*quently unable to vest in their own 
nent plans or obtain health insurance 
ge from a private employer. Mili-
pouses who become divorced often 
II access to retirement and health 
ts—despite a 'career' devoted to the 
7") (remarks of Rep. Schumer). See 
d., at 18315, 18316, 18317, 18320, 
18328. Reading the Act as not pre-
g States from characterizing retire-
pay waived to receive disability bene-
s property divisible upon divorce is 
ul to loathe clear remedial purposes 
? statute in a way that the Court 's 
retation is not. 
1
 conclusion that States may treat 
military retirement pay as property 
i)le upon divorce is not inconsistent 
38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. 
This anti-attachment provision pro-
that veterans' disability benefits 
I not be liable to at tachment, levy, or 
re by or under any legal or equitable 
as whatever, either before or after 
pt by the beneficiary." Gaye Mansell 
owledges, as she must, that § 3101(a) 
udes her from garnishing under state 
Major Mansell's veterans ' disability 
benefits in satisfaction of her claim to a 
share of his gross military retirement pay, 
just as § 1408(c)(1) precludes her from in 
voking the federal direct payments mecha-
nism in satisfaction of that claim. To rec-
ognize that § 3101(a) protects the funds 
from a specific source, however, does not 
mean that § 3101(a) prevents Gaye Mansell 
from recovering her 50 percent interest in 
Major Mansell's gross retirement pay out 
of any income or assets he may have other 
than his veterans ' disability benefits. So 
long as those benefits themselves are pro-
tected, calculation of Gaye Mansell's enti-
tlement on the basis of Major Mansell's 
gross retirement pay does not constitute an 
"at tachment" of his veterans ' disability 
benefits. Section 3101(a) is designed to 
ensure that the needs of disabled veterans 
and their families are met, see Rose v. 
Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 634, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 
2038, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987), without inter-
ference from creditors. That purpose is 
fulfilled so long as the benefits themselves 
are protected by the anti-attachment provi-
sion. 
In sum, under the Court 's interpretation 
of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, the 
former spouses Congress sought to protect 
risk having their economic security severe-
ly undermined by a unilateral decision of 
their ex-spouses to waive retirement pay in 
lieu of disability benefits. It is inconceiva-
ble that Congress intended the broad reme-
dial purposes of the s tatute to be thwarted 
in such a way. To be sure, as the Court 
notes, Congress sought to be "fair and 
equitable" to re^ i red^ service members as 
well as to protect divorced spouses. Ante, 
at 2031, and n. 19. Congress explicitly 
protected military members by limiting the 
percentage of disposable retirement pay 
subject to the federal garnishment remedy 
and by expressly providing that military 
members could not be forced to retire. See 
10 U.S.C. §§ 1408(e)(1), 1408(eX4MB), 
1408(c)(3). Moreover, a retiree is still ad-
vantaged by waiving retirement pay in lieu 
of disability benefits: the pay that is 
waived is not subject to the federal direct 
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payments mechanism, and the former 
spouse must resort instead to the more 
cumbersome and costly process of seeking 
a state garnishment order against the val-
ue of that waived pay. See H.R.Rep. No. 
98-700, pp. 4-5 (1984) (discussing difficul-
ties faced by ex-spouses in obtaining state 
garnishment orders). Even these state 
processes cannot directly attach the mili-
tary retiree's disability benefits for pur-
poses of satisfying a community property 
division given the strictures of the anti-
attachment provision of 38 U.S.C. 
§ 3101(a). There is no basis for conclud-
ing, however, that Congress sought to pro-
tect the interests of service members by 
allowing them unilaterally to deny their 
former spouses any opportunity to obtain a 
fair share of the couple's military retire-
ment pay. 
It is now once again up to Congress to 
address the inequity created by the Court 
in situations such as this one. But because 
I believe that Congress has already ex-
pressed its intention that the States have 
the authority to characterize waived retire-
ment pay as property divisible upon di-
vorce, I dissent. 
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Taxpayers brought action challenging 
Arizona s ta tute permitting State Land De-
partment to lease minerals and school t rust 
lands a t flat rate royalty. The Superior 
Court, Maricopa County, No. C-433745, 
John Sticht, J., granted summary judgment 
in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appeal-
ed. Motion for transfer was granted and 
the Arizona Supreme Court, Feldman, 
V.C.J., 155 Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183, re-
versed and remanded with instructions. 
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme 
Court, Justice Kennedy, held that: (1) Su-
preme Court had jurisdiction, and (2) stat-
ute governing mineral leases of s tate lands 
was void. 
Affirmed. 
Justice O'Connor took no part in the 
consideration or decision. 
Justice Brennan filed an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment in which Justices White, Marshall, 
and Blackmun joined. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a concur-
ring and dissenting opinion in which Justice 
Scalia joined. 
1. Federal Courts <s=>503 
Arizona Supreme Court 's decision, that 
s tate law governing mineral leases was 
invalid, was final, and therefore, United 
States Supreme Court had jurisdiction on 
writ of certiorari even though Arizona Su-
preme Court remanded case for trial court 
to determine appropriate further relief; tri-
al court on remand did not have before it 
any federal question as to whether past or 
current leases were valid since respondents 
on appeal withdrew request for accounting 
and payment of sums under past leases and 
trial court 's further actions could not affect 
Arizona Supreme Court 's ruling that s tate 
law was invalid. A.R.S. § 27-234, subd. B. 
2. Courts <s=»97U) 
Although state courts are not bound to 
adhere to federal standing requirements, 
they possess authority, absent provision 
for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render 
binding judicial decisions that rest on their 
own interpretations of federal law. 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1738. 
Addendum "D." 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 1 
UPDATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FOR SUE VARALLO AS OF FEBRUARY 15, 1993 
(Includes pay raise and other income) 
1. Gross Monthly Income 
Salary $3350.53 
Dividends & interest 
Dreyfus & Vanguard (est) * 110.57 
Mortgage note from Mom's estate * 152.03 
Royal Bank of Scotland Bond * 119.00 
Savings account (est) 329.00 
$4060.60 
* income from mother's estate 
2. Monthly Deductions 
State & federal income tax $ 877.54 
Number exemptions taken 0 
Social Security 256.30 
Medical insurance (Mall Handlers, 
High Option, Self & Family) 87.99 
Retirement fund 194.33 
Savings Plan 10.83 
Charity 6.50 
Life Insurance 15.38 
$1448.87 
3. Net Monthly Income: $2611.73 
4. Debts & Obligations 
First Security Bank Mortgage on Condo $84,500 $ 593.00 
Park Place Homeowners Asso Condo Fee 175.00 
Westminster College Valerie's School $2,000 667.00 * 
Judge Memorial High School Carafs School ? 270.00 * 
First Federal Bank Mortgage on Btfl House $126,000 $1388.00 *: 
* These obligations are currently shared equally w/husband. 
**This obligation is shared equally w/husband; he is currently 
under court order to make the mortgage payments. 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
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5. Property 
Automobile: 1990 Mitsubishi Galant $10,000 
Securities, stocks, bonds: 
Royal Bank of Scotland Bond * $15,000,00 
Petroleum Technologies Corp ** 15,000,00 
* Purchasedw/proceeds from mother's estate; currently held 
w/husband as joint owner as broker did not have Pay On Death 
option. 
**Purchased w/proceeds from mother's estate. 
Cash & Deposit Accounts 
America First Credit Union 
Chase Manhatten Bank 
Exchange Credit Union 
Vanguard Money Market Fund * 
Dreyfus Money Market Fund * 
* Funds from mother's estate 
Retirement" Accounts: 
Thrift Saving Plan (IRA) est. 1,900.00 
Pentagon Fed Credit Union (IRA) 536.72 
$ 9,943.80 
392.21 
79,000.78 
5,261.98 
21,274.90 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRILYN SUSAN VARALLO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANCIS V. VARALLO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9247013b! 
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The above-Captioned matter was tried -Lefoie Tne 
Honorable Jon M. Memmott on February 17 and February 18, 1993. 
Ronald Nehring appeared as counsel for plaintiff; Harold Dent 
appeared as counsel for defendant. Having heard the testimony 
of witnesses, received evidence, and considerea the arguments 
of counsel, the Court, being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, now enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Findings Relating to Jurisdiction. 
1. Plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Davis 
County, state of Utah, and maintained such residency for more 
than three months immediately prior to the filing of this 
action, 
2. Defendant and plaintiff are husband and wife, 
having been married on June 26, 1970, at Washington, D.C. 
Findings Relating to Grounds. 
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties 
have developed differences which are irreconcilable, causing 
the continuation of the marriage to be impossible. 
Findings Relating to Child Custody and Visitation. 
4. Three children have been born as issue of this 
marriage, to-wit: Valerie Jean Varallo, Dorn January 18, 1972; 
Sean Thomas Varallo, born August 17, 1974; and Cara Noel 
Varallo, oorn December 21, 1977. 
5. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be 
awarded the care, custody, and control of Cara Varallo, subject 
to defendant's right to exercise rights of visitation as set 
out in the Standard Visitation Rule for the Second Judicial 
District Court. 
6. The Court finds that Sean Varallo does not have 
special needs which warrant ongoing custody and support. 
Findings Relating to Child Support. 
7. The Court finds the plaintiff's gross income to 
be $3,242 per month, and the defendant's gross income to be 
$4,225 per month for the purposes of determining child support 
pursuant to the Child Support Obligation Worksheet. 
Accordingly, defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of 
$401.86 per month as child support. 
Findings Relating to Alimony. 
8. Plaintiff is currently employed full time by the 
United States Bureau of Reclamation. Defendant is currently 
unemployed. Defendant has a bachelor of science degree, 30 
years of experience in the United States Army, and two years 
experience as an employee of Unisys, Inc. The Court finds that 
defendant is capable of employment, notwithstanding his 
disability rating whicn may impair defendant's ability to 
perform physical labor. The Court recognizes that defendant is 
unlikely to find employment at a salary comparable to that 
received during his employment at Unisys and tnat his prospects 
for employment may depend on obtaining vocational training. 
9. The Court finds that in order to maintain the 
standard of living which the parties enjoyed during their 
marriage, plaintiff is in need of support and, therefore, 
defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff alimony in the araount of 
$500 per month. The Court finds that defendant's re-employment 
would constitute a material change of circumstance entitling 
plaintiff to seek an adjustment of alimony. 
Findings Relating to the Marital Home. 
10. During the course of the marriage, the parties 
acquired a residence located at 826 North Ridge Drive, 
Bountiful, Utah. The Court finds the equity in the marital 
home to be approximately $70,000. The Court finds that the 
home should be sold in a manner reasonaoly calculated to 
maximize its value and the net proceeds of the sale equally 
divided one-half to each party. Pending the sale of the 
residence, defendant shall assume and pay the mortgage owing 
thereon, together with all other costs and expenses relating to 
the marital nome. 
Findings Relating to Retirement Plans. 
11. The Court finds that plaintiff was employed for 
several years during the course of the marriage and obtained an 
interest in a retirement plan. When plaintiff terminated her 
employment, she withdrew retirement funds which were expended 
for marital purposes. Plaintiff incurred an obligation to 
repay approximately $8,500 as a condition to reinstating her 
retirement plan. The Court finds that it is equitable for 
defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $4,250 as defendant's 
share of the reinstatement obligation. These funds shall be 
paid plaintiff within 30 days of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
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12. As of the date of trial, defendant received a 
total of $4,225 per month, of which $3,734 per month was 
comprised of military retirement payments, and $491 per month 
V.A. disability payments. The military retirement payments are 
reduced pro rata by the amount of disability payments defendant 
receives. Plaintiff and defendant were married for 18 of the 
30 years of defendant's military service. Accordingly, 
plaintiff is entitled to 30% of defendant's gross military 
retirement. 
13. Defendant has the election of enrolling in the 
Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP). Under the SBP, defendant may 
obtain for the benefit of plaintiff an annuity which would pay 
plaintiff 55% of defendant's military retirement pay in the 
event of defendant's death, a sum which would be reduced to 35% 
in the_event plaintiff were to receive Social Security 
benefits. The Court offered the parties the option of 
exercising his option to obtain the maximum available SBP 
coverage for plaintiff in lieu of a 30% award of gross 
retirement payments to plaintiff. Defendant accepted this 
offer, which the Court finds to be an equitable method for the 
allocation to plaintiff of her portion of defendant's military 
retirement. Accordingly, defendant shall exercise his SBP 
enrollment option and obtain the maximum available coverage. 
Defendant shall pay all costs of this coverage. 
Findings Relating to Educational Expenses. 
14. Both parties testified that they were committed 
to providing educational opportunities to their children to the 
maximum extent allowed by their resources. Consistent with 
this testimony, plaintiff and defendant shall share equally all 
education expenses of each of the parties' children until each 
attains the age of twenty-two years. Without limiting the 
foregoing, the Court finds that, based on the incomes of the 
parties and the value of the marital estate, Valerie should be 
permitted to complete the requirements for her degree at 
Westminster College and Cara should be permitted to continue 
her enrollment at Judge Memorial High School. 
Findings Relating to Personal Property. 
15. The personal property comprising the marital 
estate shall be divided as follows: 
To the plaintiff: 
Pentagon Federal Credit Union account 
containing approximately $32,572; 
Riggs National Bank account containing 
approximately $1,000; 
America First Credit Union account 
containing approximately $8,000; 
Chase Manhattan account containing 
approximately $3,133; 
Proceeds from the sale of the parties1 
Virginia house in the amount of $143,541. 
To the defendant: 
Pentagon Federal Credit Union account from 
which $13,733 was withdrawn at or about 
September 1992; 
Union Bank of Switzerland account having a 
value as of February 18, 1993, of $97,797; 
Army National Bank account containing 
approximately $30,000; 
Securities having a value of approximately 
$2,000; 
Proceeds from the sale of the parties1 
Virginia house in the amount of $45,659. 
16. With respect to household goods which have not 
yet been divided (Plaintifffs Exhibit 13), the Court finds that 
the china should be held by the plaintiff in trust for Cara and 
Valerie, and that the remaining household items should be 
selected by the parties on an alternating basis, with plaintiff 
choosing first. 
17. The parties own two automobiles. The Court finds 
the automobiles to be of equal value. Plaintiff is awarded the 
1990 Mitsubishi. The defendant is awarded the 1990 Isuzu. 
18. All real and personal property not identified 
herein as being part of the marital estate is found to have 
been received by plaintiff or defendant through gift or 
inheritance and not subject to distribution. 
kTES 
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Findings Relating to Health Insurance. 
19. Plaintiff has health insurance available through 
her employment and shall maintain coverage of the parties1 
children to the maximum extent permitted. Defendant has health 
coverage under CHAMPUS and shall maintain coverage for the 
parties' children to the maximum extent permissible. Any 
medical or dental expenses not covered by insurance incurred by 
the parties1 children shall be borne equally by the parties. 
Findings Relating to Life Insurance. 
20. Defendant is currently paying the sum of $568 per 
month in life insurance premiums. Two of the policies owned by 
the defendant were written by Executive Life, an insurance 
company which is insolvent and in receivership. Defendant is 
ordered to maintain unchanged life insurance contracts 
currently in force on defendant's life unless owing to the 
financial instability of the insurance company it becomes no 
longer prudent to maintain coverage under the policies. In 
that event, defendant shall obtain a substitute policy or 
policies from a life insurance company rated A+ by A.M. Best 
Company with a premium equal to that now paid by defendant 
naming as beneficiaries those persons identified as 
beneficiaries on policies now in force. 
Findings Relating to Taxes, 
21. The parties shall file separate federal and state 
income tax returns for the year 1992. Defendant shall be 
entitled to claim Sean Varallo as a dependent. Plaintiff shall 
be entitled^to claim Cara and Valerie as dependents. 
Findings Relating to Indebtedness. 
22. Plaintiff shall assume and pay the indebtedness 
secured by her condominium. 
Findings Relating to Attorney's Fees. 
23. The Court finds that the parties are capable of 
bearing their own attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution 
of this action. 
Findings Relating to Miscellaneous Matters. 
24. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to 
the other such documents as are required to implement the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered pursuant to these 
Findings and Conclusions. 
25. If defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears in 
his child support obligation/ plaintiff shall be entitled to 
mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45d-l, et seq. (1984, as amended). 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court concludes that the parties are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the 
Court's Findings of Fact, and that the plaintiff is entitled to 
a Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon entry herein. 
The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute 
have been resolved by the Court pursuant to the above Findings 
of Fact. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
JON M. MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
-10-
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Addendum "F." 
Tn re: Stenquist 
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tolberg, and Johnson l4 In the instant 
ase, this full back pay award will serve not 
nly to make plaintiff whole, but also to 
iscourage similar unconstitutional dismiss-
Is in the future M 
Thus we cannot conclude that plaintiffs 
ight-year struggle for vindication should 
ield him reappointment with only one 
ear's back pay. Such a "victory" would be 
yrrhic indeed His reemployment is for a 
>ming single one-year entitlement; for 
irther employment he must prove his com-
etence in accordance with lawful universi-
f procedures His loss of earnings, how-
ver, encompasses seven years, and upon a 
roper showing he should recover the whole 
ppropriate damages 
The judgment is affirmed 
BIRD, C J , and MOSK, RICHARDSON, 
[ANUEL and NEWMAN, JJ , concur 
I. We note that a plethora of statutory provi 
slons both in California and elsewhere demon 
strates a general policy in favor of full back 
pay awards even in the absence of constitution 
al violations Thus, for example, under the 
National Labor Relations Act, even an at will 
employee who is improperly dismissed is entl 
tied to an award of full back pay from the date 
of the improper dismissal to the date of his 
reinstatement (29 U S C § 160(c)) As the 
United States Supreme Court explained in 
NLRB v Rutter Rex Manufacturing Co (1969) 
396 U S 258, 263, 90 S Ct 417, 420, 24 L Ed 2d 
405, "(T)he purpose of the remedy is clear 'A 
back pay order is a reparation order designed 
to vindicate the public policy of the statute by 
making the employees whole for losses suf 
fered on account of an unfair labor practice' 
ICitation omitted JM 
Numerous California statutes In the Educa 
tion Code and in other areas provide for simi 
larly comprehensive back pay remedies Thus, 
for example section 89540, former section 
24310, of the Education Code provides that 
with respect to both tenured permanent teach 
ers and untenured probationary teachers, * [ijf 
the dismissal suspension or demotion 
[of the teacher for cause] is revoked or modi 
fied the employee shall be restored to 
his position in accord with the decision, and 
shall be paid back salary equal to that which 
the employee would haxe earned if continuous 
ly employed in accord with the decision *' 
(Emphasis added ) (See also former Ed Code, 
§§ 13439, 13516 5, now §§ 44946, 45037 (certifi 
cated employee of school district), §§ 13408, 
13409, 13411, now $$ 87735, 87736, 87738 (reg 
ular and certificated employees of community 
148 Cal Rptr 9 
In re the MARRIAGE OF Richard Wil-
liam and Marilyn Betty STENQUIST. 
Richard William STENQUIST, Appellant, 
v. 
Marilyn Betty STENQUIST, Appellant. 
L.A. 30718. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank 
Aug 7, 1978 
Appeal was taken from judgment of 
the Superior Court, San Diego County, 
Louis M Welsh, J , in marriage dissolution 
case The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J , 
college district), Gov Code § 19584 (employee 
of state civil service) Lab Code, § 1426 (per 
mitting State Fair Employment Practice Com 
mission to order employer to reinstate employ 
ee with full back pay when employer is found 
to have engaged in unlawful employment prac 
tice) 
15. The trustees rely on 7immerer v Spencer 
(5th Clr 1973), 485 F 2d 176, and Frosc v 
Trustees, 46 CalApp3d 225, 120 Cal Rptr 1, 
for the conclusion that back pay is not availa 
ble to plaintiff Both cases are distinguishable 
from the instant case 
In Zimmerer, the court found a nontenured 
teacher s dismissal improper only because of 
the defendants failure to provide the teacher 
with a hearing to which she was entitled 
Finding ' that the [defendant] Board s reasons 
for its actions were valid and that 
the controversy was intractable and recognized 
by the parties to be such,' the court concluded 
that ' as a practical consequence the 
most that Dr Zimmerer lost was one year s 
pay " (485 F 2d 176 179 ) In the instant case, 
by contrast the record does not in any way 
reveal that plaintiffs performance would inevi 
tably have led to his termination after one 
additional year of teaching 
The Frost decision is also distinguishable 
from the present case In Frost the court up 
held the chancellor s decision to reinstate a 
probationary academic employee, but to deny 
him back salary The claim in Frost for pay 
ment of back salary however, was not based 
on an alleged violation of constitutional rights, 
as in the present case 
IN RE MARRIAGE 
Cite as 582 
held that (1) upon dissolution of marriage, 
husband's military retired pay was properly 
divided on basis of determination that pen-
sion rights attributable to husband's mili-
tary service before marriage, plus the por-
tion of those rights earned during marriage 
attributable to husband's disability, consti-
tuted his separate property while the por-
tion of pension rights earned during mar-
riage equivalent to ordinary retirement 
pension, computed on the basis of longevity 
of service and rank at retirement^ constitut-
ed a community asset, but (2) in case in 
which parties had been married for 25 years 
and, following retirement from military, 
husband had not yet been employed, while 
wife was attempting to start work as part-
time real estate salesperson, trial court 
abused its discretion in divesting itself of 
jurisdiction to award spousal support 24 
months after the date of the decree 
Affirmed in part and reversed and re-
manded in part 
Clark, J , filed a dissenting opinion 
Opinion, 62 CalApp3d 849, 133 Cal 
Rptr 341, vacated 
1. Divorce «=>252 
Upon dissolution of marriage, hus-
band's military retired pay was properly 
divided on basis of determination that pen-
sion rights attributable to husband's mili-
tary service before marriage, plus the por-
tion of those rights earned during marriage 
attributable to husband's disability, consti-
tuted his separate property while the por-
tion of pension rights earned during mar-
riage equivalent to ordinary retirement 
pension, computed on the basis of longevity 
of service and rank at retirement, constitut-
ed a community asset 10 U S C A §§ 1201, 
1401 
2. Husband and Wife *=»265 
One spouse cannot, by invoking a con-
dition wholly within his control, defeat com-
munity interest of the other spouse 
S*2 P2d-^1 
OF STENQUIST Cal <J7 
P.2dM 
3. Divorce *=*240(4) 
Award of only $1 per month in spousal 
support was not an abuse of discretion 
where, following division of husband's mili-
tary pension and considering wife's income 
from part-time employment, husband and 
wife would have approximate equal month-
ly incomes 
4. Divorce <&=>254 
Decisions to terminate continuing juris-
diction with respect to spousal support can-
not be based on speculation concerning fu-
ture earnings and employment, but instead 
should be deferred until the realized facts 
demonstrate whether further support is 
warranted 
5. Divorce «=>254 
In case in which parties had been mar-
ried for 25 years and, following retirement 
from military, husband had not yet been 
employed, where wife was attempting to 
start work as part-time real estate salosj>er-
son, trial court abused its discretion in di-
vesting itself of jurisdiction to award spous-
al support 24 months after the date of the 
decree 
6. Court* *=» 100(1) 
Husband and Wife <*= 249(1) 
Military retired pay based on disability 
contains two components (1) compensation 
to the serviceman for loss of earning power 
and personal suffering, and (l>) retirement 
support, the latter component, to the ex-
tent that it is attributable to employment 
during marriage, is community property, 
but such holding will be applied retroactive-
ly only to those cases in which the property 
rights arising from the marriage have not 
yet been adjudicated, to such rights if such 
adjudication is still subject to appellate re 
view, or if in such adjudication the tri il 
court has expiessly reserved jurisdiction to 
divide pension rights 
Hervey, Mitchell, Ashworth & Kceney 
and Thomas Ashworth, III, San Diego, for 
appellant Husband 
Rand & Day and Roland B Day, San 
Diego, for appellant Wife 
Cal. 582 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
artrude D. Chern, Santa Maria, as ami-
curiae on behalf of appellant Wife. 
OBRINER, Justice. 
etiring after 26 years of military ser-
, husband received a "disability" pen-
i of 75 percent of his basic pay in lieu of 
retirement" pension at 65 percent of 
ic pay.1 Although a military "retire-
it" pension is a community asset (In re 
rriage of Fithian (1974) 10 Cal.3d 592, 
, 111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449), hus-
d claims that his entire "disability" pen-
i is his separate property under our deci-
I in In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 
.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420. 
)king beneath the label of a "disability" 
ision, however, the trial court found that 
y the excess of the "disability" pension 
hts over the alternative "retirement" 
ision represented additional compensa-
te attributable to husband's disability; 
\ balance of the pension rights acquired 
ring the marriage, it ruled, served to 
>lace ordinary "retirement" pay and thus 
ist be classed as a community asset. 
We agree with the reasoning of the trial 
jrt; to permit the husband, by unilateral 
tction of a "disability" pension, to "trans-
ite community property into his own sep-
ate property" (In re Marriage of Fithian, 
pra, 10 Cal.3d 592, 602, 111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 
5, 517 P.2d 449, 455), is to negate the 
otective philosophy of the community 
operty law as set out in previous decisions 
this court. We therefore affirm the 
dgment of the trial court apportioning 
isband's pension rights between separate 
id community assets and dividing the 
immunity interest equally between the 
>ouses. 
Turning to wife's cross-appeal, we ex-
ain that the trial court's order limiting its 
irisdiction over spousal s u p p o r t to 24 
lonths conflicts wi th t he policy es tabl i shed 
We used the labels "disability pay" and 
"retirement pay" in In re Marriage of Jones 
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 457, 460, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 
531 P.2d 420. Sections 1201 and 1401 of 10 
United States Code, which govern military 
retirement benefits, speak only of "retired 
pay." 
in our recent decision of In re Marriage of 
Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.Sd 437, 143 Cal.Rptr. 
139, 573 P.2d 41. Because any assertion 
that wife will attain economic self-suffi-
ciency within 24 months of the judgment 
below rests on speculation, not evidence, the 
trial court's order divesting itself of the 
power to order spousal support beyond that 
brief period constitutes an abuse of discre-
tion. We therefore reverse that portion of 
the trial court's order, remanding the mat-
ter for further proceedings in light of this 
opinion. 
1. The trial court correctly apportioned 
husbandfs pension into community 
and separate assets. 
In the instant case the husband joined the 
Army in 1944 and married in 1950. In 1953 
he suffered a service-related injury leading 
to amputation of his left forearm, for which 
the Army assigned him an 80 percent dis-
ability rating. If the husband had retired 
immediately, his maximum "disability" pay 
would have been 75 percent of basic pay, 
compared to a maximum "retirement" pay 
of 22V* percent of basic pay. He neverthe-
less continued his military service until he 
retired in 1970. At that time he faced the 
choice of taking regular "retirement" pay 
at the rate of 65 percent of his basic pay, or 
taking "disability" pay, a stipend equal to 
75 percent of basic pay.1 Assuming the 
husband desired the higher amount, the 
Army began making "disability" payments 
to him. 
[1] The husband commenced proceed-
ings for dissolution of the marriage in 1974. 
The trial court first determined that all 
pension rights attributable to the husband's 
military service before marriage, plus the 
portion of those rights earned during mar-
riage attributable to the husband's disabili-
ty, constituted his separate property. It 
2. We note that if the husband had retired four 
years later, in 1974, both his maximum "dis-
ability" and his maximum "retirement" pay 
would have been 75 percent of his basic pay. 
ir* ivTJ iTju\ivivi/\\«r.i 
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then ruled that that portion of the pension 
rights earned after the marriage equivalent 
to an ordinary retirement pension, comput-
ed on the basis of longevity of service and 
rank at retirement, constituted a communi-
ty asset. 
The court finally divided this asset equal-
ly between the spouses.8 The husband ap-
peals from the portion of the judgment 
awarding his wife part of his pension as 
community property. The wife also appeals 
from the judgment below; challenging the 
court's apportionment, she claims that only 
that portion of the pension attributable to 
husband's employment before marriage is 
separate property. 
We begin our discussion of this issue by 
reviewing the procedure by which a dis-
abled serviceman may compute the amount 
of "retired pay" to which he is entitled. He 
may elect, first, to compute his "retired 
pay" on the basis of his rank and disability 
by multiplying his monthly basic pay by his 
percentage of disability. Alternatively, he 
can compute his "retired pay" on the basis 
of rank and longevity of service by multi-
plying his monthly basic pay by 2xfa percent 
times his years of service. (10 U.S.C. 
3. The trial court held that "(t]he ratio of that 
portion of the marriage from the commence-
ment thereof up until the time of the petition-
er's (husband's) retirement from military ser-
vice, as compared with the entire total service 
of twenty-five years, eight months and ten days 
with which petitioner was credited, is seventy-
seven percent (77%). The Court therefore 
finds that had the petitioner retired on longevi-
ty retirement pay, the respondent [wife] would 
be entitled to 38.5% of such pay, as a division 
of community property, such percentage repre-
senting fifty percent (50%) of the amount of 
such retirement accumulated during coverture 
. . . . Ill] The Court further finds that . . 
the difference in pay between what the Peti-
tioner would have received had he retired on 
straight retirement for years, and the disability 
pay which he is actually receiving, is the sole 
and separate property of the husband, while 
said lesser sum Is community property, as ac-
cumulated during coverture. . [II] Pur-
suant thereto, the Court finds that 65/75ths 
(86.66%) of the disability retirement pay being 
received by the Petitioner would be community 
property to the extent the same was accrued 
during coverture, and that 77% thereof was so 
accrued during coverture, hence, 66.73% of 
\>r o i E i i u i u i o i v./ui. ;;;; 
P.2d9« 
§ 1401.) Under either formula, he cannot 
receive more than 75 percent of his last 
monthly basic pay. The amount of retired 
pay the serviceman receives under either 
option therefore depends largely on his 
monthly pay at retirement, a function of 
longevity of service and rank; rank itself is 
closely related to length of service. 
In In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 
Cal.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420, 
and In re Marriage of Ijochr (1975) 13 
Cal.3d 465, 119 Cal.Rptr. 113, 531 P.2d 425, 
its companion memorandum decision, we 
held that a serviceman's right to "disabili-
ty" pay, acquired before he had earned a 
"vested" right to ordinary retirement pay, 
was separate property. Subsequently in In 
re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, we held 
that "vested" and "nonvested" |>ension 
rights should be treated alike. Relying on 
those decisions, the husband contends that 
all military pensions based on disability are 
now separate property.4 Closer examina-
tion, however, reveals that the reasoning of 
Jones and Brown supports the division of 
the husband's pension which the present 
trial court ordered. 
said disability retirement pay is community 
property and one-half thereof (33.36%, round-
ed off to 33'/3% for convenience by stipulation) 
is respondent's share. (86.66% X 77% -> 2 -
33»/3%)." 
4. The wife on her part acknowledges that the 
trial court arrived at an equitable apportion-
ment of the pension between separate and 
community interests. She argues, however, 
that the duty of making such apportionment 
imposes so great a burden on the courts that 
we should instead adopt a clear and simple rule 
that all "disability" payments, the right to 
which was earned during coverture, are com-
munity property. Rejecting this rigid rule and 
the contention that any other disposition of the 
issue causes complications, we point out that 
the method of apportionment adopted by the 
trial court, which we endorse, does not involve 
any delicate balancing of equities, but a simple 
mathematical computation based on the rela-
tionship of the "disability" pension to an alter-
native "retirement" pension. It does not im-
pose a burden so heavy that for reasons of 
expediency we must settle for the less equita-
ble, all-or-nothing rule wife proposes. 
Cal. 582 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Jones, we held that when a spouse is 
sd to receive a pension only because 
jisabled, and has no right to a pension 
se of longevity of service, the disabili-
nefit payments are his separate prop-
jpon dissolution of the marriage. At 
ime Jones was decided, however, we 
ed the community interest in a non-
1 retirement pension a mere expectan-
,nd not a property interest. (See 
:h v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 
235.) Since Jones retired before his 
to a "retirement" pension vested, his 
tance of "disability" pay did not af/ect 
present community asset, but merely 
nted an expectancy from coming into 
on. Recognizing, however, that the 
iples in Jones might not govern a case 
hich the serviceman had acquired a 
d right to retired pay wholly apart 
his disability, we expressly limited our 
ion to cases involving nonvested pen-
e year following our decision in Jones 
verturned past precedent and held in 
? Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, that 
on rights, whether or not vested, con-
Led a property interest; that to the 
it that such rights derive from employ-
, during coverture, they now comprise 
nunity assets. This holding under-
s the fundamental premise of Jones: 
the award of a serviceman's "disabili-
>ension to the serviceman as his sepa-
property would not impair any commu-
interest of his spouse. Under current 
-in contrast to the law prevailing when 
s was decided—both the nonvested 
ement pension in Jones and the bus-
's vested right to a "retirement" pen-
in the present case constitute valuable 
/hile In In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 
3d 838, 851, footnote 14. 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 
1 P.2d 561, we disapproved dicta in Waite 
I Marriage of Peterson to the effect that 
wested pension rights were not community 
iperty, we did not disapprove the holding in 
se cases that one spouse could not by elec-
i destroy the community interest of the oth-
spouse. 
community assets deserving of judicial pro-
tection. 
Our reasoning in Brown is particularly 
appropriate to the present case. As we 
stated there, "over the past decades, pen-
sion benefits have become an increasingly 
significant part of the consideration earned 
by the employee for his services. As the 
date of vesting and retirement approaches, 
the value of the pension right grows until it 
often represents the most important asset 
of the marital community. . A di-
vision of community property which awards 
one spouse the entire value of this asset, 
without any offsetting award to the other 
spouse, does not represent that equal divi-
sion of community property contemplated 
by [the Family Law Act]." (In re Marriage 
of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 847, 126 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 638, 544 P.2d 561, 566.) 
[2J We cannot permit the serviceman's 
election of a "disability" pension to defeat 
the community interest in his right to a 
pension based on longevity. In the first 
place, such a result would violate the set-
tled principle that one spouse cannot, by 
invoking a condition wholly within his con-
trol, defeat the community interest of the 
other spouse. (See Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 
Cal.3d 461, 472, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 
13; In re Marriage of Peterson (1974) 41 
Cal.App.3d 642, 650 651, 115 Cal.Rptr. 
184.)5 As the court explained in In re 
Marriage of Mueller (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 
66, 137 Cal.Rptr. 129, a case indistinguisha-
ble from the present appeal, the employee 
spouse retains the right to determine the 
nature of the benefits to be received.' It 
would be inconsistent with community 
property principles "to permit that spouse 
to transmute what would otherwise be com-
munity property into his or her separate 
6. Recognition of the nonemployee spouse's in-
terest in the "disability" pension would not 
limit the employee's freedom "to elect between 
alternative retirement programs." (In re Mar-
riage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 849, 126 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 640. 544 P.2d 561, 568.) Any 
serviceman eligible to receive "disability" pay-
ments higher than ordinary retirement benefits 
would remain free to elect the higher payments 
if he so chose. 
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property." (70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 71-72, 137 
Cal.Rptr. at p. 132.)7 
In the second place, "only a portion of 
husband's pension benefit payments, though 
termed 'disability payments,' is properly al-
locable to disability. It would be unjust to 
deprive wife of a valuable property right 
simply because a misleading label has been 
affixed to husband's pension fund benefits." 
(In re Marriage of Cavnar (1976) 62 Cal. 
App.3d 660, 665, 133 Cal.Rptr. 267, 270; see 
Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who 
Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Rela-
tions Law and Retirement Plans (1978) 5 
Peppcrdine L.Rev. 191, 198 and cases there 
cited.)8 
The purpose of disability benefits, as we 
explained in Jones, is primarily to compen-
sate the disabled veteran for "the loss of 
earnings resulting from his compelled pre-
mature military retirement and from dimin-
ished ability to compete in the civilian job 
market" (13 Cal.3d at p. 459, 119 Cal.Rptr. 
at p. 109, 531 P.2d at p. 421) and secondarily 
to compensate him for the personal suffer-
ing caused by the disability. Military 
retired pay based on disability, however, 
does not serve those purposes exclusively. 
Because it replaces a "retirement" pension, 
and is computed in part on the basis of 
longevity of service and rank at retirement, 
it also serves the objective of providing 
support for the serviceman and his spouse 
after he leaves the service. Moreover, as 
the veteran approaches normal retirement 
age, this latter purpose may become the 
predominate function served by the "dis-
ability" pension. 
7. We note that the courts of Texas have held 
that if a serviceman surrenders a vested right 
to retirement benefits in order to obtain "dis-
ability" benefits, the "disability" benefits are 
community property. (See Busby v. Busby 
(Tex. 1970) 457 S.W.2d 551; Dominev v. Domi-
ney (Tex.Civ.App.1972) 481 S.W.2d~473, cert, 
den., 409 U.S. 1028, 93 S.Ct. 462, 34 L.Ed.2d 
321.) 
8. As we have affirmed many times, adjust-
ments in the amount of alimony awarded will 
not mitigate the hardship caused the wife by 
the denial of her community interest in the 
pension payments. Alimony lies within the 
discretion of the trial court and may be modi-
The present case illustrates the point. 
The husband here did not retire premature-
ly from military service to face the prospect 
of competing on the civilian labor market 
handicapped by his disability; he served for 
26 years, retiring only after he had acquired 
a vested right to a "retirement" pension. 
He did not begin to receive his disability 
pension until 17 years after the injury. The 
value of his present "disability" pension de-
pends largely on the high military rank he 
had achieved at the time of retirement and 
his extensive military service; it docs not 
relate to his rank or longevity at the time 
of injury. Under these circumstances, the 
pension's function of compensating the hus-
band for loss of earning capacity or provid-
ing recompense for personal suffering is 
secondary to the primary objective of pro-
viding retirement support. 
The Court of Appeal in In re Marriage of 
Mueller, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 66, 137 Cal. 
Rptr. 129, explained the method of allocat-
ing a disability pension between the sepa-
rate interest of the disabled spouse and the 
community interest in the retirement bene-
fits. It stated that "where the employee 
spouse elects to receive disability benefits in 
lieu of a matured right to retirement bene-
fits, only the net amount thus received over 
and above what would have been received 
as retirement benefits constitutes compen-
sation for personal anguish and loss of earn-
ing capacity and is, thus, the employee 
spouse's separate property. The amount 
received in lieu of matured retirement ben-
efits remains community property subject 
to division on dissolution." (70 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 71, 137 Cal.Rptr. at p. 132.)' 
fied with changing circumstances: "the spouse 
'should not be dependent on the discretion of 
the court . . t o provide her with the 
equivalent of what should be hers as a matter 
of absolute right.' " (In re Marriage of Brown, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d 838. 848, 126 Cal.Rptr 633 
639. 544 P.2d 561, 567.) 
9. Although the quoted language from In re 
Marriage of Mueller speaks of "matured" 
retirement benefits, the court earlier in its opin 
ion made clear that matured benefits could not 
be distinguished from immature but vested 
benefits. Indeed in light of In re Marriage of 
Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838. 126 Cal.Rptr 633. 
544 P.2d 561, no distinction can be drawn be 
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amount of $1 per month, but contends that 
the 24-month limitation is an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
Since the court's continuing jurisdiction is 
not expressly limited to the 24-month peri-
od, the order is not entirely clear on its 
face. The award of $1 per month alimony, 
however, serves to clarify the meaning of 
the order. That award plainly is not in-
tended as genuine support for the wife, but 
to serve as a legal fiction demonstrating the 
continuing jurisdiction of the court over 
spousal support. By limiting the $1 per 
month payments to a period of 24 months, 
the court impliedly indicated that it did not 
intend to extend its jurisdiction to modify 
the award of spousal support beyond the 
24-month period. 
So interpreted, the trial court's award is 
inconsistent with our recent decision in In 
re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d 
437, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41. We 
stated in Morrison that "A trial court 
should not terminate jurisdiction to extend 
a future support order after a lengthy mar-
riage, unless the record clearly indicates 
that the supported spouse will be able to 
adequately meet his or her financial needs 
at the time selected for termination of jur-
isdiction. In making its decision concerning 
» trial court in the present case cor-
' followed this formula. It first classi-
as separate property that portion of 
tusband's pension attributable to em-
lent before marriage. Turning to the 
ce of the pension, it assigned as sepa-
property only the excess of the hus-
s pension over the "retirement" pen-
that he would have received if not 
led; the remainder of the pension it 
ed as community property.11 Finding 
portion of the trial court's decision in 
d with the principles stated in In re 
iage of Mueller, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 
37 Cal.Rptr. 129, and adopted in this 
on, we affirm its division of the mari-
roperty.11 
The trial court abused its discretion 
by limiting its jurisdiction to modify 
spousal support to a period of 24 
months. 
e trial court ordered husband to pay to 
"as and for her spousal support, the 
of $1.00 per month, payable for a peri-
\ twenty-four (24) months, commencing 
:h 1, 1974, subject to the continuing 
diction of the Court to alter, modify, or 
mate the same upon good cause first 
% shown." Wife does not challenge the 
;en matured benefits and nonvested bene-
Contrary to the view advanced In the dls-
itlng opinion, allocation of the "disability" 
lslon between separate and community In-
ests does not discriminate against the dis-
ed. In attempting to demonstrate such dis-
mination, the dissent first describes a 
ilthy worker who takes some action, such as 
mlnating his employment before his pension 
;ts or working beyond his retirement date, 
ich has the effect of forfeiting all or part of 
pension rights. In such a case, of course, 
» worker's spouse has no claim to any of the 
felted rights; a community share of nothing 
aals nothing. (See Reppy, Community and 
parate Interests in Pension and Social Secur-
Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERI-
[ (1978) 25 U C L A . L.Rev. 417, 426, fn. 31.) 
e dissent then compares such a healthy 
>rker to a disabled worker who retires and 
:eives a "disability" pension, part of which 
der the present decision will be classified as 
mmunity property. Because the spouse of 
; disabled worker can claim a share in his 
pension, the dissent concludes that the decision 
discriminates against the disabled. 
The conclusion of the dissent, however, de-
rives from the dissent's inappropriate compari-
son. If instead of comparing a healthy worker 
who has forfeited pension rights with a dis-
abled worker receiving a pension, we compare 
healthy and disabled workers who are both 
receiving pensions, we discover that under the 
allocation formula set forth In this opinion the 
disabled worker usually will retain a higher 
percentage of the benefits. In the present case, 
for example, the husband's pension by virtue of 
his disability is higher than the "retirement" 
pension of a healthy serviceman of equivalent 
rank and longevity. Because we allocate to 
husband the whole of the excess of his "disabil-
ity" pensions over a "retirement" pension, he 
receives greater pension benefits than does the 
undisabled veteran. 
II. Language in In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 
13 Cal.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420, 
and In re Marriage of Loehr, supra, 13 Cal.3d 
465, 119 Cal.Rptr. 113, 531 P.2d 425, inconsist-
ent with this opinion, is disapproved. 
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the retention of jurisdiction, the court must 
rely only on the evidence in the record and 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. It must not engage in specula-
tion. If the record does not contain evi-
dence of the supported spouse's ability to 
meet his or her future needs, the court 
should not 'burn its bridges' and fail to 
retain jurisdiction." (20 Cal.3d at p. 453, 
143 Cal.Rptr. at p. 150, 573 P.2d at p. 52.) 
In the present case, the parties had been 
married for 25 years. Following retirement 
from the military, husband has not been 
employed. Wife attempted to start work as 
a part-time real estate salesperson, but as 
of trial she earned only about $100 a month. 
As is so often the case, the combined in-
come of the parties is insufficient to meet 
the anticipated expenses of separate liv-
ing.12 
[3] If the husband's military pension is 
divided as ordered by the trial court, hus-
band and wife will have approximately 
equal monthly incomes; thus the award of 
only $1 per month in spousal support is not 
an abuse of discretion. Any attempt to 
predict conditions of two, five, or ten years 
hence, however, is a matter of total specula-
tion. Husband may remain unemployed 
and totally dependent on his military pen-
sion; on the other hand his demonstrated 
talents may yield a well paying job. Wife 
may or may not succeed as a real estate 
salesperson. 
f4] Both In re Marriage of Morrison and 
the Court of Appeal cases cited with ap-
proval in Morrison stress that decisions to 
terminate continuing jurisdiction cannot be 
based on speculation concerning future 
earnings and employment. Such decisions 
12. The record on appeal does not include a 
reporter's transcript of the brief testimony 
heard by the trial court. The arguments of the 
parties suggest that none of this testimony bore 
on the question of the wife's ability to attain 
economic self-sufficiency within a period of 
two years following the decree. 
13. Upon such reconsideration, the trial court 
may wish to reserve jurisdiction to award 
spousal support to the husband as well as to 
the wife If the economic prospects of the par-
ties so warrant. 
should instead be deferred until the realized 
facts demonstrate whether further support 
is warranted. As the Court of Appeal ex-
plained in In re Marriage of Smith (1978) 79 
Cal.App.3d 725, 738-739, 145 Cal.Rptr. 205, 
210: "by making an order terminating all 
spousal support . . without reserv-
ing jurisdiction to extend the period, the 
court put it out of its power to provide any 
support whatever for wife after that time 
even if, after maximum effort on her part, 
she is unable to support herself in a reason-
able fashion. There is no justification for 
the court so 'burning its bridges.'" (See 
also In re Marriage of Andrccn (1978) 76 
Cal.App.3d 667, 673, 143 Cal.Rptr. 94.) 
[5] We conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in divesting itself of 
jurisdiction to award spousal support 24 
months after the date of the decree. Four 
years having passed since the trial court 
rendered its judgment, that court should 
now reconsider the issue of spousal support 
in light of the current income and earning 
potential of the parties, and frame its 
award in conformity with the principles 
outlined in this opinion and elucidated fully 
in In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 
Cal.3d 437,18 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 l\2d 41. 
3. Summary. 
[6] We conclude that military retired 
pay based on disability contains two compo-
nents: (a) compensation to the serviceman 
for loss of earning power and personal suf-
fering, and (b) retirement support. The 
latter component, to the extent that it is 
attributable to employment during mar-
riage, is community property.14 The trial 
court correctly followed this analysis in ap-
14. Following the policy of In re Marriage of 
Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 851, 126 Cal.Rptr. 
633, 641, 544 P.2d 561. 569, our holding re 
specting the division of military "disability" 
pensions applies retroactively only to cases "in 
which the property rights arising from the mar-
riage have not yet been adjudicated, to such 
rights if such adjudication is still subject to 
appellate review, or if in such adjudication the 
trial court has expressly reserved jurisdiction 
to divide pension rights." 
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ning the husband's pension rights in 
istant case. That court erred, how-
in limiting its jurisdiction to award 
al support to the brief period of two 
; it should have retained jurisdiction 
ler to be able to evaluate the parties' 
and capacities in light of future 
s. 
j portion of the judgment limiting the 
s jurisdiction to award spousal sup-
s reversed and the cause remanded for 
er proceedings consistent with the 
expressed herein. In all other re-
i the judgment is affirmed. Marilyn 
|uist shall recover her costs on this 
il. 
*D, C. J., and MOSK, RICHARDSON, 
UEL and JEFFERSON (Assigned by 
Chairperson of the Judicial Council), 
oncur. 
ARK, Justice, dissenting, 
issent. 
tirement pensions earned during mar-
constitute community property, and 
ility pensions—no matter when the 
ility occurs—constitute separate prop-
Under federal law, a veteran who has 
fied for both may receive only one. 
;r the separate property interest or the 
nunity property interest must be sacri-
, and the question before us is whether 
dissolution a portion of the disability 
ion—equal to the amount of retirement 
ion earned during marriage—shall be 
to be community property. On the 
of well-settled principles, authorities 
reason set forth in In re Marriage of 
s (1975) 13 Cal.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 
531 P.2d 420, it must be concluded the 
>led person upon dissolution is entitled 
e future disability pension payments as 
rate property, with spousal support 
able to meet the needs of the nondisa-
former spouse in appropriate cases, 
i reach the result that part of the dis-
ty pension is community, the majority 
>prove our recent unanimous decision in 
's (by the author of today's opinion), 
implying that Jones was based on the 
overruled doctrine of French v. French 
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235, which 
held that nonvested retirement pensions are 
mere expectancies. (Ante, p. 13 of 148 Cal. 
Rptr., p. 100 of 582 P.2d.) The implication 
is false; Jones did not rely upon the 
doctrine of French. Moreover, by re-
pudiating Jo/ies, the majority establish an 
invidious discrimination between disabled 
employees and healthy ones who terminate 
employment, a discrimination betraying a 
shocking lack of compassion for the handi-
capped. 
FACTS 
Husband entered the Army in 1944 and 
married in 1950. In 1953 he was injured by 
shell fragments, suffering amputation of 
his left forearm. Rather than exercising 
his right to disability compensation, he 
chose to remain on active duty. 
When husband retired in 1970 at the age 
of 43, he possessed the options of regular 
retirement pay based on longevity of ser-
vice equal to 65 percent of his basic pay, or 
disability compensation equal to 75 percent 
of his basic pay. Disability compensation is 
not subject to federal or state taxes. The 
Army assumed husband desired the higher 
amount and began making disability pay-
ments to him. 
Husband commenced dissolution of the 
marriage in 1974. The trial court held the 
difference between future disability com-
pensation and regular retirement benefits 
constitutes husband's separate property. A 
portion of the pension was attributed to 
husband's employment prior to marriage 
and was also held to be his separate proper-
ty. The balance was attributed to employ-
ment during marriage and was held to be 
community property. The court awarded 
the wife half of all community assets, de-
termined $38,000 was her separate property, 
granted child support and one dollar per 
month spousal support for two years. 
RETIREMENT PENSIONS 
Recognizing that retirement benefits are 
not gratuities but represent deferred com-
pensation for past service, this court has 
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held that anticipated future retirement 
payments attributable to employment dur-
ing marriage constitute a community asset 
divisible upon dissolution. (In re Marriage 
of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 841 et seq., 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561; In re Mar-
riage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 461, 119 
Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420; Waite v. Waite 
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 461, 471, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 
492 P.2d 13; PhiUipson v. Board of Admin-
istration (1970) 3 Cal.3d 32, 89 Cal.Rptr. 61, 
473 P.2d 765.) On this basis, future mili-
tary retirement benefits have been held di-
visible as community property. (In re Mar-
riage of Fithian (1974) 10 Cal.3d 592, 604, 
111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449.) The 
retirement pension is divisible whether 
vested or nonvested. (In re Marriage of 
Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 843 850, 126 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) While non-
vested pension rights may in theory be di-
vided by determining the present value of 
the rights, their evaluation must take into 
account the possibility that death or termi-
nation of employment may destroy them 
before maturity. The uncertainties war-
rant refusal to divide present value and 
instead awarding a portion of each pension 
payment as it comes due. (Id. at p. 848, 126 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) 
Limitations on the applicability of com-
munity property principles to retirement 
pensions have also been established. Judi-
cial recognition of the nonemployee spouse's 
interest in pension rights does not limit the 
employee's freedom to change or terminate 
his employment, to modify employment 
terms, including retirement benefits or "to 
elect between alternative retirement pro-
grams.12 The employee retains 
"&In PhiUipson v. Board of Administration, 
supra, 3 Cal.3d 32, 89 Cal.Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765, 
the employee had absconded with most of the 
community assets; the trial court to equalize the 
division of community property awarded the 
spouse all of the employee's pension rights. Un-
der those special circumstances we held that 
since the employee no longer enjoyed a benefi-
cial interest in the rights, the divorce court could 
control the employee's election between alterna-
tive benefit programs. (3 Cal.3d at p. 48, 89 
Cal.Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765.) 
the right to decide, and by his decision 
define, the nature of the retirement bene-
fits owned by the community." (In re Mar-
riage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 849-
850, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 640, 544 P.2d 561, 
568.) Unlike other community property in-
terests, the nonemployee spouse's interests 
may not be devised or inherited. (Waite v. 
Waite, supra, 6 Cal.3d 461, 472 474, 99 Cal. 
Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13.) And a provision in 
the employee benefit plan granting benefits 
to an employee's "widow" will be enforced 
to exclude benefits to a spouse married 
during the employment period where the 
marriage was dissolved and the employee 
remarried. (Id. at p. 472, fn. 6, 99 Cal.Rptr. 
325, 492 P.2d 13; PhiUipson v. Board of 
Administration, supra, 3 Cal.3d 32, 42-43, 
89 Cal.Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765; Benson v. 
City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355, 
360-362, 33 Cal.Rptr. 257, 384 P.2d 649; In 
re Marriage of Peterson (1974) 41 Cal. 
App.3d 642, 650, 115 Cal.Rptr. 184.) 
These limitations on the applicability of 
community property doctrine reflect that 
pension programs not only compensate for 
past services but are also designed to induce 
persons to continue in the service of their 
employer by providing subsistence for em-
ployees and their dependents. (Waite v. 
Waite, supra, 6 Cal.3d 461, 472 473, 99 Cal. 
Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13.) When the various 
goals conflict, community interests will be 
sacrificed when necessary to protect the 
private interests of employers and employ-
ees. 
DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
Unlike retirement |>ensions, veteran's dis-
ability benefits do not constitute deferred 
compensation for past services. While lon-
gevity of service may be a factor in deter-
mining the underlying right to disability 
compensation and its amount, benefits de-
pend primarily upon physical or mental dis-
ability, compensating for loss of earning 
capacity in the open labor market. Earn-
ings following dissolution are of course sep-
arate property. The secondary pur|x>se of 
disability benefits is to com|>ensate for pain, 
suffering, disfigurement and resulting mis-
fortune—all personal rather than communi-
ty concerns. (//) re Marriage of Jones, su-
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ra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 462, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 
31 P.2d 420; 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. 
,aw (8th ed. 1974) Community Property, 
1, p. 5094.) 
Because the main bases for disability 
ompensation are loss of earning capacity 
md personal damage rather than past serv-
ces performed, disability compensation is 
malogous to a personal injury award rather 
han to a retirement benefit. In Wash-
ngton v. Washington (1956) 47 Cal.2d 249, 
(02 P.2d 569, we held that while personal 
njury awards recovered during marriage 
night be classified as community property, 
i cause of action for such injury becomes 
:he injured spouse's separate property when 
:he cause has not been reduced to judgment 
jrior to the date of divorce. Justice Tray-
lor reasoned that in "such a case not only 
Tiay the personal elements of damages such 
is past pain and suffering be reasonably 
treated as belonging to the injured party, 
but the damages for future pain and suffer-
ing, future expenses, and future loss of 
Earnings are clearly attributable to him as a 
jingle person following the divorce. More-
over, as in any other case involving future 
earnings or other after-acquired property, 
the wife's right, if any, to future support 
may be protected by an award of alimony." 
(47 Cal.2d 249, 253-254, 302 P.2d 569, 571.) 
The Legislature subsequently extended 
the Washington principle to all personal 
injury damages and settlement payments 
received after interlocutory decree of disso-
lution. (Civ. Code, § 5126.) 
For the foregoing reasons, we concluded 
in In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d 
457, 464, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 113, 531 P.2d 
420, 425, that "military disability payments 
received after dissolution of a marriage 
should . . . be classified as the sepa-
rate property of the disabled veteran." 
(See In re Marriage of Olhausen (1975) 48 
Cal.App.3d 190, 192 et seq., 121 Cal.Rptr. 
444 (police officer disability).)1 
1. The majority's formula Implicitly accepts the 
conclusion that disability benefits are separate 
property. Under the formula, had there been 
WAIVER OF RETIREMENT PENSION 
The veteran in Jones did not possess a 
vested right to a retirement pension and we 
expressly left open the question whether a 
disability pension, granted after the service-
man obtains a vested right, constitutes sep-
arate property. Nevertheless, the reason-
ing of Jones requires our conclusion that 
disability payments are separate property 
whether or not the veteran's right to a 
retirement pension has vested. 
Jones was decided when the rule existed 
that nonvested pension rights do not consti-
tute community property divisible on di-
vorce. (French v. French, supra, 17 Cal .2d 
775, 778, 112 P.2d 235.) We later overruled 
French and held that nonvested pension 
rights are divisible upon dissolution. (In re 
Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 
851, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) Re-
jecting the argument that division of non-
vested retirement pensions would infringe 
upon the employee's freedom to contract, 
we pointed out that recognition of the non-
employee spouse's interest in vested pension 
rights does not limit the employee's right to 
change or terminate employment, to modify 
employment terms including retirement 
benefits, or to elect between alternative 
retirement programs. (Id. at p. 849, 126 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 661.) 
Because our decision in Brown deter-
mined that vested and nonvested retire-
ment pensions shall be treated alike, no 
reason exists to distinguish our holding in 
Jones that disability compensation follow-
ing dissolution is separate property when a 
disabled employee possesses nonvested 
retirement rights. Disability compensation 
is obviously a legitimate separate property 
interest, whether the retirement pension is 
vested or not. And when, as here, direct 
conflict exists between that interest and the 
community interest in the retirement pen-
sion, one must bow. Resolution of the con-
flict is provided by Washington v. Wash-
ington, supra, 47 Cal.2d 249, 253-254, 302 
P.2d 569, holding disability compensation 
no retirement benefits, the former spouse of 
the disabled employee would not be entitled to 
any of the disability pension. 
IN RE MARRIAGE 
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separate property but fashioning spousal 
support to meet the needs of the nondisa-
bled spouse.2 
Such holding does not result in a depriva-
tion of the spouse's justifiable reliance on a 
retirement pension. Any such reliance 
must take into account our holding in In re 
Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 464, 
119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420, that mili-
tary disability payments received after dis-
solution of a marriage are separate proper-
ty of the disabled veteran if retirement due 
to disability occurs prior to vesting of a 
retirement pension. Thus, the spouse is on 
notice during the entire period when the 
retirement pension is assertedly earned that 
should the employee obtain dissolution and 
retire for disability, the disability payments 
will be separate. 
THE MAJORITY OPINION 
A. The Excuse to Reconsider In re Mar-
riage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 119 
Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420. 
The majority indicate that Jones was 
somehow based on the doctrine of French v. 
French, supra, 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235, 
that nonvested pension rights were mere 
expectancies and thus not subject to divi-
sion upon divorce as community property. 
(Ante, p. 13 of 148 Cal.Rptr., p. 100 of 582 
P.2d.) The majority then reason that be-
cause French was overruled in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 851, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, we should 
now repudiate Jones. 
The majority's indication that Jones was 
based on the expectancy doctrine is false. 
As shown above, the basis on Jones was 
that disability pensions are primarily com-
pensation for loss of earning capacity and 
for pain, suffering, disfigurement, and re-
sulting misfortune—all separate rather 
than community concerns after dissolution. 
Jones does not cite French or mention the 
expectancy doctrine. And there was a very 
2. Such an approach was followed by the trial 
court in Waite v. Waite, supra, 6 Cal.3d 461, 
466, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13, in dividing 
the retired judge's pension and providing for $i 
a month support. The court ordered that, in 
OF STENQUIST Cal 1 
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good reason why it was not mentioned—\ 
justices were fully aware of the Iikclih< 
that French and the expectancy doctr 
would be repudiated. I^ ess than a y< 
earlier, this court in In re Marriage of \ 
son (1974) 10 Cal.3d 851, 853, 112 Cal.Rj 
405, 406, 519 P.2d 165, 166, stated in 
second and third sentences of the opini 
"We granted a hearing upon the petition 
respondent wife, supported by an impl 
invitation from the Court of Appeal, 
ascertain the current viability of the rule 
French v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775, 1 
112 P.2d 235, [134 A.L.R. 366], that pens 
benefits which have not yet vested an 
mere expectancy and not subject to divis 
as community property. [H] Upon furti 
examination of the record it appears t 
issue is not properly before us 
All of the justices who participated 
Jones had participated in Wilson, and 
participated less than a year after Jo 
when in Brown, French was disapprov 
The right hand knew what the left lu 
was doing. In the circumstances, while 
pectancy doctrine could have furnisher 
basis to reach the result in Jones, any 
liance upon exj>ectancy doctrine of Frci 
in Jones would have been improper. Jo 
not even mentioning French or the ex pi 
ancy doctrine, it is unreasonable to sugg 
that Jones was somehow based on Frci 
or the doctrine. 
The excuse furnished by the majority 
repudiating our recent unanimous decis 
in Jones displays a remarkable lack of c 
dor. 
B. Results of Repudiation of Jones. 
However contrived the excuse given 
reconsidering a recent unanimous decisi 
however weak the reasons given for repi 
ating the decision, in the last analysis 
results following from the new rule adop 
must be weighed on their own mer 
When we weigh the majority's determi 
tion to repudiate Jones, we find that tl 
the event the retired judge accepted a trm 
rary judicial assignment thereby suspend 
pension payments, the support should be 
creased to an amount equal to the fori 
spouse's share of the pension. 
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compensate former spouses for loss of non-
vested pension rights due to termination of 
employment. The disabled are placed in a 
worse position than the healthy who termi-
nate employment. Former spouses of the 
disabled are given benefits when former 
spouses of the healthy are denied similar 
benefits. 
The disabled are also placed in a worse 
position than the healthy employee who 
continues his employment. There is no lia-
bility to former spouses because there are 
no retirement benefits. The employee may 
continue to work until he dies in which 
event there may never be retirement pen-
sion payments. On the other hand, the 
employee who retires for disability under 
today's majority decision immediately must 
pay part of the disability pension to the 
former spouse. The former spouse of the 
disabled employee is entitled to benefits 
upon payment of the disability pension, 
when had the employee remained healthy 
the former spouse might not have been 
entitled to any benefits and at most could 
only receive delayed benefits.3 
Both federal and state law prohibit dis-
crimination against the handicapped in em-
ployment. (See, e. g., 29 U.S.C. § 793; Lab. 
Code, §§ 1430, 1735.) Today, the majority 
not only permit but require discrimination 
against the disabled who are compensated 
for their liability to compete in the labor 
market—discrimination essentially against 
the unemployed handicapped. I cannot join 
in the majority's discrimination; I cannot 
share their lack of compassion. 
Primarily, there are three situations 
where there is a clear difference in the 
practical effects of the majority's determi-
nation to give the former spouse an interest 
in the disability pension and my approach to 
hold that the pension is separate property 
with spousal support available to meet the 
needs of the formal spouse. The three situ-
ations involve justification to deny or se-
verely limit spousal support. The disability 
pension and other economic resources avail-
tablished an invidious discrimination 
n disabled employees and healthy 
ees who terminate employment 
here is a dissolution. 
pproving Jones, the majority purport 
r upon In re Marriage of Brown, 
15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 
>1. Both Jones and Brown dealt with 
ees who had non vested retirement 
I rights. Brown was concerned with 
ees generally without focusing on 
vho were disabled. Brown held that 
ited retirement pensions would be 
mity property like vested ones, 
rer, recognizing that nonvested pen-
ghts might be destroyed by death or 
lation of employment before vesting, 
>urt held that the uncertainties war-
efusal to divide present value of the 
n and instead awarding a portion of 
>ension payment as it comes due. (In 
rriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 
26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) This 
carefully pointed out that judicial rec-
an of the nonemployee spouse's inter-
pension rights does not "limit" the 
yee's freedom to change or terminate 
yment. "The employee retains the 
to decide, and by his decision, the 
* of the retirement benefits owned by 
>mmunity." (Id. at pp. 849-850, 126 
rtr. at p. 640, 544 P.2d at p. 568.) 
mort under Brown when the healthy 
yee having only nonvested retirement 
terminates his employment—perhaps 
lore lucrative employment—the non-
\ pension rights are lost with the em-
e owing no obligation to compensate a 
»r spouse for the loss of the nonvested 
m rights. Under Jones, a comparable 
was reached—the disabled employee 
g nonvested retirement rights who 
nated employment and received a dis-
y pension was not required to compen-
Lhe former spouse for loss of the non-
d pension rights. 
disapproving Jones, the majority sin-
jt the handicapped and compel them to 
le majority in footnote 10 suggest that the 
per comparison is between healthy employ-
who receive pension payments and the dis-
»d The comparison is not in point because 
no payments are made under nonvested pen-
sions The pension must be vested before 
there are payments 
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able to the disabled employee may be insuf-
ficient to meet his needs, warranting denial 
of spousal support. The former spouse may 
have sufficient economic resources so that 
little or no support is required. The former 
spouse may remarry terminating spousal 
support (Civ. Code, § 4801.)4 In all three 
situations the balance of equities falls in 
favor of the disabled employee. 
C. The Majority's Settled Principle. 
Relying upon Waite v. Waite, supra, 6 
Cal.3d 461, 472, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 
13, and In re Marriage of Peterson, supra, 
41 Cal.App3d 642, 650-651, 115 Cal.Rptr. 
184, the majority proclaim the "settled prin-
ciple that one spouse cannot, by invoking a 
condition wholly within his control, defeat 
the community interest of the other 
spouse." (Ante, p. 13 of 148 Cal.Rptr., p. 
100 of 582 P.2d.) 
However, the cases cited do not stand for 
the so-called "settled principle," but hold 
only that the possibility the employee may 
elect to forego an otherwise vested pension 
does not unvest that pension. (Waite and 
Peterson were decided prior to this court's 
decision in Brown holding that nonvested 
pensions are community property subject to 
division upon dissolution.) 
Moreover, the so-called "settled principle" 
is contrary to Brown because, as we have 
seen, the employee is free to change or 
4. Death of the obligor ordinarily terminates 
spousal support (Civ Code, § 4801), but em 
ployee pension payments ordinarily terminate 
on death of the employee As pointed out 
earlier, surviving spouse benefits are paid only 
to surviving spouses, not former spouses who 
may have been married to the employee during 
the period of employment 
5. In re Marriage of Cavnar (1976) 62 Cal 
App 3d 660, 133 Cal Rptr 267, is distinguisha-
ble on its own terms In that case, the hus-
band, after obtaining retirement payments at 
the age of 59, converted his retirement benefit 
plan to a disability retirement plan, receiving 
increased benefits The court held that the 
portion of the disability benefits which could 
have been received as retirement benefits was 
a community asset The court pointed out that 
In re Marriage of Jones, supia, 13 Cal 3d at p 
462, 119 Cal Rptr 108, 531 P 2d 420, and 7n re 
Marriage of Olhausen, supra, 48 Cal App 3d at 
pp 193-194, 121 Cal Rptr. 444, holding disabili-
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terminate employment, modify retirement 
terms, or elect between alternative retire-
ment programs. (In re Marriage of Brow n, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 849-850, 126 Cal Rptr. 
633, 544 P.2d 561.) Dissolution of the mar-
riage does not require an employee to retire 
at the earliest possible age; rather he may 
forego retirement and continue working in 
which case there are no retirement pay-
ments to divide and the earnings after dis-
solution will be the employee's separate 
property or community property of any new 
marriage.5 
I would reverse the judgment. 
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Heirs of an estate brought suit against 
a bank for damages allegedly occasioned 
ty pay was separate property were based on 
the characterization of disability benefits "as 
compensation for personal anguish and dimin 
ished earning capacity " The court then went 
on to reason that, because the husband had 
already retired before electing disability pay, 
that pay could not be characterised as tompen 
sation for diminished earning capacity or for 
inability to compete in the labor market It 
was concluded that only part of the disability 
pay could be properly allocated to disability 
(62 Cal App 3d at p 665, 133 Cal Rptr 267 at 
270) 
By way of contrast, in the instant case the 
husband commenced receiving disability pav at 
the age of 43, he did not receive retirement pa\ , 
and it is clear that his disability pay is compen 
sation for the diminished ability of a one armed 
man to compete In the labor market 
I would disapprove In re Marriage of Mueller 
(1977) 70 Cal App 3d 66, 137 Cal Rptr 129 
